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1. Introduction 
We live in a creative, and therefore a critical, time. On what we are doing depends 
the future of the Empire, and it is only by free intercourse between our statesmen 
here and those of the dominions beyond the seas that we can hope to maintain and 
strengthen the bonds of unity. I feel sure that the time for small kingdoms has passed 
away. The future is with the great Empires, and it rests with us to say whether our 
own shall be counted for many ages to come as one of the greatest or whether we 
shall split up into minor and comparatively unimportant nationalities. I 
Joseph Chamberlain, 1902 
In the final quarter of the nineteenth century a wave of British nationalism swept 
Great Britain and her self-governing colonies, binding them together with a vision of 
an Empire united as one. Institutions, especially the Royal Colonial Institute (founded 
in 1868) and the Imperial Federation League (1884), and writers, such as John Seeley, 
Charles Dilke and James Froude, actively promoted the unity of the British race. 
Benjamin Disraeli's Crystal Palace speech ofJune 1872 gave the movement early 
official voice and Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary from 1895 to 1902, its 
fullest expression in policy. In 1876, Queen Victoria emerged from 15 years of 
mourning to be styled Empress ofindia and was embraced as figurehead; General 
Gordon, massacred at Khartoum in 1885, became the movement's martyr. Britannia, 
premiering in London musical halls in the wake of that famous death, reassured its 
audiences with the refrain, 'There's little fear for England! With brave Colonial sons/ 
Ready at the hour of need! With money, men and gunS.,2 In seeming response, the 
Colonial Defence Committee began coordinating defence policies around the Empire 
in that same year. Two years later, during the 1887 Jubilee, representatives from the 
self-governing colonies gathered for the first colonial conference ever held. The 
phenomenon moved Seeley to announce, in the early 1880s, the birth of 'a new state, 
I Letter, J. Chamberlain to G. Reid, J3 June 1902, BUL, Joseph Chamberlain Papers, JCI4/1/1/52. 
2 P. Surmnerfield, 'Patriotism and Empire: Music-Hall Entertainment 1870-1914' in Imperialism and 
Popular Culture, ed. J. Mackenzie, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1986, 28. 
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English in race and character,' comprising Britain, Canada, parts of South Africa, and 
the Australasian colonies. He named that state 'Greater Britain.' 3 
This late-Victorian imperialism was a new development. Earlier in the century it had 
been widely held that the self-governing colonies would eventually go the way of the 
United States of America and separate from the mother country. The British 
willingness to grant self-government to the Australian colonies at mid-century and the 
1867 Canadian Confederation seemed to justify such a view. Disraeli himself had 
been a separatist, grumbling as late as 1866, 'what is the use of these colonial dead 
weights which we do not govem?,4 Riding the wave of their industrial supremacy, 
the British people were more inclined to trade than rule, and with the 1865 Colonial 
Laws Validity Act, and the withdrawal of most British army garrisons from Australia 
and Canada by 1871, their government appeared to be phasing out its involvement 
with the colonies. 
There are some historians who challenge this orthodox position. Taking their lead 
from Robinson and Gallagher, economic historians who question the laissez faire 
understanding of the Empire of the early nineteenth century, they stress the continuity 
of British interest in the Empire.s Yet even these revisionists will generally concede 
that something of the character of British imperialism changed after 1870. Hyam and 
Martin, for example, admit to a 'more strident, more pompous and circumstantial' 
3 J. Seeley, The Expansion a/England, ed John Gross, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1971, 14 
& 17. Seeley borrowed 'Greater Britain' from the title of Sir Charles Dilke's 1868 account of his 
travels in the colonies. 
4 H. Browne, Joseph Chamberlain, Radical and Imperialist, Longman, Essex, 1974, 19. 
, P. Kennedy, 'Continuity and Discontinuity in British imperialism 1815-1914' in British Imperialism 
in the Nineteenth Century, ed. C. Eldridge, Macmillan, London, 1984,38. 
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devotion to the Empire by 1900.6 Porter is more reluctant, accepting a change, but 
contending that its extent has been exaggerated and challenging the popular appeal of 
imperialism in the late nineteenth century.7 
A clear definition oflate-Victorian imperialism can help resolve some of the problems 
posed by the revisionists. As Darwin demonstrates, the nineteenth century British 
Empire was no simple, monolithic structure but a 'tripartite world system' consisting 
of the self-governing colonies, the dependent empire, and a large informal empire.s 
The British people interacted with these separate empires in quite different ways and 
lumping these relationships altogether into a single 'imperialism' generates a 
confusing picture. Additional complication arises from the baggage attached to the 
word 'imperialism': in the mid-nineteenth century Britons themselves negatively 
associated it with authoritarian government and only towards the end ofthe nineteenth 
century did they comfortably begin to use it to describe their relationship with the 
self-governing colonies.9 We will use imperialism in the same limited way: to only 
describe the relationship between Britain and the self-governing colonies (Seeley's 
Greater Britain: New Zealand, Canada and the Australian and south African colonies). 
The exceptional features of this relationship - one of deep cultural and sentimental 
attachment, and not just power, politics and economics - justifY the narrowness of the 
definition. It was in fact a nationalist relationship: to borrow Cobban's colourful 
6 R. Hyam and G. Martin, Reappraisals in British Imperial History, Macmillan, London, 1975, 117. 
7 B. Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire. Society. and Culture in Britain, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2004, 18, 194. 
8 J. Darwin, 'A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics' in The Oxford History 
of the British Empire, Volume 4, ed. J. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1999,65. 
9 A. Thompson, Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics c. 1880-1932, Pearson Education, 
Essex, 2000, 15; G. Young, Victorian England: Portrait of an Age, 2'd ed., Oxford University Press, 
London, 1953, 176. 
3 
description, 'raj kind of bastard imperialism which is merely nationalism writ large;,10 
others use 'pan-British nationalism,' II or 'Britannic nationalism.' 12 The special 
nature ofthis imperialism was recognized even at the time; Lord Rosebery, speaking 
in May 1899, declared, 'I mean the greater pride in the Empire which is called 
Imperialism. Sane Imperialism, as distinguished from what I might call wild cat 
Imperialism, is nothing but this, a larger patriotism.' 13 Late-Victorian imperialism 
can in this sense be understood within the broad context of the great flowering of 
nationalism around the world in the period 1880 to 1914. 14 
'Nationalism' presents an additional problem of definition. It has its own spell, 
posing as a natural and inevitable force, in existence throughout history and driving 
all peoples towards self-determination and independence. However, as Hobsbawm 
demonstrates, nationalism is an historical phenomenon, consisting of 'invented 
traditions', and its appearance demands full explanation - it is not sufficient to merely 
point to the awareness of local interests and expect nationalism's 'inevitability' to fill 
out the argument. ls This is a common trap for scholars who neglect to define 
nationalism, owing to the debasement of the term in the vernacular: a popular 
confusion of 'nations' and 'states' has diluted to 'nationalism' to the point where it is 
often used simply to mean loyalty to a state. 16 This usage was widespread even in the 
10 A. Cobban, 'The Idea of Empire', in Ideas and Beliefs of the Victorians: an historic revaluation of 
the Victorian Age, ed. N. Annan, Sylvan Press, London, 1949,329. 
II A. Thompson, 'Thinking Imperially? Imperial Pressure Groups and the Idea of Empire in Late-
Victorian and Edwardian Britain', DPhil Thesis, Corpus Christi College, Oxford, 1994,229. 
12 D. Cole, "The Problem of "Nationalism" and ulmperialism" in British Settlement Colonies', Journal 
of British Studies, 10, 1971, 174. 
13 quoted in G. Kitson Clark, An Expanding Society: Britain 1830-1900, Melbourne University Press, 
Melbourne, 1967,70. 
14 E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire: 1875-1914, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1987, 142. 
" E. Hobsbawm, 'The Nation as Invented Tradition', in Nationalism, eds J. Hutchinson and A. Smith, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, 76. 
16 W. Connor, . A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Etlmic Group, is an ... ', in Nationalism, eds J. 
Hutchinson and A. Smith, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994,38-40. 
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nineteenth century. For example, in discussions in New South Wales on the subject 
of that colony's participation in the Australian federation movement, the Premier, 
George Reid, was challenged as to what he meant by 'national.' He responded: 
There is no reason why the Australian nation so constituted shall not subsist in 
perpetual harmony and alliance as a part of the British Empire ... the tendency of 
humanity is strikingly in that direction. 17 
Edward Hutton used the term 'nation' in a similarly fluid way, often referring to 
Australia and Canada as young nations, but meaning young British nations. A nation 
is more than a state; it is a group of people who believe themselves to be culturally 
and ethnically distinct. Loyalty to a nation ~ nationalism ~ is more than mere 
provincialism; it is a consciousness of a unique identity and, as Kohn argues, a desire 
to forge a nation-state that will embody that belief. 18 
With the growth of the idea of Greater Britain in the late nineteenth century, it was to 
this British nation that the populations of Britain and of the self-governing colonies 
felt culturally and ethnically attached, while still remaining conscious of their local 
autonomy and jealous of their local interests. What factors underlay this shift in 
identity? 
Ironically, the granting of colonial self-government and the withdrawal of the 
garrisons were themselves partly responsible for the renewed British interest in the 
self-governing colonies from mid-century; as Northrop Frye puts it, 'nobody has 
much use for a colony, apparently, or at least for the human part of it.' 19 The reduced 
17 NSW Parliamentary Debates, 1895 Session, Volume 80, 30 October 1895, 2177. 
"H. Kobn, 'Western and Eastern Nationalisms', in Nationalism, 162. 
19 N. Frye, Divisions on a Ground: Essays on Canadian Culture, ed. J. Polk, Anansi, Toronto, 1982, 
44. 
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cost to the British exchequer made it possible for the Empire to now be conceived as 
an asset (both financial and defensive) rather than a burden?O In a similar way, the 
people of those colonies, 'the human part', were no longer dependent subjects and 
could now be considered fellow members of a common imperial nation. 
To understand why late-Victorian imperialism developed in Britain it is necessary to 
contend with both this 'human part' and with the economic and security interests 
involved: with sentiment and self-interest. Politicians of the day recognised this; 
when Lord Salisbury opened the 1887 Colonial Conference he endorsed the 
colonialists' wisdom in approaching the negotiations on grounds other than mere 
affection, on the 'solid and reasonable foundations of self-interest and security.'21 
Ten years later, Joseph Chamberlain made the same point when opening that year's 
Colonial Conference: 
Strong as is the bond of sentiment, and impossible as it would be to establish 
any kind of relations unless that bond of sentiment existed, I believe we all feel 
that it would be desirable to take advantage of it, and to still further tighten the 
ties which bind us together. .. 
I have said that I believe in sentiment as the greatest of all the forces in the 
general government ofthe world, but, at the same time, I should like to bring to 
the reinforcement of sentiment the motives which are derived from material and 
personal interest.22 
20 D. Morton, A Military History of Canada, Hurtig Publishers, Edmonton, 1990, 107-8. 
21 R. Shields, 'Australian Opinion and Defence of the Empire', Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, 10, 1964,47. 
22 Right Hon. Joseph Chamberlain's Speech at the First Meeting of the Colonial Conference of 1897 in 
Selected Speeches and Documents on British Colonial Policy 1763-1917, Vol. 2, ed. A. Keith, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1918, 2 IO and 223. 
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Seeley himself defined Greater Britain as constituting a 'community of race, 
community of religion, [and a] community of interest.' 23 
As a community of sentiment, Seeley's Greater Britain responded to the emotional 
dislocation caused by the great social changes of the late nineteenth century. 
Anderson argues that nationalism first appeared in Europe only in the late eighteenth 
century with the fragmentation of traditional communities by industrialisation and 
urbanisation.24 These twin processes continued relentlessly through the course of the 
nineteenth century, severing ties and undermining old social structures. By 1900 
seventy percent of the British population lived in towns and cities.25 At the same time, 
the great expansion of the British franchise (the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 
quadrupled the electorate) necessitated a new basis of cohesion. The 1885 parliament 
was the first in which landowners were outnumbered - how were these new classes of 
citizens to be incorporated into the British political community? 
Greater Britain answered to this need for a new community and in doing so it drew 
from the rich vein of British Romanticism, from the poetry of Coleridge and the 
histories of Carlyle. As Kitson Clark describes it, 'what happened in politics was 
connected undeniably if mysteriously with the romantic movement in literature. ,26 
This influence is apparent in the rhetoric oflate-Victorian imperialism: Garnet 
Wolseley, for example, the late-Victorian army's chief reformer and popular hero, 
derided cosmopolitan hopes for perpetual peace as base materialism and proffered the 
Romantic argument, 'I cannot help thinking that it would deprive life of some of its 
23 Seeley, The Expansion of England, 15. 
24 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins of Nationalism, Verso, London, 
1983,4 
25 Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists, 170. 
26 G. Kitson Clark, The Making of Victorian England, Methuen and Co, London, 1962,34. 
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finest poetry, the poetry of nationality, and of an intense and ardent love of country.' 27 
It is also apparent in the racial language oflate-Victorian imperialism. The idea of an 
Anglo-Saxon racial community blossomed in the period, having derived pseudo-
scientific credibility from scientific discoveries and from social Darwinism.28 
Science assisted the development of late-Victorian imperialism in other ways. The 
introduction of rotary presses in the 1850s caused an explosion in publishing that 
facilitated the communication of the new imperial ideas to an increasingly literate 
society (in 1869 the National Education League, founded in Birmingham, began 
lobbying for universal, non-denominational schooling). The steamship and the 
telegraph were revolutionary: with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the 
completion of the Atlantic (1866) and Australian (1872) cables, Britain seemed closer 
than ever to the colonies. These triumphs of the Rational age allowed late-Victorians 
to view their Empire in new, and sometimes hopeful, ways. 
Finally, Seeley's 'community of interest' is tremendously important in explaining the 
development oflate-Victorian imperialism in Britain. There is a consensus among 
historians that a principal cause of the imperial shift was a feeling of insecurity in the 
face of increasing commercial and military international competition after 1860.29 
The unification of Germany and Italy; economic rivalry with the booming populations 
of the United States and Germany; and military threats from the mass, national armies 
27 Wolseley address to the Harborne and Edgbaston Institute at Binningham, 25 Jannary 1889 (Joseph 
Chamberlain in the Chair), quoted in the Times (London), 26 January 1889, 12. 
28 R. Huttenback, Racism and Empire: White Settlers and Colored Immigrants in the British Self-
Governing Colonies 1830-19/0, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1976, 15. 
29 P. Knaplund, 'Intra-Imperial Aspects of Britain's Defence Question, 1870-1900', Canadian 
Historical Review, June 1922, 126; H. Strachan, The Politics oJthe British Army, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1997,41; A. Thompson, Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics c. 1880-1932, 
Pearson Education, Essex, 2000, 23. 
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of France, Germany, and Russia all combined to challenge British power in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century. Insecurity caused the British people to look to their 
Empire for moral and material support. Late-Victorian imperialism gained a 
bipartisan consensus in the 1880s when key Liberal politicians and intellectuals joined 
the imperial cause, their confidence in perpetual free trade shaken by the trade 
depressions of 1868 and 1876.30 As Thompson puts it, 'it [the Empire] offered a way 
of preserving and protecting British power when the foundations of that power looked 
. ,31 
ever more Insecure. 
Kitson Clark identifies the two 'formidable legacies' of the nineteenth century in the 
idea of nationalism and the modern, omnipresent state.32 It was this combination of 
the Romantic and the Rational that defined the late-Victorian age. It was a period of 
both hope and fear, a time when science and the successes of Rationalism seemed to 
promise a limitless future, but also a time when fierce competition and rapid change 
created confusion and doubt.33 The development in Britain ofthe idea of Greater 
Britain was the result of the Romantic pull of sentiment and of the push of interests, 
economic and military, generated by the Rational development of the nation-state. 
All of these changes touched the self-governing colonies as well. The idea of Greater 
Britain was as seductive to them as to the British; for example, Empire Day was 
celebrated in Canada from the 1890s and in Australia from 1905, both well before its 
adoption in Britain itself. According to Page, nothing moved Canadians in this 
,. P. Burroughs, 'John Robert Seeley and British Imperial History', The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 1, 1973, 205, H. Browne, Joseph Chamberlain, Radical and Imperialist, 
Longman, Essex, 1974,55. 
" Thompson, 'Thinking Imperially?', 25. 
32 Kitson Clark, An Expanding Society, 126. 
33 P. Crook, Darwinism, war and history: The debate over the biology of war from the 'Origin of 
Species'to the First World War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994,63. 
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period so powerfully as the Empire.34 The response of these self-governing colonies 
to late-Victorian imperialism, a force that exerted a profound influence on their 
developing national identities, has not, however, received sufficient scholarly 
attention.35 
In a way this is understandable - it is a complex problem and historians have tended 
to approach it in pieces. The entire relationship, between the idea of Greater Britain, 
Britain itself and the self-governing colonies, contains elements that are not easily 
reconciled. Greater Britain as a 'community of interest' is itself easily approached: 
facing military and financial challenges from many quarters the British goven3ffient at 
times sought military guarantees and reciprocal tariffs from the colonies, those 
colonies balanced these requests against their own security and economic interests. 
Colonial responses to proposals to politically federate the Empire can be similarly 
treated; MacLean, for example, gives a detailed account of Canada and the Imperial 
Federation League. But how does one combine that problem with colonial responses 
to Seeley's communities of race and religion (or, to use Meaney's umbrella term, the 
'community of culture,)?36 This was a side of Greater Britain to which the self-
governing colonies responded far more whole-heartedly, perhaps even more strongly 
than the British themselves.37 In his conclusion, 'the imperial federation movement in 
Canada was largely nationalist. Its supporters were motivated by a variety of 
interests, but most of them may be related directly to Canadian national interests,' 
MacLean does demonstrate Canada's distinct' community of interest' - but such a 
34 R. Page, 'Canada and the Imperial Idea in the Boer War Years', Journal of Canadian Studies, 5, 
1970,33. 
35 N. Meaney, 'Britishness and Australia: Some Reflections', The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 31, 2003, 123. 
36 N. Meaney, 'The Problem of Nationalism in Australian History and Historiography', Australian 
Historical Studies, 116,2001,85. 
37 Meaney, 'Britishness and Australia', 121. 
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narrow answer ignores the harder problem of the Canadian response to the 
'community of culture' represented by Greater Britain.38 McLean himself quotes 
Canadian P.M. John Thompson indicating that business is business, and it does not 
reflect upon loyalty to the Empire: 
When we are to consider questions relating to the promotion oftrade between 
the different colonies, trade with the Mother Country, the facilities of 
communication throughout the different portions of the Empire, we realize that 
while there is ample room for patriotism and loyalty, methods of business have 
to be followed. 39 
Can one describe the Canadian response as 'largely nationalist' if that 'nationalism' 
was just based on the protection of Canadian interests? 
A study of Lieutenant-General Edward Hutton's colonial career offers valuable 
insights into this problem: in his various postings Hutton brought British hopes for the 
development of Greater Britain; he encountered colonial reservations (based on the 
protection oflocal interests) and enthusiasm (based on a sense of shared identity); and 
in constructing his plans for colonial contributions to imperial defence he 
endeavoured to reconcile those responses. In his attempts to implement those plans 
the difficulty of the task is apparent and, as a result, important features of colonial 
identity are revealed. The career of one British army officer cannot pretend to offer 
an exhaustive account oflate-Victorian imperialism. It can, however, demonstrate 
key aspects of the relationships between Greater Britain, Britain, and the self-
governing colonies. 
38 G. MacLean, 'The Imperial Federation Movement in Canada, 1884-1902', PhD thesis, Duke 
University, 1958,3\3. 
39 J. Thompson at the Ottawa Conference 1894, in MacLean, Imperial Federation Movement, 123. 
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The British anny played a central role in the development oflate-Victorian 
imperialism. Following the Gennan model, the two generally accepted paths to 
greater imperial unity were a kriegsverein (military union) or a zollverein (customs 
union). The idea of an imperial customs union was tremendously important but it was 
a debate dominated by hard-headed calculations of economic self-interest and the 
ideological divisions between free traders and protectionists. Defence, as Burroughs 
notes, was the most potent empire unifying issue of the day.4o In fact the whole 
imperial movement had a decidedly militarist tone. Of the two military anns, the 
Royal Navy was the more decisive factor in imperial defence and colonial 
contribution to the navy was a central issue; however, this tended to boil down to 
financial contribution, questions of control and guarantees of security.41 In studying 
Greater Britain the anny is, in many respects, a more interesting subject because it 
better represents the community of culture at work. The colonies sent men, not 
money, to the Sudan and to South Africa. The departures of those contingents and 
the campaigns they fought aroused a passion and an excitement that an Australian 
contribution to the Admiralty coffers, for instance, could not. Colonial contributions 
to the British anny demonstrate the interaction of those separate communities of 
culture and interest. As Hutton himself wrote, throughout history mutual defence has 
bound 'individuals as well as nations together by ties at once of mutual sentiment, 
sympathy, and self-interest. ,42 
40 P. Burroughs, 'Imperial Defence and the Victorian Army', The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 15, 1986,63 and P. Bwroughs, 'The Mid-Victorian Navy and Imperial 
Defence', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 30, 2002, lB . 
• , The one notable exception of the period being the naval contingent Australia sent to China during the 
Boxer Rebellion. Even this was overshadowed a 'hundred-fold' by the contingents leaving at the same 
time for the South African war. [R Wilde, 'The Boxer Affair and Australian Responsibility for 
Imperial Defence', Pacific Historical Review, 26, 1957, 57]. 
.2 E. Hutton, 'The Bond of Military Unity' in The Empire and the Century, John Murray, London, 
1905,227. 
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Among British anny officers of his day, Hutton was one ofthe most experienced in 
commanding colonial forces. He served in Canada and Australia at critical moments 
for Greater Britain: he commanded the Canadian militia during the initial stages of the 
Second South African War (the Boer War), arguably the high-point oflate-Victorian 
imperial sentiment and a moment that split the Canadian population and the Canadian 
cabinet on the question of whether to send a contingent; he led a combined colonial 
mounted force on campaign in that war; and he commanded military forces in 
Australia in the lead up to, and immediately following, Australian federation, a time 
of vital importance for Australian identity formation and for its relationship with the 
Empire. 
In those positions he conceived of himself as being much more than a mere 
commander: 
Humble individual though I was, some inner voice seemed to force me into 
undertaking the mission of showing that military service is the main factor for 
training democratic communities in their primary duties of citizenship. It was a 
new role for a soldier to undertake.43 
Hutton considered the problems of the Empire, admired its luminaries (such as Seeley 
and Chamberlain), and constructed his own schemes for imperial defence in the light 
of the new imperialism. He was forceful in attempting to introduce these ideas to the 
colonies. A close friend of his once warned him off attempting to be a 'big man': 
Do stick to your own business, the anny, and leave great national questions to 
the people it concerns. Let us reform the anny by all means, but let it be their 
doing and not ours, and let us efface ourselves and our part in it, as far as 
43 E. Hutton, 'Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hutton', Chapter 13 (First Typed Draft), 16, 
BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50113 [Hutton'S emphasis]. 
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possible: All this public speaking and preparing the public mind for changes is 
not our business and is absolutely ruinous to the cause.44 
It is fortunate for the historian that Hutton ignored this good advice. Hutton's fiery 
public speaking, his provocative use of the press, and his heated conflicts with 
colonial politicians all throw a great deal oflight on the issues oflate-Victorian 
imperialism. 
One of the concerns ofthis thesis will be to test the colonial response to Hutton and 
his attempts at reforming the military forces of Australia and Canada. The account of 
that response is, by necessity, limited to the spheres in which he moved and it goes 
beyond the scope of the thesis to conduct a thorough survey of colonial opinion for 
each stage of his career. Melhuish warns that the British understanding of colonial 
opinion was distorted by the fact that the people who gauged that opinion tended to 
have contact only with the colonial upper classes, or with colonists who had returned 
to Britain.45 McLean concludes his dissertation by arguing that the sentiment behind 
the Imperial Federation movement was never a popular one - it was limited to those 
born or educated in Britain, to members of the United Empire Loyalists, and the Loyal 
Orange Order, and the like.46 Berger agrees that sections of the Canadian public, 
particularly farmers and the labour movement, opposed the Imperial Federationists.47 
Porter's study of imperialism in Britain concludes, in a similar fashion, that it was 
largely an upper class affair of only marginal interest to the working class.48 All of 
44 Letter, Kitson to Hutton, 6 December 1901, BL, Hutton Papers, 187. 
45 K. Melhuish, Australia & British Imperial Policy: Colonial Autonomy and the Imperial Idea, 1865-
1902, PhD thesis, University of Sydney, 1965,64. 
46 MacLean, 'Imperial Federation', 394. 
47 C. Berger, 'Imperialism and Nationalism: 1884-1914' in Readings in Canadian History Post-
Confederation, ed. R. Francis and D. Smith, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Canada, 1982,95. 
48 B. Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2004, 39 and 208. 
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these arguments are summarised by Trainor, in his call for the study of imperialism 
not simply as an inter-nation issue but also in terms of its relative influence on 
different segments within societies: different classes, genders, ethnic groups, and so 
forth 49 
It is useful to recognise that different sectors of society may have responded in 
different ways to late-Victorian imperialism; indeed in Canada, with its population 
split between French and English speakers, it is vital. But this does not negate the 
value of searching for positions of consensus, for a dominant culture. Britain and the 
self-governing colonies could not escape the age of nationalism and historians should 
not ignore the task of defining how the dominant portion of those communities 
conceived the nation. Indeed Trainor himself is not above such generalities -
describing, by the end of the 1880s, an 'anti-imperial response' and the 'the 
emergence of Australian nationalism' - indicating that his fragmentation of colonial 
opinion may simply amount to a desire to find 'true believers' to carry the torch of 
Australian nationalism through dark days. 50 
Hutton's career in the colonies offers a useful way of searching for such positions of 
consensus. He certainly belonged to the kind of elite circles McLean describes; but 
nevertheless, in his political and his public roles, he did engage with representative 
samples of the colonial populations. Primarily a political actor in these positions, he 
dealt extensively with colonial governments that had been elected by universal 
manhood franchise and were therefore generally representative of colonial opinion. 
Hutton continually tested the limits of his authority, he was a difficult general, and 
49 L. Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, conflict and compromise 
in the late nineteenth century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994,4. 
so Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism, 66. 
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each of his clashes with the local political reality throws light on what the colonial 
public would allow. Hutton conceived of his role in the colonies more widely than 
most commandants: he sought to educate, inform, and engage with the general public. 
In each colony he travelled the breadth of his command. He hosted public events-
tattoos, tournaments and the like - and spoke publicly wherever he could find an 
audience. These attempts to reach the colonial publics directly, and the reactions of 
his audiences, reveal additional insights into colonial opinion. 
No secondary authority treats Hutton's career in its entirety. His life before the 
colonial appointments has been hardly touched (Badsey's detailed account of the 
mounted infantry movement being the notable exception).51 Hutton's career in the 
colonies has received more attention but in piecemeal fashion; no source takes the 
wide view of Hutton's colonial career necessary to fully establish his overall approach 
to the role of the colonies in imperial defence. Existing scholarship has merely 
looked at Hutton in particular roles, either in Australia or in Canada. 
Mordike, Trainor and Preston all study Hutton from a radical nationalist perspective 
(Berger critiques this type of history in Canada history using the term 'liberal 
nationalist'): they construct stories of gradual but inexorable national development, 
from a subservient colonial status to free and independent nation-hoodY Hutton 
figures in these accounts as a soldier obsessed with the (metropolitan focussed) 
imperial ambition of seeking colonial defence commitments in service to the British 
Empire. They contend that Hutton acted on imperial plans worked out in Britain and 
51 S. Badsey, 'Fire and Sword: The British Army and the Arme Blanche Controversy 1871-1921', 
DPhii Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1981,91-100. 
" C. Berger, 'Introduction', in Imperial Relations in the Age of Laurier, ed. C. Berger, University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1969, viii. 
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without any real reference to local conditions, beyond the Machiavellian use oflocal 
fears and interests to conceal those ambitions. They define colonial opposition to 
those plans as evidence of local nationalism. Taking a different line, Penlington, 
Norris and Meaney agree that Hutton did have an imperial motive, but they argue that 
his ambitions in the colony were not restricted to this. They describe a variety of 
objectives, including a professional interest in the local defence of the colonies, and 
they allow for causes for the colonial response other than a simple local nationalism. 
The British government, according to Johnson, planted a 'Trojan horse' in New South 
Wales when they recommended Hutton for the post of commandant, his first colonial 
command. 53 This is a popular argument, made most completely by Mordike and 
Trainor. These two historians give short shrift to the basic military reforms Hutton 
initiated in the colony, preferring to concentrate on his imperial agenda, as Mordike 
puts it: 
Undoubtedly, his achievements had been considerable, but in introducing his 
various organisations and reforms and in developing his proposals for federal 
defence, he had kept imperial requirements firmly in mind. The issue oflocal 
defence and its unique requirements had not been addressed seriously. 54 
Trainor agrees; to him, Hutton was simply 'an over-eager imperialist.' 55 Trainor 
places Hutton within the context oflate-Victorian imperial defence policy, 
highlighting the 1888 naval agreement and the Bevan Edwards report of 1889.56 He 
contends that the British authorities from the late 1890s looked to the colonies for a 
53 D. Jolmson, Volunteers at Heart: The Queensland Defence Forces, 1860-1901, University of 
Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1975, 183. 
54 J. Mordike, An Army for a Nation: A history of Australian military developments 1880-1914, Allen 
and Unwin, Sydney, 1992,43. 
55 Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism, 103. 
5. L. Trainor, 'British Imperial Defence Policy and the Australian Colonies, 1892-96', Historical 
Studies, 14, 1970,206 & 208. 
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cheaper means of ensuring the Empire's defence.57 Mordike points to a widespread 
belief that the colonies would grow faster than Britain, both financially and 
demographically, and that their military and material assistance was therefore deemed 
vital for her future. 58 Trainor and Mordike concur that these British authorities 
wished to federalise Australia's military forces so that they could be more easily 
tapped during times of crisis.59 Their argument can be briefly summarised: Hutton 
was briefed before his departure from London by British imperialists (Conservative 
M.P., Howard Vincent, and the Permanent Undersecretary for the Colonies, Robert 
Meade); in those meetings he was instructed in general terms to achieve a federal 
defence arrangement and to promote the Empire; and on arrival in Australia he single-
mindedly set out to achieve those ends.6o 
This portrait of Hutton establishes a potent, British imperial figure - an ideologue -
against which the budding elements of a new Australian nationalism can be seen to 
clash. Mordike, for instance, concludes from this episode, 'nationalism and the 
realities of colonial self-government conspired to frustrate British attempts to guide 
and influence colonial military developments.'61 Trainor describes a 'clash of 
imperialism and nationalism' and suggests that Hutton was forced to keep his agenda 
secret for fear of rubbing, 'the raw nerve of Australian nationalism.'62 Hutton's 
agenda, however, seems to be all these historians have to offer in the way of evidence 
for such a nationalism. They find little concrete evidence amongst sentiments 
expressed by the colonists themselves, and content themselves with a few awkward 
57 Trainor, 'British Imperial Defence Policy', 204. 
58 Mordike, Army Jar a Nation, 8. 
5. Trainor, 'British Imperial Defence Policy', 208; Mordike, Army Jar a Nation, II. 
60 Trainor, 'British Imperial Defence Policy', 210; Monlike, Army Jar a Nah'on, 23 & 43. 
61 Mordike, Army Jar a Nation, 43. 
62 Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism. 104; Trainor, 'British Imperial Defence 
Policy', 212. 
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examples. Mordike, for instance, asserts that Premier Dibbs's reductions in the 
military budget demonstrate suspicion of Hutton' s deeper motives, despite the far 
more obvious cause of economic depression.63 He also claims that 'the fundamental 
issue which divided Dibbs and Hutton was the commandant's determination to fulfil 
his imperial directions by organizing an Australian federal military force,' despite the 
fact that it was Dibbs himself who in January 1894 first encouraged Hutton to draft a 
scheme of federal defence.64 
Neither historian explores the concept of nationalism with any depth and their 
readings of Hutton's command in New South Wales suffer as a result. They delve 
into the nature of colonial identity but because they are looking for a particular result 
they miss fundamental questions - what did Hutton actually represent? Was he an 
agent of centralised and organised 'British authorities' or, more simply, a member of 
a widespread and popular movement favouring greater imperial unity? What did 
opposition to Hutton's reforms in New South Wales represent? Was it distaste with 
his sentiments of imperial unity deriving from a competing model of local identity? 
Or just a distrust of the effects of his reforms based on a conception oflocal interests? 
Such questions must be posed if an accurate portrait of colonial identity and of its 
relationship with the idea of Greater Britain is to be reached. 
Writing a continent away, Preston takes a line very similar to Mordike and Trainor in 
his assessment of Hutton's command of the Canadian militia. Hutton determined the 
principles he would apply in Canada before ever setting foot there: without reference 
.3 Mordike, Army for a Nation, 35. 
04 J. Mordike, 'The Origins of Australia's Anny', Australian Defence Force Journal, 87, 1991, 13; E. 
Hutton, 'Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hutton', Chapter 13, First Typed Draft, BL, 
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to local needs Hutton, he argues, planned to implement the conclusions reached in his 
1898 paper on a 'Co-operative System for the Defence of the Empire.'65 Hutton, 
Preston insists, had a 'determination to build a force to serve the empire' without 
reference to Canadian interests.66 Like Trainor and Mordike, Preston downplays the 
importance of Hutton's practical reforms by positioning them as ancillary to his 
imperial agenda: 
Sir Edward Hutton had much military lore to teach the amateur soldiers of the 
colonies, but he did not understand the political situation in the Empire. He 
regarded the Canadian command not as a Canadian national military 
organisation but as a district of the British military command system.67 
Hutton's protestations about constructing a national army for Canada were just a 
smoke screen towards that end; the national army was Hutton's 'best line.'68 Like 
Mordike and Trainor, Preston leans on this caricature of a single-mindedly imperialist 
Hutton as a foil to imply a countervailing Canadian nationalism, emphasising 
Hutton's frequent conflicts with Canadian politicians.69 Preston's remaining 
arguments to support a local nationalism are not convincing: he cites, for example, the 
embarrassing incident when Hutton, taking the first shot on a rifle range during an 
inspection, was given a blank cartridge by an insubordinate trooper as evidence of a 
popular 'suspicion' of the imperial relationship.7o Yet even this single example ofa 
popular distaste for the new commandant's imperialism is disputed and Penlington 
6S R. Preston, Canada and 'Imperial Defense ': A study of the origins of the British Commonwealth's 
defense organization, 1867-1919, Duke University Press, Durham, 1967,250. 
66 Preston, Canada and 'Imperial Defense " 252. 
67 Preston, Canada and 'Imperial Defense " 255. 
68 Preston, Canada and 'Imperial Defense " 251. 
69 Preston, Canada and 'Imperial Defense " 252. 
70 Preston, Canada and 'Imperial Defense " 253. 
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provides the more likely explanation that Hutton was ill-treated on this occasion due 
to a residual dislike of his predecessor.71 
Penlington's approach to Hutton's Canadian service is more balanced. He interprets 
Hutton's talk of a Canadian national army as a genuine attempt to foster popular 
interest in the militia, and thereby strengthen Canadian defence, and he supports this 
contention by enumerating the specific local reforms Hutton introduced - such as his 
reorganisation of the military branch.72 At the same time, Penlington does not ignore 
Hutton's broader imperial agenda; but he seeks to reconcile this with Hutton's other 
stated aims. Hutton wanted Canada to have a national army capable both of 
defending Canada and of contributing, 'to the military defence of the British Empire 
in a manner and with a power which will place Canada in a position ofunparal\eled 
dignity and influence among all the possessions of the Crown.' 73 Such imperial 
elements in Hutton's plans were possible because of the strong pro-British sentiment 
existing in Canada at that time. This sentiment was cultural and also represented a 
temporary alignment of interests, especially Canadian fears of American 
encroachment and British assistance in resolving the Alaskan boundary dispute. For 
Penlington's Hutton therefore, 'colonial and imperial motives were entwined with the 
more important national motives.' 74 
Morton and Miller both provide excellent and detailed accounts of Hutton's Canadian 
command and they offer valuable insights into key episodes, especially the Domville 
dispute and Hutton's recall. Hutton features in Miller's study of the Governor 
71 N. Penlington, Canada and Imperialism, 1896-1899, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1965, 
143. 
12 Penlington, Canada and Imperialism, 144 & 177. 
73 PenJington, Canada and Imperialism, 153. 
74 Penlington, Canada and Imperialism, 234. 
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General to Canada as the 'greatest cross of Minto's early administration.'75 Morton's 
subject is the Department of Militia and Defence and he is interested in Hutton as 
refonner and agent of conflict between the civil and military branches of the 
department. 76 Both of these historians focus on Canadian political history and they 
are less inclined than either Penlington or Preston to draw conclusions from that 
material to make claims for the nature of Canadian identity. 
Hutton's military command in South Africa has received little coverage. Mordike 
notes in a general way that British hopes for future support from the colonies were 
encouraged by the Second South African War and contends that events such as the 
Morant-Handcock affair fuelled the cause of the Australian nationalists.77 Field, in 
his work on Australia's participation in the war, barely mentions Hutton, merely 
noting Hutton's leadership of the Australian brigade and reproducing Hutton's 
enthusiastic assessment of the quality of Australian troopS.78 Wilcox and Miller both 
give very good accounts of the movements of Hutton's brigade; however, their 
interests are, respectively, the roles of Australians and Canadians in the war - this 
thesis will focus on the war's effect on the development of Hutton's ideas about 
Greater Britain. 79 
The final colonial command, Hutton's role in fonning an Australian Anny after 
federation, has received the most attention. Mordike applies essentially the same 
75 C. Miller, The Canadian Career of the Fourth Earl of Minto: The Education of a Viceroy, Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, Waterloo, 1980,64. 
76 D. Morton, 'Authority and Policy in the Canadian Militia, 1874-1904', PhD thesis, University of 
London, 1968,5,383 & 429. 
77 Mordike, Army for a Nation, 63. 
78 L. Field, The Forgollen War, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1979, III. 
79 C. Wilcox, Australia's Boer War: The War in South Africa 1899-1902, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 2002; c. Miller, Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War. 1899-1902, 
Canadian War Museum and McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 1993. 
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argument to Hutton's service as G.O.C. of the Australian anny that he used in 
describing Hutton's command in New South Wales. The battle between the forces of 
British imperialism and Australian nationalism seemingly continued. Once again 
Mordike argues that before departing Britain for Australia Hutton received his 
imperialist orders from British authorities. In this instance it was an interview with 
Chamberlain himself, as well as meetings with King Edward, St John Brodrick 
(Secretary for War), and Lord Roberts, to each of whom he promised 20,000 mounted 
infantry. Hutton, according to Mordike, was overawed by these men and 'under 
extreme pressure to produce the results which he had promised his patrons. ,80 On 
arrival in Australia, therefore, Hutton was even less tolerant of opposition, 'He 
promoted the scheme with a passion and energy which gratified his ego but distorted 
his judgement.'81 Mordike ties all Hutton's actions in Australia to the imperial 
agenda: 
It suited his imperial goals to use national requirements to fabricate the case for 
overseas service for the military forces.82 
Mordike's account is again distorted by his understanding of Australian military 
history as 'a contest between the two ideologies' of nationalism and imperialism.83 In 
line with this conceptualisation, Mordike conceives British overtures for fonnal 
defence arrangements as a grasping imperialism and Australian rebuffs as examples 
of a burgeoning nationalism; for instance: 'It soon became apparent that Barton had 
decided to adhere to a national approach to defence. ,84 Hutton certainly had an 
imperial agenda, but this is not of itself sufficient evidence of Australian nationalism, 
80 Mordike, Army for a Nation, 91. 
81 Mordike, Army for a Nation, 87. 
82 Mordike, Army for a Nation, \0 1. 
83 Mordike, Army for a Nation, xviii. 
84 Mordike, Army for a Nation, 108. 
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and Mordike once again struggles to establish such a sentiment. He grasps at the 
smallest opportunities to assert nationalist sentiment: parliamentary cost cutting is not 
simply economising, but demonstrates that parliament was, 'also suspicious about his 
report on Australian defence. ,85 This quickly becomes a parliamentary nationalist 
consensus: '[there was 1 genuine bipartisan concern about the dangers of organising 
the Australian defence forces for imperial ends;' 86 Mordike, however, finds it 
difficult to sustain this nationalist argument against the force of evidence to the 
contrary. His definition of Australian nationalism shifts from the triumphal radical 
version of his preface,8? to a 'sub-imperial nationalism,88, to merely a qualified 
imperialism.89 In describing the intent behind Forrest's (Minister of Defence) 
Defence Act he concedes that it, 'like the personal loyalties he shared with most of his 
countrymen, was ambivalent on issues of national versus imperial loyalties. ,90 
Participation in the Second South African war, which continued during Hutton's 
initial years in Australia, actually excited a 'popular imperialistic fervour.'91 Grey, 
who relies on Mordike in his discussion of Hutton's Australian command, also 
believes Hutton saw 'his duty in imperial and not national terms' but is similarly 
slippery in defining Australian nationalism, referring to 'the nationalist content of the 
imperial sentiment in Australia and Canada.'92 
Norris and Meaney provide more plausible explanations for the parliamentary 
resistance Hutton encountered in attempting to implement his defence plans. Both 
"Mordike, Armyfora Nation, 107. 
86 Mordike, Army for a Nation, 97. 
87 Mordike, Army for a Nation, xviii. 
88 Mordike, Army for a Nation, 56. 
89 Mordike, Army for a Nation, 116. 
90 Mordike, Army for a Nation, 77. 
9i Mordike, Army for a Nation, 80. 
92 J. Grey, A Military History of Australia, revised ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, 
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agree that defence was not an important issue for the Commonwealth.93 The defence 
portfolio was initially assigned to 'the man ofleast stature in the whole cabinet', 
Dickson, who in fact died just a few weeks after assuming his new role; Forrest took 
over the reins hoping that Defence would prove a less taxing portfolio than the Post 
and Telegraph.94 For the first Commonwealth government economy was of far 
greater concern than defence, especially given the restrictions on Commonwealth 
revenue imposed by the constitution's Braddon Clause.95 Opposition to Hutton's 
policies, therefore, did not necessarily arise from an Australian nationalism. 
Mordike's picture of an obsessively imperialist Hutton is also distorted and Meaney, 
like Penlington for Canada, provides a more balanced picture, pointing to a mix of 
'professional, national and imperial aims.'96 Hutton, Meaney argues, 'belonged to a 
new breed of British officer' who took a 'professional and meritocratic' view of his 
.. 97 posItion. 
Failures to define key terms, particularly 'nationalism', plague many of the secondary 
sources that have examined Hutton's career. From this survey of the secondary 
literature it is apparent that Preston, Mordike and Trainor suffer from what Thompson 
and Cole agree to be a false dichotomy between nationalism and imperialism.98 This 
corrupts their descriptions of both Hutton's imperialism and colonial identity. It also 
distorts their estimation of Hutton's level of agency. One of the key contentions made 
93 R. Norris, The Emergent Commonwealth; Australian Federation: Expectations and Fulfilment 1889-
1910, Melbowne University Press, Melbowne, 1975, 119; N. Meaney, A History of Australian Defence 
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by all three is that Hutton did not act from his own initiative, but at the bidding of 
imperialists in London such as George Clarke and Joseph Chamberlain. Porter warns 
against constructing a simple metropolitan against periphery model of the Empire.99 
While Hutton certainly had an imperial vision - and he did respect the imperial 
notables with whom he had contact - he enjoyed much freedom of action. Hutton 
developed and promoted his own schemes for greater imperial cooperation, asserting 
these views in competition with the mainstream of the imperial federation movement. 
On that movement Hutton pronounced publicly: 
A certain influential body of those who are pressing Imperial Federation seek to 
bind all portions of the Empire hand and foot to one given policy both of 
defence and of finance. Attractive as this may seem, a sojourn in our Colonies, 
even of short duration, will soon demonstrate the impossibility of such a system 
being accepted by the majority of our fellow-subjects of Greater Britain. JOO 
Hutton's relations with London were at times as complicated as his relations with 
colonial governments. He was never blind to the local priorities. By the end of his 
career Hutton had become convinced that asking the colonies to meet requests for 
more definite military support without in return giving them a greater say in the use of 
those troops was folly. WJ 
The picture of Hutton's imperialism that Preston, Mordike and Trainor present is a 
straw man set up to imply an opposing colonial nationalism. Penlington, Miller, 
Morton, Norris and Meaney explain Hutton's conflicts in the colonies more 
99 A. Porter, 'Introduction', The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 3, ed. A. Porter, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1999,4 & 16. 
100 E. Hutton, 'Our Comrades of Greater Britain', Paper read before A1dershot Military Society, 24 
November 1896, in E. Hutton, The Defence and Defensive Power of Australia, Angus and Robertson, 
Melbourne, 1902,43. 
101 Letter, Hutton to Kelly Kenny, 4 August 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50097,163. 
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satisfactorily by offering a range of causes: including Hutton's fiery personality, his 
professionalism, and, more generally, an awareness oflocal colonial interests. These 
latter historians have written good accounts of Hutton in the various phases of his 
colonial career. However, none of these scholars follow his career across those roles 
and they ask different questions to the ones posed by this thesis - why did Hutton act 
the way he did in the colonies? How did he view Greater Britain? How did his 
experiences in the colonies change that view? What does the colonial response to 
Hutton truly indicate? What does it reflect of their sense of identity, their relationship 
with Britain, and their conception of Greater Britain? 
To answer these questions it is necessary to first establish Hutton's own position. 
This evolved over the course of his early life and career. Greater Britain was a late 
nineteenth century phenomenon and Hutton did not begin his life or career pre-
programmed with imperial views. Indeed he grew up in a country which looked on 
the British Empire very differently than it did at century's end. At the outset, Hutton 
shared with his stepfather a vision of a limited, civilising, just and Christian Empire. 
This slowly changed over the course of his early career until, in the late 1880s and 
I 890s, Greater Britain finally emerged as central to Hutton's worldview. This thesis 
will examine that change and then endeavour to apply that picture to Hutton's 
colonial commands. 
In his role in New South Wales Hutton had his first opportunity of applying this 
vision; it was a period of experimentation and of discovery. He brought those lessons 
to Canada, his most controversial command, where he faced a unique set of 
challenges related to Canadian identity and its relationship to the idea of Greater 
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Britain. He bounced back from an embarrassing exit from that country to lead a 
mixed brigade of mounted troops from Britain, Canada, the Australian colonies and 
New Zealand on campaign in South Africa. Hutton's campaign, because ofthe hopes 
with which he invested his command, reveals the full extent of his vision for the 
British Army and for the British Empire. The Australian army, amalgamated after 
federation from the militias of the former colonies, was Hutton's final and most 
important colonial command. He was charged with constructing a new national army; 
his attempt to do so marked the culmination of his colonial career. 
In each of his colonial commands Hutton engaged with colonial identity. He brought 
his own set of values to the task; he certainly had British interests in mind - but he 
was no simple-minded imperialist scheming to subvert colonial interests. His story is 
much more interesting than that. In his struggles to understand the colonial mind, to 
harness shared values, to reconcile British and colonial interests, and - yes, 
sometimes - to impose his own ideas on reluctant governments, he reveals the 
complexity oflate-Victorian imperialism. 
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2. An Education in Empire: 1850s to 1880s 
Edward Hutton carried several key ideas to his posts of command in the self-
governing colonies. Ideas of imperial unity and national development were 
paramount. Other notions - manliness, race, Christianity, professionalism - were also 
prominent, feeding into the grander themes of Empire and nation. Understanding 
where those ideas came from is vital in understanding his actions in the colonies. As 
J 011 discovered, when seeking to understand the mindsets of British leaders of the 
First World War, such ideas often develop in early life, a phase when the influence of 
family, teachers, and peers is strongly felt. l This chapter will examine the 
development of Hutton's thought through his childhood, education, and early career. 
This period of Hutton's early life and career, besides illuminating his subsequent 
actions in the colonies, stands alone as a subject worthy of study. The quarter 
century, 1860-1885, spanned a period of great change in the British people's sense of 
identity, in their perceptions of themselves and of their place in the world. Streets 
summarises it as a 'shift from a moral, Liberal, Christian imperial ideal at mid-century 
to a hawkish, jingoistic, military ideal by century's end. ,2 The British moved from a 
confident, prosperous, and outward-looking mode to become warier and more 
defensive. This is clearly seen in their relationship with the Empire. 
This chapter will seek to understand how these grand trends affected an individual -
how Hutton's ideas of Empire gradually evolved to the point of his adoption of the 
new imperialism of the late nineteenth century. It will begin by establishing Hutton's 
I J. Joll, '1914: The Unspoken Assumptions' in Origins a/the First World War, ed. H. Koch, 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1972, 311. 
2 H. Streets, "'The Right Stamp of Men": Military Imperatives and Popular Imperialism in Late 
Victorian Britain', PhD Thesis, Duke University, 1998, 13. 
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early ambivalence towards concepts of nation and Empire. It will then study the 
qualities that conditioned Hutton to the embrace of a nationalist and imperialist 
perspective: in his schooling and early career he learned professionalism and 
manliness; in his first active service - the African campaigns of the early 1880s - he 
began to think about race; and, finally, his adoption of a nationally unifying form of 
Christianity was a vital element in his imperial transformation. 
Edward Hutton was born into a middle class family in Torquay, Devon, on 6 
December 1848. His father, a banker, perished six months later, leaving Hutton to be 
raised by his mother and stepfather, a lieutenant colonel of the British Army, Arthur 
Lawrence. Hutton grew very close to Lawrence, who raised him as his own son, and 
in adulthood Hutton came to regard him as 'the kindest friend I have in the world.,3 
Lawrence exerted two important influences on his young charge: a career soldier 
himself, he encouraged Hutton to adopt a professional approach to the army; and he 
was an active and evangelical Christian, prominent in military Anglican committees, 
who practiced the kind of doctrinally based faith dominant in British life in the first 
half of the century.4 
Over the course of his early career, Hutton drifted from his stepfather's evangelical 
Christianity. Indeed, by the time he came to draft his memoir, during the First World 
War, it was the example of his mother's more sentimental faith that he stressed, 'At 
her knee I learnt the principles of religion in its highest sense. She taught me that 
earnest work and thought for others should be the real aim and object of human 
3 Letter, Hutton to Lawrence, 1 November 1884, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50090. 
4 Letter, Copland-Crawford to Hutton, 22 December 1892, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50093: 'Your dear 
stepfather was a leader in that regard and a great force. Why not you?' 
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existence. ,5 Yet in his early life Hutton was undoubtedly affected by Lawrence's 
religious position and it influenced the way he viewed the Empire. As late as 1879, in 
an address to the Staff College on the Zulu war, he expressed the old liberal, Christian 
vision of an Empire dedicated not to the expansion, or maintenance, of British power 
but to 'advancing the spread of civilisation and the truths of religion.,6 He continued, 
in words that could have as easily been his stepfather's: 
But do not let us only give way to feelings akin to that of the Romans whose 
proud boast was that the sun never set upon their Empire - let us rather 
recognise the fact that we are fulfilling the inscrutable will of Providence and 
that it is our mission to carry civilization and the blessings of peace and religion 
among the native races of South Africa. 
Our knowledge of the Bible will easily find some parallel to reconcile the means 
of war and bloodshed with the end I speak of. 
As the Israelites of old were, under divine directions, destined to conquer the 
natives of Canaan and bring among them the knowledge of the only true God, so 
may we not but believe that a like demand is made upon us, and that this, our 
favoured nation, is but after all the instrument in God's hand for bringing 
ultimate peace and the blessings of civilization upon all races, no matter what 
their colour, who acknowledge us as conquerors. 
Let us not then repudiate our responsibility - let us rather - be we soldiers - be 
we civilians - be we colonists - assist in spreading the blessings of the religion 
5 E. Hutton, 'Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hutton', Chapter I, 5, BL, Hutton Papers, 
ADD 50112. 
6 E. Hutton, Notes for Lecture on 'Personal Recollections of the Zulu War' - presented to Staff College 
1880, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50110, 75. 
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and civilisation which we possess among all the native races with whom we are 
brought in contact. 7 
Within a decade Hutton had set aside this vision and had come to view the British 
Empire not as a responsibility but as a privilege: an inheritance to be protected -
against military and economic rivals - and unified by strengthening the bonds 
between Britain and her self-governing colonies. 
Those self-governing colonies, which became so important to him in later life, barely 
figured in his thinking during his early career. When the British government began 
the final phasing out of the bulk of its Canadian and Australian army garrisons in the 
late 1860s, Hutton was serving in Canada and his battalion was withdrawn home to 
England. In his reaction he expressed no disquiet at the imperial implications of such 
a policy, fearing only the professional military consequences: 'I hear from an extract 
in the St. John paper of an article in the 'Times', that it is far from impossible that all 
the troops will be withdrawn from Canada and Australia next year. I hope it will not 
prove to be the case, for then there will be no choice between England and India; and 
we shall lose the best and healthiest quarter out of England.,8 
How did Hutton progress to an intense identification with the people of the self-
governing colonies from that dispassionate starting point? How did he move from a 
vision of a civilising and Christian Empire, with a mission to assist the undeveloped 
world, to a beleaguered Empire, whose maintenance was vital to the wealth and 
security of the British nation? 
7 E. Hutton, 'Personal Recollections of the Zulu War', BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50110, 76 (Hutton's 
emphasis). 
8 Letter, Hutton to Mother, 25 October 1868, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50090. 
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The British people as a whole embraced late-Victorian imperialism in response to an 
internal need for new forms of identity and the external stimulus of growing economic 
and military competition. Hutton's adoption of the idea of Greater Britain can be 
understood in the same way. His perception of his role within society - as a 
professional soldier and a manly officer - oriented him to a British nationalist and 
imperialist perspective. His awareness of external threats to British power spurred 
him along in that direction and influenced his views on race. The change in his 
religious belief would prove decisive. 
A defining quality of Hutton's military career was the professional spirit with which 
he approached it. In this he reflected something of the age. BowIe suggests that the 
most characteristic idea of the Victorian era was' progress.'9 The rise of 
professionalism accompanied this, a result ofthe specialization forced by advances in 
technology and a response to the requirements of increasingly bureaucratic and 
competitive states. 1O This was particularly marked in the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century when the number of professional associations in Britain almost 
doubled (from 27 to 49)." Hutton came to identify with this group; for example, in 
1897 he wrote to Charles Dilke (author of Greater Britain) on the subject of army 
reform: 
To break down the barrier of social, court and professional conservatism now in 
times of professional peace is, many of us think impracticable - no one except a 
9 J. BowIe. 'Origins and Development of the Idea of Progress' in Ideas and Beliefs of the Victorians: 
an historic revaluation of the Victorian Age, Sylvan Press, London, 1949. 
JO G. Kitson Clark, An Expanding Society: Britain 1830-1900, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 
1967,167; S. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1957,32. 
II H. Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England Since 1880, Routledge, London, 1989, 20. 
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professional man and one who has the business instincts common enough in 
commercial life can really grasp the hopeless chaos.1 2 
This quote also indicates that, although a professional viewpoint flourished, it was 
largely restricted to the middle class. In the British army it remained a rare quality, 
limited to particular regiments and individuals (such as Garnet Wolseley and his 
clique).13 Most officers of Hutton's day were dilettantes and romantic amateurs, 
gentlemen who had bought their commissions and who treated soldiering as a 
respectable and congenial pursuit, but one not to be taken too seriously. They were 
largely uninterested in exploring military problems; for instance, the discussion of 
professional matters in the officers' mess was virtually forbidden. 14 Hutton was a 
much more vigorous and intellectually engaged officer: he actively sought out 
opportunities for professional education and advancement, he investigated technical 
questions in a scientific spirit, and he attempted to spread this professional spirit 
amongst the rest of the British officer corps. 
An understanding of Hutton's professionalism is essential for two reasons - it 
motivated him and it was intimately tied to his developing sense of identity. 
Professionalism was a powerful driver that propelled Hutton on an ambitious career 
path. It drove him to study the defensive problems of the Empire, to draft solutions, 
and to travel to the furthest reaches of the Empire in order to implement those 
schemes. It also thrust him into conflicts with politicians and fellow officers who did 
12 Letter, Hutton to Dilke, 9 February 1897, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50095. 
J3 G. Wolseley, The Story of a Soldier's Life, Vol. 2, Archibald Constable aod Co., Westminster, 1903, 
233. 
" Hutton, 'Memoirs', Chapter II, 2. 
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not share his views. Huntington points out that the great problem with military 
professionalism is that it generates tension between the expert and the politician, 
between the military and civilian spheres, and indeed Hutton's professionalism would 
later impact on his relations with colonial governments.15 
Hutton's professionalism is also of significance in its connection to his budding 
nationalism - it mediated the way he attached his sense of identity to the British 
nation and the British Empire. A professional is not simply an expert; they also 
derive status by using their skills to serve society or the nation. This distinguishes 
them from mere money-makers or entrepreneurs. 16 As Reader puts it, the professional 
class comprises a 'subtle blend of self-interest and public spirit.' 17 Also noting this, 
Kitson Clark connects the growth of British professionalism in the nineteenth century 
to the challenge facing the class system; the great expansion of the middle class 
demanded new ways of making a gentleman and professional careers offered a means 
of attaining the necessary respectability. 18 
For professional soldiers this idea of service was, if anything, more significant than it 
was for the other classes of professional. Huntington and Bond agree that a 
professional officer corps requires a single, permanent source of authority to give it 
legitimacy and that its development in the nineteenth century was tied to the 
appearance of nation-states. 19 As a professional-minded officer Hutton came to view 
15 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 20. 
16 Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society, 121 and 123. 
17 W. Reader, Professional Men: The Rise of the Professional Classes in Nineteenth-Century England, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1966,2, 199 and 203. 
18 G. Kitson Clark, The Making of Victorian England, Methuen and Co, London, 1962, 
255. 
19 B. Bond, The Victorian Army and the StajfCoilege 1854-1914, Eyre Methuen, London, 1972, 13; 
Huntington, Soldier and the State, 35. 
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himself as a defender of the Empire, responsible to the nation and not just to a 
particular class. The way he conducted himself professionally informed and reflected 
his growing nationalism and it is therefore vital to understand whence that 
professionalism came. 
Hutton inherited much of his military professionalism from his stepfather. Lawrence 
had forged a successful career from soldiering and he encouraged his sons to do 
likewise. In their youth he prompted them to seek opportunities that would prepare 
them for successful lives in the military; for example, he had his sons learn French 
and German before enlisting since language was a valuable skill, and an aid to 
promotion, but not taught within the army.20 He sent Hutton to Switzerland after Eton 
for a year's study of French and Classics in preparation for the army entrance exam?! 
Throughout Hutton's early career Lawrence was a constant influence, prompting him 
to seek all manner of opportunities for professional advancement. It was at his 
stepfather's instigation that Hutton attended Staff College in the early 1880s.22 
This family professionalism was bound up in their relatively humble class position. 
In his memoir Hutton is defensive about the paucity of information he provides about 
his family: 'I propose, therefore, to preface this narrative with a brief allusion to my 
family, showing how in my case, heredity may have been an important element in the 
formation of my character, but in a far greater degree how environment exercised a 
controlling power, and one to which I feel indebted in no small measure. ,23 This 
statement reveals a measure of awkwardness in Hutton's attitude to his family's place 
20 Letter, Lawrence to Hutton, 17 July 1879, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50090. 
21 Hutton, 'Memoirs', Chapter I, 8. 
22 Letter, Hutton to Father, 24 June 1881, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50090. 
23 Hutton, 'Memoirs', Chapter I, I. 
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in British society. While he was educated at Eton, studied abroad, had a commission 
in a good regiment purchased for him, mixed with generals, and eventually married 
into the aristocracy, he was not born into that class. He was sensitive to this. In his 
memoir he described, for instance, Lady Charles Paulet's hesitation in allowing his 
marriage to her daughter.24 Given this sensitivity it was natural for him to place 
environment over heredity. And it was natural for him to adopt the army as a sort of 
surrogate family. He threw all his energy into becoming the most successful officer 
he could because for him the army became a principal source, and not merely an 
expression, of his sense of identity. His authority would depend on his skills as an 
expert and his service to the nation, rather than from any automatic status attached to 
his class. 
This was of course a two-edged sword and, just as industrialisation had undermined 
traditional social ties, professionalism would increasingly challenge the old, purely 
aristocratic basis of the officer corps, causing Hutton to chafe against dilettantes who 
looked 'upon their profession as a source of amusement and pleasure,' products of the 
'mischievous Purchase system. ,25 
Hutton's intense identification with his school, Eton, which he attended for just over 
two years in the mid-1860s, also grew from class. Eton, ironically, had been 
established so that poor students might have the opportunity to be educated alongside 
wealthy gentlemen. From the mid-nineteenth century, however, the middle classes 
sought to distinguish themselves within society and to be an Etonian became a social 
24 Hutton, 'Memoirs', Chapter 12, I. 
25 Hutton, 'Memoirs', Chapter 3, 2. 
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distinction in itself?6 Hutton fonned a lifelong connection with the school, despite 
the brevity of his enrolment; such was its significance to his sense of status. He 
willingly adopted the ideals and attitudes of that institution. 
A particular master at Eton, Edmund Warre, fostered Hutton's military 
professionalism. Hutton spent two years under Warre's tutelage, the beginning of a 
lasting acquaintance. Warre had only recently begun teaching at Eton (he later 
became headmaster and then provost of the school); he was young, in his twenties, 
and saw himself as something of a new broom. During the height of the 1859 war 
scare, a volunteer movement spread throughout Britain, Tennyson penned his poem, 
'Fonn, Riflemen, Fonn,' and Volunteer Rifle Corps sprung up around the country.27 
Warre had been swept up in this - he joined the Oxford Rifle Corps and, in his first 
year at Eton, he founded the Eton cadet corps, borrowing drill instructors from the 
Windsor Grenadier Guards.28 This cadet corps became his educational passion. In 
1866 he reconstituted the corps, joining it to the local Bucks Volunteers and 
equipping his boys with Enfield rifles.29 He instituted an army class, to specially 
prepare boys for a military career.30 Hutton saw Warre as his first military instructor, 
describing him as, 'by education and circumstances a Parson, and English Gentleman, 
a Scholar and a Schoolmaster, but by nature a Soldier, a Man of Action and a Leader 
ofmen.'31 
26 C. Hollis, Eton: A History, Hollis and Carter, London, 1960,289. 
27 J. Dunlop, The Development of Ihe British Army 1899-1914, Methuen, London, 1938, 56. 
28 A. Ainger, Memories of Elan Sixty Years Ago, Jolm Murray, London, 1917,275 and 277. 
29 Ainger, Memories ofEton Sixty Years Ago, 49. 
30 Hollis, Elan: A History, 284. 
31 E. Hutton, 'Life of the Rev Edmund Warre', BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50111, 278. 
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Warre was also Hutton's first connection to the clique of very influential army 
officers led by Garnet Wolseley. Redvers Buller, one of the principal members of that 
group, had been Warre's fag at Eton. Hutton claimed Warre admired Wolseley as 
'the greatest Military Genius of our era' and sympathised with Wolseley's aim to 
reform the army, extend the educational opportunities for officers, and implement 
modern ideas of military organisation and tactics.32 Hutton's military 
professionalism, which derived from his stepfather, was affirmed by Warre who once 
declared, 'the safety and success of an army depends more than ever upon the 
intelligence and professional knowledge of the officers.' 33 
Warre had a dominating, charismatic influence on his students.34 He exercised a 
profound influence on Hutton. Such was his debt to his teacher that, on Warre's 
death, Hutton composed a panegyric, his, 'Life of the Rev. Edmund Warre.'35 In it, 
Hutton described Warre as a kind of manly apostle: 'The boys around him seemed to 
breathe an atmosphere of manliness and to become inspired by his magnetic power 
with the highest principles of honour and oftruth.'36 Warre's 'manly physical 
bearing' had an 'ascendancy over the Eton boys, such indeed as only a school hero of 
the highest merit and renown can ever achieve. ,37 Warre fused together the virtues of 
an imperial, athletic, ethical manliness in the profession of soldiering. 
This ideal of manliness - the idea that vitality, verve and 'go-aheadness' are linked to 
an outdoors, athletic and sporting life - became another essential pillar of Hutton's 
32 Hutton, 'Life of the Rev Edmund Warre', 281. 
33 E. Warre, 'History of Tactics' ,Lecture 2, Military Lectures, A1dershot Military Society, 23 February 
1888,3. 
34 Ainger, Memories o/Eton Sixty Years Ago, 59; Hollis, Eton: A History, 286. 
3S Hutton, 'Life of the Rev Edmund Warre', 275. 
3. Hutton, 'Life of the Rev Edmund Warre', 279. 
37 Hutton, 'Life of the Rev Edmund Warre', 275. 
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identity. Hutton's idea of manly virtue is significant because, with his 
professionalism, it infonned the character of his developing nationalism and 
imperialism. Hutton's professionalism lent him a legitimacy founded on expertise 
rather than class and thereby helped transfer his sense of primary loyalty to the nation. 
Skill alone, however, was not deemed a sufficient basis for leadership and the 
qualities valued in an officer largely remained those of the country gentleman: 
strength, courage, honour, and skill on horseback.38 A bias persisted in favour of 
'natural' education as against 'artificial' classroom study.39 A quality was wanted to 
fill the place of aristocratic notions of an inherited chivalry and a manly, physical 
bearing substituted for aristocratic blood as the basis for the right to leadership, 
thereby serving to enhance the connection between officers and the nation. 
In his view of manliness, Hutton reflected a general trend in late-Victorian society. 
Tosh describes a consensus position among scholars in the field that representations 
of masculinity changed during the nineteenth century, from the' earnest, expressive 
manliness of the Evangelicals to the hearty, stiff-upper-lip variant in the era of 
Kitchener and Baden-Powell. ,40 He warns that this was mainly confined to the upper 
classes but suggests that, at moments of alarm about British military preparedness 
(and the 1860s were such a moment), this bled into the mainstream.41 Deslandes, in 
his examination ofthe undergraduate culture at Oxford and Cambridge, concludes 
that there was a finn emphasis in this period on traits such as fortitude, loyalty, 
38 Reader, Professional Men, 74. 
39 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 19. 
40 J. Tosh, 'What Should Historians do with Masculinity? Reflections on Nineteenth-Century Britain', 
History Workshop Joumal, 38,1994,181. 
41 Tosh, 'What Should Historians do with Masculinity?', 182. 
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athleticism, respect, tradition and service.42 Dawson suggests that this, like 
professionalism, was related to the changing class structure: the middle class sought 
to appropriate the 'romance of heroic adventure' as part of their bid for power.43 
At Eton, manliness was primarily transmitted through sport. Under Warre's influence 
a vigorous athletic culture developed at Eton.44 This was a decided change for the 
school- in the early half of the century sportsmen were discouraged (and if they 
dared leave the grounds to represent the school in games they were flogged).45 Crotty 
suggests that by the 1870s athleticism had become rampant in British public schools 
and attributes the rise to a fear of impending war: fit boys were necessary to defend 
the nation.46 Militarism was in the air, and athleticism had a serious purpose. The 
soldier, and more particularly the officer, came to represent a masculine ideal. 
After Eton, Lawrence directed the early stages of Hutton's military career. He 
purchased a commission for his son in the 60th Rifles in August 1867. Lawrence 
followed his son's early progress with a keen eye, corresponding with Colonel 
Hawley, Hutton's new colonel.47 Lawrence's choice of regiment was significant. He 
looked at only the most professionally dynamic regiments in the army for his son, 
eschewing the aristocratic but effete cavalry. Hutton echoed these prejudices, writing 
to his stepfather of his new regiment: 'My brother officers are ... fellows, and above all 
such gentlemen, no "cavalry swagger" about them, but simply gentlemen. ,48 The 60th 
42 P. Deslandes, "'The Foreign Element": Newcomers and the Rhetoric of Race, Nation, and Empire in 
"'Oxbridge" Undergraduate Culture, 1850-1920', Journal of British Studies, 37, 1998, 57 and 62. 
43 G. Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities, 
Routledge, London, 1994, 108. 
44 Mangan, The Games Ethic and Imperialism, 23. 
45 Hollis, Eton: A History, 294. 
46 Crotty, Making the Australian Male, 222. 
47 Letter, Hawley to Lawrence, 25 September 1868, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50090. 
48 Letter, Hutton to Lawrence, 8 December 1868, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50090. 
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Rifles were a forward-looking regiment. They were proud of encouraging an 
'independence of thought' and of having a tradition of adopting 'new methods.,49 
Hutton joined the 4th Battalion of the 60th Rifles, then stationed in New Brunswick, 
Canada. These first few months, spent in Canada, worked to confirm and extend the 
ethos inculcated in Hutton at Eton. Hutton recalled in his memoir that, 'the spirit of 
Eton was in a large measure the spirit ofthe Regiment. ,50 He discovered that most of 
his fellow officers were former Etonians. It was a Regiment entirely in sympathy 
with the type of education Hutton had received at WaITe's hands - in fact Warre 
himself later trained with the Regiment, learning modern tactics with which he then 
drilled his cadets at Eton. 51 
Hutton was very impressed with his new colonel, Hawley, describing him as, 'as near 
to my ... ideal of a Colonel as it is possible for any ordinary individual to be. ,52 
Hawley was the model of a professional soldier. He developed novel systerns of 
training and tactics and had an enlightened concern in the welfare of his soldiers. 53 
The key to Hawley's approach was the devolution of command - a trust in the 
capacity of his soldiers and junior officers. Hutton explained this in a letter to his 
mother: 
I was quite astonished to find how well the art oflight infantry movements was 
understood by the men, it would have charmed Papa to see how each individual 
soldier seemed alive to the advantage to be gained by the smallest [illegible] or 
49 E. Hutton, 'Introduction', A Brief History of the King's Royal Rifle Corps 1755-1948, 3'" ed, 
Wellington Press, Aldershot, 1948, 1. 
50 Hutton, ~Memoirs', Chapter 2,2. 
51 Hutton, 'Life of the Rev Edmund Warre' , 280. 
52 Letter, Hutton to Lawrence, 8 December 1868, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50090. 
53 Hutton, "Memoirs', Chapter 2, 2. 
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inequality in the ground. The Colonel's system is I think a very good one - he 
assembles the officers and explains how he wishes a certain manoeuvre done, 
for instance we are supposed to be marching up a road and deadly artillery open 
fire on us, we extend at once on each side of the road, leaving the road itself 
clear, and get under cover ourselves whence we can keep up an effective fire on 
the enemy and yet be protected to a certain extent: well this having been 
explained to us we return to our respective companies and explain it fully to the 
men, and then execute it by companies. This enables the men to follow what is 
going on, and they take it in, and understand the idea thoroughly. 54 
Hawley's approach to training had made a great impression on Hutton. The idea that 
individual officers and even soldiers could be trusted to act independently was 
founded on assumptions about the character of those men. At the end of his career, 
summarising the key lesson he had learned from Hawley, Hutton wrote that, 
The essence of Hawley's training was the development to the utmost of 
individuality among his officers and riflemen. He recognised that the chief 
characteristic of our race - the true source of our greatness as a world-power - is 
the self-reliance and initiative of the free-born individual Briton, and the 
recognition that the machine-like methods of collectivism, as practised in the 
conscript armies in Europe, has no true place among successful British troops. 55 
It is significant that Hutton attached 'individuality' to 'race.' Hawley's training taught 
Hutton to identify with his soldiers and to view them as fellow 'Britons', members of 
the same race and the same nation. Such respect for the individual soldier 
necessitated a greater duty of care and this was linked to a shared national mission; 
Hawley taught, 'firstly, assiduous care in the organization, the well-being, and the 
54 Letter, Hutton to Mother, 18 October 1868, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50090. 
55 Hutton, 'Memoirs', Chapter 2, 4 (Hutton'S emphasis). 
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discipline of all ranks; secondly, the physical and mental culture of officers and men; 
and lastly, that forgetfulness of self and of self-interest which prompts Englishmen 
under all conceivable circumstances to 'play the game' - to sacrifice all, their lives if 
need be - in fulfilling their duty.' 56 
Hutton's inculcation into a manly, sporting culture also continued in Canada. Writing 
home to his mother, Hutton expressed his ambition of soon becoming 'an efficient 
sportsman.'57 Hawley encouraged his officers to hunt, freely granting them leave for 
shooting expeditions. He believed that there was no better form of training for young 
officers. 58 For Hutton's contemporaries, hunting was deemed 'the manliest of 
sportS.'59 The sport was associated with the best qualities of the British character, 
'dash, determination, and go-straight-to-the-pointness.'6o Hunting produced the ideal 
type of soldier, 'no man takes so readily to soldiering as a sportsman, and particularly 
a man who rides well to hounds.'61 It is not surprising that hunting was particularly 
prized as a manly sport, drawing, as it did, on aristocratic traditions ofleadership. By 
joining rides and shoots, Hutton connected himself with that tradition. By 
emphasising the sporting and athletic aspects of the hunt, however, he helped 
reposition it as a sport for men, rather than a sport for a privileged elite.62 
56 Hutton, 'Memoirs', Chapter 2.4. 
57 Letter, Hutton to Mother, 24 September 1868, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50090. 
58 Hutton, 'Memoirs', Chapter 2,8. 
" Lord Minto, 'Introduction', in E. Alderson, Pink & Scarlet: or Hunting as a School for Soldiering, 
London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1913, vii. 
60 Alderson, Pink & Scarlet, 4. 
61 Lord Minto, 'Introduction', Pink & Scarlet, ix. 
62 What was progressive in the 18608 was rather less so forty years later when Hutton's continuing 
attachment to the hunt became something reactionary and, even, unprofessional. De Lisle recalls with 
a shudder an incident during the Boer War when he marched with Hutton's brigade- a herd of Bles-
bok stampeded through the column and several officers began shooting, heedless of the danger to the 
men and badly wounding one. Chief amongst these 'thoughtless sportsmen' was Hutton. [De Lisle, 
'Memoirs of the Great Boer War', KCL, De Lisle Papers, GB99 KCLMA De Lisle Item 2 Vol I). 
44 
The completion of the withdrawal of the colonial garrisons that precipitated Hutton's 
departure from Canada was one of a series of reforms instituted by Edward Cardwell, 
the British Secretary of State for War from 1868 to 1874. During that term of office, 
Cardwell restructured the British army. He made his office supreme over the military 
administration, he ended the purchase of commissions (from 1 Nov 1871), and he 
reduced the minimum term of military service from twelve to six years. In effecting 
these reforms Cardwell received the support of the army's most dynamic general, 
Wolseley.63 These reforms, especially the abolition of purchase, encouraged officers 
to take their work in the army seriously and to treat it as a profession. Junior officers 
now had to qualify for their ranks and courses were set up to prepare them. 
The abolition of purchase spurred Hutton on in his professionalism. In his ambition 
to gain up-to-date military knowledge, he travelled (on his own initiative) to the 
continent to view the 1870 Franco-Prussian war. This war would have profound 
impact on British military thought; as Wolseley put it, 'it silenced those who had been 
loudest in denunciation of war as the inhuman practice of a barbarian age, and in their 
honest, though foolish, pooh-poohing of any possibility of its recurrence upon a great 
scale in civilized Europe. ,64 Hutton travelled to the site of Germany's most crushing 
victory and in his diary expressed a passing sympathy for the victims of the conflict, 
'conversation with these poor people who have seen and have suffered so much is 
interesting to me in the extreme. ,65 He was far more interested, however, in the 
professional, as opposed to the human, side of the war. He was very impressed by the 
Prussian army. He particularly admired the fact that each battalion had its own supply 
63 E. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992,8. 
64 Wolseley, The Story of a Soldier's Life, 227-8. 
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arrangements, enabling them to move independently of the transport COrpS.66 In his 
later colonial commands he paid especial attention to the transport arrangements of 
his field armies, and this seems to have been the earliest inspiration for that reform. 
Hutton's obsession with manliness also comes through in his diary describing his trip 
to the Franco-Prussian war. He admired the 'workmanlike' quality of the Prussian 
troops and especially of their 'well-bred' officers.67 On the other hand he despised 
the Americans he saw, 'who ape the French in manners and dress, especially in high 
heeled boots poor creatures! and the men most particularly seem to have an 
effeminacy of voice which I think is a very sure sign of the degeneracy of all the most 
noble manly qualities.'68 
In his schooling and early years in the army, therefore, Hutton attained two essential 
qualities: professionalism and manliness. Professionalism promoted a scientific and 
Rational approach to soldiering; manliness, on the other hand, was an essentially 
Romantic notion - heroic, chivalric and vital. The upwardly mobile middle class 
reconciled these two quite distinct qualities: they harnessed progress for power and 
tradition for legitimacy. In Hutton, the two qualities operated together. His manliness 
was intimately connected to his professional sense: as a young officer, for example, 
he took pains to organise for his battalion rifle and athletics meets, boxing, cricket and 
football games in the belief that, 'all great leaders oftroops in all ages seem to have 
laid great stress upon team games.'69 When Hutton entered Staff College, he was 
66 Hutton, 'Diary of visit to Franco-Pmssian War', 31 October 1870, 28. 
67 Hutton, 'Diary of visit to Franco-Pmssian War', 9 November 1870, 57. 
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elected whip and the Honorary Secretary of Drag, and captain of the cricket eleven.7o 
These appointments were boons to his career. He described them as 'positions which 
were much in demand and considered to be antecedents to coveted staff appointments 
later.' 71 The commandant of the Staff College in fact placed such emphasis on 
hunting that a bad rider was effectively barred a staff appointment. 72 Sporting 
excellence was equated with professional vitality and verve. Hutton encouraged his 
brother Fred to take up cricket, suggesting, 'In the cricket field or racket court or in 
the hunting field you will always find the best and most go ahead fellows in every 
garrison.,73 He confided to Fred that he would be as proud seeing him playing at 
Lords as he would at the top of the Sandhurst admissions list - he felt Fred needed no 
encouragement academically (his stepfather no doubt provided that) but needed 
prodding towards sportS.74 
In the period 1879 to 1885 Hutton had his first experiences of active service, fighting 
in a series of small wars in Africa: the Zulu War (1879), the first Boer war (1881), the 
Egyptian campaign (1882), and the relief expedition to the Sudan (1884 and 1885). It 
was a vital phase in Hutton's progression towards the adoption of the idea of Greater 
Britain. Under the test of battle, Hutton's qualities of professionalism and manliness 
matured. This period also offers insights into Hutton's early racial thinking. 
Hawley's influence was enduring. In 1876 Hutton wrote his first book, based upon 
Hawley's system, entitled, Light Drillfor Men in the 60th Rifles. In it he promoted 
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the individuality of riflemen and the importance of acting' as little like machines as 
possible.' 75 His respect for the qualities of the soldiers as individuals is also evident 
in remarks in his letters home from the 1879 Zulu campaign, which followed from the 
disastrous defeat of Lord Chelmsford's South African army and was the first war 
Hutton participated in: 'the more I see of the soldier,' he wrote to his stepfather, 'the 
more certain I feel that we do not give him credit for the intelligence, and quickness 
of perception which he possesses - this quality is particularly marked with us, who 
recruit almost entirely from London.' 76 Hutton, taught by Hawley to promote 
individual resourcefulness in order to achieve the tactics and manoeuvres required by 
the modern battlefield, had abandoned the aristocratic disdain with which a British 
officer traditionally viewed the recruit. This growing identification with the British 
soldier would influence his adoption of a racial perspective. 
Hutton's view of the British soldier matched a general shift in the attitude of the 
British public towards the troops. Anderson notes that, after the Crimea, the British 
public began to look far more fondly on their soldiers: early in the century they had 
been feared as drunken, press-ganged louts and were often refused service and even 
denied communion while in uniform; after the Crimea, preachers began to associate 
the army's mission with Christian virtue.77 Anderson ascribes this to a general 
militarisation of the British pUblic.78 The practical effects ofthis were improvements 
made to the conditions of army service in the latter part of the nineteenth century -
75 E. Hulton, Circular letter, 1876, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50092. 
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rations, barracks, and leisure facilities were all improved with the hope of attracting 
. 79 
more recruIts. 
The British public's growing militarism also fostered a greater coverage of military 
affairs and correspondents followed the army on most of its campaigns in this period. 
Individual officers, such as Wolseley, Roberts and Buller, had risen on the basis of 
their public reputations and had realised the importance of fostering good 
relationships with the press.80 Hutton was beginning to understand the importance of 
the press, too. During the first few months of the Zulu War he worked as a paid 
correspondent for the Times, describing the movements of his regiment. In May 
1879, when Hutton was appointed to the staff of General Crealock, he gave up his 
presswork, lamenting that, 'All my friends are not equally scrupulous.'81 Hutton's 
relationship with the press over the course of his career is an interesting one, marked 
by a conflict between his professional ambition and his sense of professional conduct; 
and between his relationship with the public and his relationships with his fellow 
officers. 
Hutton's professional military ambitions began to be fulfilled in Africa. His 
appointment as aide de camp to Major-General Hope Crealock on 30 April 1879, 
owing to good reports of his conduct on the march to Ekowe, marked the beginning of 
a military career outside his regiment - promising new paths to promotion and 
allowing Hutton more freedom to manage the direction of his career. 82 Ambitious 
officers of Hutton's day would transfer between regiments to participate in as many 
79 Streets, 'The Right Stamp of Men' ,57. 
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campaigns as possible in the hope of receiving brevet promotions (an army rather than 
a regimental rank).83 Shortly after accepting the post Hutton received an offer from 
Redvers Buller, commanding the Frontier Light Horse, to act as his second in 
command. He would quickly regret his rejection of that offer: Buller's force was 
operating with Evelyn Wood's column and both were members of Garnet Wolseley's 
'Ashanti ring'; Wolse1ey assumed command of the British campaign in June. His 
'ring' was a coterie of British officers formed from the thirty-six officers whom he led 
in the Ashanti campaign of 1873.84 This group of reform-minded officers mostly 
fought together in a series of campaigns over the next few decades. 
In contrast to the dynamic, modern style ofWolseley and his disciples, Hutton's new 
commander in South Africa, Crealock, proved to be cautious and plodding. Wolseley 
commented that no one who knew him would appoint Crealock to a 'command 
requiring dash and energetic movements. ,85 Crealock positioned his force badly, it 
was poorly supplied, unable to support Lord Chelmsford, and so far from its target 
Ulundi that, according to Wolseley, it 'might as well have been operating on the road 
to Aldershot.' 86 Hutton learned valuable lessons of the importance of transport, of 
adequate medical arrangements, and of mobility. 87 But they were lessons grounded in 
frustration and by July Hutton fully realised his mistake in not joining Buller's force. 
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He confided to his stepfather his disappointment with Crealock as a commander, his 
despair that in the public's estimation all their tiresome labour would count for 
nothing, and he took solace only in the fact that Wolseley would shortly arrive-
presenting him with an opportunity 'of making valuable acquaintances. ,88 Hutton had 
seen no action and therefore received no promotion. Worse yet was Wolseley's 
disdain: he could 'ill disguise his opinion of our General's slow but sure strategy, and 
we in his Staff come in for our share of ill favour. ,89 
In May 1879 Hutton attended the bedside of Arthur Mynoor, a British officer and 
fellow Etonian, dying of disease by the Inyzane river. He was so deeply moved by 
the experience that he wrote his stepfather, 'His last moments were so extraordinarily 
happy that I must tell you how one of the noblest specimens of an Eton boy I have 
ever met can die even in the horrible tortures of a wasting and frightful disease like 
dysentery.' He wrote of prayers, of lending Mynoorhis one luxury, a pillow, and of 
the young officer's dying words, 'Hush, don't touch me. I am going to heaven.,9o He 
also asked his stepfather to convey his report to Warre, who had been Mynoor's tutor, 
to be sent on to the boy's parents. Warre used the account in a Sunday sermon to the 
boys at Eton. Mynoor represented the ideal Etonian warrior as cultivated by Warre: 
he was a sportsman ('a plucky rider, and first rate runner'), a Christian, and he met 
death with a stoic, manly bravery. 91 This episode reveals that, fifteen years on from 
his education at Eton, Hutton remained deeply influenced by that schooling. He did 
not merely continue to subscribe to the Etonian ideal; but, in his continuing 
relationship with his alma mater, he helped it to flourish. 
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This ideal contrasted starkly with Hutton's impression of his quarry, the Zulu, whom 
he viewed as an inhuman and savage race: 
He is a brutal, fat, cunning looking savage, with a cast in his eye and a tendency 
to elephantiasis, brought on they say by drinking beer - His wives, six in 
number, are more distinguished for their want of clothing than for their beauty-
a string of small coloured beads being the sole costume of his favourite spouse! 
These savages are the only instance I have ever heard of human beings who had 
no religion, and no systems of burying their dead - for you cannot call a few 
superstitious sites a religion. However both physically and mentally these Zulus 
are a very vigorous race.92 
Hutton's use of race changed significantly over the course of his life. As he became 
more fearful for the continuance of British power, he became ever more absolute in 
his racial language. To give one example: his initial opinion of the French Canadians, 
fonned in the 1860s, was of a 'very industrious quiet people ... [who 1 speak their own 
language and keep to themselves in consequence; but they get on well with their 
English neighbours. ,93 At the turn of the century, following his Canadian command 
and his experience of French Canadian opposition to the Second South African War, 
that early tolerance had completely vanished, 'Must they not feel that the day will 
dawn when an Australian Anny will land in Vancouver, a British Anny at Quebec, 
and a South African Anny at St John N.B. who together will force the French 
92 Letter, Hutton to Lawrence, 23 April 79, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50090. 
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Canadian of the future to forever hold his peace should his efforts to force the tricolor 
upon Canada make such efforts necessary.,94 
Britons, generally, changed in their use of race from mid-century. Though they had 
previously felt a measure of superiority towards other peoples, this tended to be 
conceived as a cultural rather than racial difference; in the latter part of the century, 
however, such difference was increasingly viewed as inherited and innate.95 Noting 
the shift, Thompson provides the important corrective that Britain never experienced 
the kind of xenophobia which occurred elsewhere in Europe.96 Nevertheless, the old 
liberal and Protestant hope for individual - and national - salvation was challenged by 
this new idea. Lorimer explains it as a product of changes in the British class 
structure: membership of a common race promised all orders of society a connection 
to the nation.97 Rich suggests that external competition and imperial expansion were 
also powerful drivers behind the change.98 Both arguments have force: the use of race 
in the late nineteenth century was at once an expression of fear and a call for unity -
and in both senses it was essential in the development of the idea of Greater Britain. 
During the Zulu war, Hutton was quite ambivalent in his racial thinking. He tended to 
relate the experience of war itself to his closest peacetime equivalent, hunting, once 
confessing to his stepfather that, 'I am rather ashamed to own it, but 1 like this life and 
am as happy as the day is long. It is to me like a shooting expedition only there is no 
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actual sport! ,99 And he accepted the justice of British actions; yet still felt sincere 
regret at the consequences. This is most evident in his pity for the victims of British 
punitive raids, 'poor people we burnt their kraals - necessary to show our intentions 
to enforce our demands - (I suppose!!)' 100 In July, at the war's end, Hutton was 
surprised at the docility of his former enemy, 'They have the most perfect confidence 
in our good faith. These savages who two weeks since would have assegaied us all if 
they could, now stand round as we pass looking on with the greatest interest, and 
kindly looks - and come into our camps and laugh and talk to our men without the 
least apparent dread OfUS.'101 He ascribed to the Zulu an almost child-like simplicity 
but still retained his stepfather's liberal, Christian paternalism. Rich describes this 
ambivalent mixture of feelings, suggesting the British saw the blacks as 'both savage 
and bestial figures who needed to be controlled at all costs and as passive and helpless 
beings in need of missionary care and protection.' 102 
That same ambivalence is evident in a lecture Hutton presented to the Staff College 
based on his experiences in the war. In it he combined Christian patemalism with a 
crude social Darwinism. Social Darwinism became increasingly popular in Britain 
from the 1860s, by which time many had given up on assimilation, doubting whether 
'savage' races could survive the advance of white culture. 103 Hutton in his lecture 
referred to a 'natural law of nations' and warned of' continual struggle with the native 
races': 
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The history of all colonies is in this aspect the same - a life struggle between 
savagery and civilisation! 
The result in all cases is the same! 
Sooner or later the savage becomes extinct either in his being or at least in his 
habits - as instances may be quoted the North American Indians who in Canada 
are disappearing before the onward march of Anglo-Saxon settlers - the Maoris 
in New Zealand who are fast disappearing in point of number - the more 
degraded Aborigines in Australia are almost extinct - the Hottentots again in the 
Cape Colony, though they have by intermarriage lost their identity, may be said 
still to exist, from the fact of their having adapted themselves to the usages of 
civilised life, and been absorbed into the homogenous coloured populations 
accordingly. 104 
The Zulu, in this speech, was an instinctual warrior - a racial, rather than merely 
cultural, predisposition - as is evident in Hutton's discourse on Zulu biology: 
The Zulu is above all else a warrior! His whole life is devoted to hunting and 
military exercises. His whole thoughts are of war, and his greatest ambition is 
to have wetted his spear, and thus acquired the right to marry. 
His countenance is open and features engaging, the features, more often than not 
lit up by a smile for his sense of the ridiculous is great, are certainly 
prepossessing and not of the low type of African savage, characterised by thick 
lips and low forehead. 
104 Hutton, 'Personal Recollections of the Zulu War', 45. 
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Their average height is about 5.9 and symmetrical as they are the development 
of the muscles of their lower limbs are especially remarkable. lOS 
Within this scheme of conflict, and of savage races, pity was a sign of weakness and 
defeat fatal to prestige. Native populations could only be controlled by the use and 
display of power. 
Surprisingly, however, it was in this same speech that Hutton also promoted the old 
Christian mission (quoted fully at the beginning ofthis chapter): 'to carry civilization 
and the blessings of peace and religion among the native races of South Africa.' 106 As 
Hutton became ever more sensitive to challenges to British power this ambivalence 
faded away. 
The contemporary British stereotype of an African ruler, as represented in popular 
productions like The Zulu Chief and Cetewayo at last, was one oflust, chaotic 
violence, and trickery. 107 In mid-August 1879, following the conclusion of hostilities, 
Hutton had an opportunity oftesting that stereotype when he was invited to join a 
patrol attempting the capture of Cetewayo. On that journey they visited the kraal of 
another Zulu chief, Somkeli, seeking intelligence. This episode afforded Hutton his 
most intimate view of Zulu life. He later described it as one of the most 'delicate and 
dangerous situations' of his career. lOS The tone of the meeting was friendly, Hutton 
flirted with the chieftain's many wives and passed out biscuits to the children; 
however, the scouting party was small and would have been helpless had their Zulu 
hosts revolted. 
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In that position, Hutton viscerally felt the importance of British prestige. He wrote to 
his stepfather admitting that, 'our lives depended upon the moral effect of the English 
Impi 70 miles off at Ulundi and [we 1 were careful to keep watch ... horses saddled 
that night.' 109 In his memoir he represented British prestige in the figure of Herbert 
Stewart, their leader: 'Standing in the centre of the circle in front of the chief, he 
looked, as he was, a dignified gentleman, and a leader such as any man, black or 
white, would be proud to follow.' 110 British prestige is incarnate in an individual. 
This type of encounter, where a solitary Briton meets a large and threatening body of 
natives, quelling them with a natural authority, recurred a couple of years later in 
Hutton's career when General Archibald Alison saved Hutton and others at Tanta 
from a mass of retreating soldiers by boldly demanding that the senior Egyptian 
officer come before him and surrender. I I I It also mirrored a popular trope of the day. 
Hutton's Zulu story, for instance, is reminiscent of the way General Gordon was said 
to have wielded his personal authority. I 12 Such encounters were under girded by the 
feeling that British power was fragile and that their authority would collapse with a 
loss of face. 
Burroughs suggests that because the Victorian army was numerically small it relied, 
to a significant extent, on the threat offorce. He describes this as 'a form of imperial 
bluff.' 113 Prestige was deemed a vital accession to British strength. During this period 
Hutton increasingly felt the absolute necessity of maintaining that prestige -
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indicating a growing awareness of external threats that spurred him on in his 
developing nationalism. 
The destruction of the Zulu nation left a vacuum in South Africa that emboldened the 
Boers. They clashed with the British at Majuba Hill, defeating a small British force 
there. The symbolic effect of that defeat was, for Hutton, devastating: 
Thus ended an action disastrous to the British Arms and far more important to 
the Boer Forces than might be supposed from the small number of British troops 
engaged. Their prestige as fighting men was established and the moral effect of 
their victory was by far the most important event that had occurred in the history 
of the Boer Race in South Africa. I 14 
The themes of race and of prestige, which had emerged during the Zulu war, recur. It 
was vital to Hutton that the symbolic power of British arms be recovered: 'Every 
officer and man felt that the occasion demanded that some effort should be made to 
restore British prestige if South Africa was to remain part of the British Empire.' 115 
Hutton was incensed at the Boers' expedient response to British reversals, and their 
willingness to make cause with the Zulus to protect their independence, and he was 
adamant that the British must not withdraw in the face of such challenges. 'They [the 
Boer leaders],' Hutton fulminated to his stepfather, 'must be ignorant of the 
characteristics of Englishmen.' 116 
Hutton therefore eagerly responded to a telegram requesting that he return to South 
Africa and take command of a squadron of mounted infantry. However, he barely had 
a chance to organise his force, let alone see any action, before the armistice with the 
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Boers was renewed (in March 1881). Hutton was disgusted at the early peace talks. 
He described the Boers to his stepfather as 'a semi-barbarous people' and doubted 
they could be influenced into submitting to any British terms in the face of their 
victories. '17 The great issue at stake for Hutton was British military prestige. No 
peace could last, for Hutton, until the British army's power to deal with rebellion was 
re-established and their standing in South Africa reasserted. '18 Hutton regretted the 
terms of the peace treaty, decrying the loss of British status: 
The Boers were always looked down upon by the worthy Briton who in his 
usual self-sufficiency considered the Boer and his opinions as beneath contempt. 
In my opinion it was very much this feeling which brought about the premature 
annexation of the Transvaal. The Boers have now more than indicated their 
character both as warriors and as free men capable of self-govermnent. But that 
our ministry should at such a critical moment, after practically 3 reverses, give 
in to the rebel Boers, is to give direct encouragement to lawlessness and riot. 
Loss of prestige in a country like this, where a few white men hold a country the 
mass of the population is either Dutch or black and inimical to our race, is a 
more important matter than Messrs Gladstone and Co seem to think. I 19 
In this quote, Hutton painted a dire picture of a British Empire based on racial 
prestige, threatened with rebellion and conflict at every turn. He emphasised that it 
was Downing Street that forced the peace: there is a sense that Gladstone, his 
ministers, and politicians generally, had betrayed the nation; and that it was soldiers 
and British fighting prestige that upheld the Empire. Govermnents must be strong. 
Hutton wrote to his brother, Fred, of further peace talks in April: 'Peace or war will 
follow the weakness or firmness of the govermnent at the present crisis. If again the 
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government yield now, there must be eventually war. The Boers are too opposed to 
civilization and trade to be allowed to have the exclusive management of such a 
country as the Transvaal. ' 120 Hutton's experience of the Boers had confirmed in him 
the importance of maintaining British prestige, had excited in him racial feelings, and 
had shown him that politicians could not always be trusted to maintain the national 
interest. 
Hutton was therefore beginning to adopt a racial perspective of the Empire, one that 
competed with his stepfather's liberal Christian vision. This grew from his 
identification with British soldiers (a product of his professionalism), his manly ideal 
of the British officer (the pinnacle of the race), his encounters with other races, and 
his increasing sense of external challenges to British power and the need to maintain 
prestige. 
Hutton's return to South Africa to fight the Boers marked a further professional 
disappointment. His failure to see action meant no promotion and no new career 
prospects. He lingered in the country, hunting with Redvers Buller, and contemplated 
the future of mounted forces. This was the one positive note of a second abortive 
African campaign: Hutton had been introduced to mounted infantry, a new type of 
British army unit, first used in the Zulu war, and in the development of which he came 
to playa leading role. Unlike cavalry, who were armed with a carbine and sword, 
lance or pistol, and who used the horse itself as a weapon, mounted infantry rode only 
for mobility, carried rifles, and would dismount in combat. Organising his squadron 
had been a valuable experience for Hutton; he saw great potential in mounted infantry 
120 Letter, Hutton to his brother, Fred, 25 April 1881, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50090. 
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and he hoped that a permanent Corps of Mounted Infantry might be established in 
England (and that he might thereby gain some sort of command).J2I Refusing an offer 
to stay on in South Africa to establish a squadron of mounted infantry there 
(preferring to complete Staff College), he proposed that a school of mounted infantry 
be established at Peitermaritzberg to train detachments from the infantry battalions 
serving in South Africa. This scheme was accepted and the school was established 
along lines planned by Hutton. 122 When Hutton returned to England in September 
1881, therefore, although professionally frustrated, the potential of mounted infantry 
had been brought alive to him. He had developed a scheme for the instruction of 
regular infantry units in mounted infantry duties, by way of a mounted infantry 
school. On his return to England he began lobbying for the formation of a similar 
school at Aldershot. 123 
If Hutton's imperialism was realised most fully in his colonial commands, then his 
central role in the development of mounted infantry was to become the highpoint of 
his military professionalism. He achieved this in concert with Gamet Wolseley and 
his ring, the most professionally dynamic British officers of their day. Hutton became 
directly involved with Wolseley in the early 1880s, having been appointed to the post 
of private secretary to General Archibald Alison, the head of the Intelligence 
Department at the War Office. On 1 June 1882, Hutton was appointed to a committee 
for training the Reserve on which Wolseley sat. Wolseley was impressed and invited 
Hutton to act as assistant secretary to another body he chaired: the mobilisation 
committee for the contemplated expedition to Egypt. 124 In order to understand 
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Hutton's later career in the colonies, it is vital to contend with the influence of 
Wolseley. Hutton had several important mentors in his life - his stepfather, Warre, 
Hawley, and Seeley - but ifhe could be said to have modelled his career on just one 
person then it must be Wolseley. 
Wolseley represented Hutton's ideal of a manly, professional soldier. The son of a 
poor Irish officer, Wolseley had risen in the army by virtue of a series of daring 
actions on campaign in the Crimea, Burma and China. He was also the army's chief 
reformer and believed in a professional and educated officer COrpS.125 Wolseley 
combined the scientific with the Romantic; as he himself once wrote, 'All this means 
that whilst no one can be a general who lacks the inestimable gift of imagination, yet 
not all the imagination of a Milton will of itself alone enable anyone to be great in 
war.' 126 
Hutton came to hold many views in company with Wolseley: a distrust of politicians, 
fear of a great continental war, and a belief that soldiers had a duty to defend the 
Empire. This letter of Wolseley' s is indicative: 
The great war still hides behind the horizon of our power of forecast. No cloud, 
even as big as a man's hand, is yet to be seen to windward. All the cleverest 
calculations as to the future have failed and the world outside of Europe has 
become too commonplace and well known for the man of action. 'Jaw' is now 
King, and the man who can flatter the crowd most effectively is he who obtains 
the privilege of being its well paid servant. As yet there is no decline in the 
manly characteristics of our soldiers and sailors, our Generals and Admirals; it is 
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only the quality of our rulers, the fibre of our ministers that has undergone a 
change for the worse: they have conformed to the democratic system of the 
day ... We want leaders and we are told to look for them in some howling fellow 
who for the time being is in the front rank of the most ignorant of our people.127 
Wolseley despised politicians and longed for the return of' Statesmen.' 128 He blamed 
party politics for cuts in defence estimates and believed that only soldiers were truly 
loyal to the nation. 129 He imagined this to be a politically neutral stance (he 
encouraged his brother George to never refer to politics and keep his opinions to 
himself);l3o yet, as Strachan demonstrates, this hatred of politicians was in fact a 
distrust of parliamentary democracy and a political stance in itself. 131 
Hutton also came to adopt many of Wolseley' s strategies. Wolseley's signal 
achievement was to form from the British army a corps ready for mobilisation for 
service at home or abroad (as Hutton later did in the colonies with his field armies).132 
The continental threat posed by mass conscription was to be met by the creation of a 
small, but highly professional, army.133 Wolseley achieved this and other reforms, 
over the opposition of spendthrift governments and conservative officers, by making 
direct appeals to popular opinion.134 To this end he used the press to exploit British 
fears of its vulnerability to French invasion. 135 Wolseley's expedient habit of 
responding to crises overseas by the plundering of experienced troops from home 
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battalions was imitated by Hutton in his plans for the formation of a mounted infantry 
corps d 'elite by harvesting experienced troops from infantry regiments. 136 
On campaign in North Africa in the early l880s, Hutton gained further experience 
with mounted infantry units. In mid-l 882 he followed Alison, commanding the 
advance force, to Egypt where Arabi, an Egyptian army officer, had risen against his 
government. Hutton was charged with the raising of a small corps of mounted 
infantry police to conduct reconnaissance and patrols. He later claimed that he 
formed it with an eye to proving his' conviction that the innovation [mounted 
infantry] was worthy of adoption in some form as a permanent arm of the British 
Army.' 137 Whether this is true or not, he certainly profited from this opportunity to 
further experiment with the creation of a mounted force. He also prospered by his 
part in the action that followed, especially Tel-el-Kebir, and received a promotion to 
brevet major in the November 1882 gazette, proudly claiming many friends 'among 
the rising lot.' 138 
The 1882 Egyptian campaign was the grandest moment of Hutton' s early career - he 
finally had scope to display a manly and athletic valour on active service. Once again 
he compared the dangers to sport: they 'appeared as no more than the chances of the 
football field; we threw ourselves into the "game" with all our might and thoroughly 
enjoyed it, and looking back, I think it is this spirit which enables great victories to be 
won and great deeds done.' 139 Hutton left his mounted infantry to serve with Alison's 
brigade, which comprised four battalions of Highlanders within the second division. 
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The whole force was under Garnet Wolseley's command. Hutton quickly 
distinguished himself in action: on 5 August Alison's brigade conducted a 
reconnaissance in force and Hutton's actions in the ensuing battle earned him a 
mention in Alison's despatch. 14o The mounted infantry corps he had formed also did 
conspicuously well, losing by death or wounding every officer posted to it except 
Pratt and Melgund (later Lord Minto, Hutton's Governor General in Canada). 
Wolseley made much mention of them and Hutton shared in the praise. 141 
The battle ofTel-el-Kebir, on 13 September 1882, was the largest and fiercest 
engagement Hutton ever fought in. Among all the little wars of the period, this was 
one of the few occasions when the British army fought a large-scale action against a 
trained and well-equipped enemy. General Wolseley gained great fame from an 
encounter that he had planned with audacity, ordering a difficult night march over 
miles of Egyptian desert culminating in a pre-dawn bayonet charge on Arabi's 
encampment, an entrenched position consisting of well-engineered earthworks and 
gun emplacements. 
The Highland brigade, commanded by Alison, assumed a prominent role in the 
assault: it was the leading unit of the second division, the first British unit to make 
contact with the enemy, and it faced the toughest sector of Arabi's entrenchments. 142 
At this time Highland units were venerated, supposedly possessing a racial aptitude 
for war, and were used in the fore of battles as elite shock troopS.143 Alison and 
Hutton shared in their mystique. In a letter home to his wife, Alison describes feeling 
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like a Highland Chief, 'Hutton,' he wrote, 'is thinking of calling himself McHutton & 
getting a kilt.' 144 Hutton wrote shortly afterwards of the glorious conduct of his 
brigade at Tel-el-Kebir, 'It was a splendid day for the Highland brigade - a triumph of 
discipline and true British dash worthy of what are called the days when we really had 
anny of something else than boys!! ']45 
During the battle, Hutton himself had ample opportunity of displaying the manly, 
martial gallantry he had come to hold as a key virtue. 'A soldier's battle indeed it 
was', he reminisced later, 'men fought in groups or singly, hand to hand, until their 
foe, fighting as desperately, were bayoneted or put to flight.' 146 Hutton acquitted 
himself with an impressive valour. Early in the battle, when the initial assault was 
failing, he was instrumental in rallying the troops, being one of the few officers to 
have kept his mount, and therefore looked to in the dark and confusion. 147 His 
exploits continued even after his horse was killed under him: recovering, covered in 
blood, and finding himself separated from the rest of the staff, he gathered together a 
band of men from several different regiments. Leading them, he charged a redoubt, 
taking it and its three guns. He continued on, capturing a Krupp field-piece and 
bringing it into action against the enemy's flank. 148 
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The war ended soon after that battle and Cairo fell the following day. Before the 
conclusion of hostilities Hutton contracted a tropical disease in the festering town of 
Tanta and almost died -later relapses nearly ended his career. 149 
Arabi was captured and sentenced to death (later commuted to lifelong exile). 
Hutton's reaction to the trial reveals his growing feelings about the relative merits of 
soldiers and politicians, and also his sense of a connection between the professional 
soldier and the nation. He was angered by a trial that he felt indecently brief and 
which failed even to pretend to justice and he sympathised with Arabi as a fellow 
soldier. I so He contrasted Arabi's patriotism with the machinations ofthe politicians 
whom he believed were truly responsible for the uprising against Turkish rule: Arabi 
had 'shown himself to be a patriot at heart, and it was generally felt that the 
determined effort of Arabi and his friends had been encouraged by their belief that 
Egypt had only to follow in the steps of the Boers to gain from the British 
Government all that they laid themselves out to require.' lSI It was Gladstone and 
politicians that were truly to blame - a very Wolseleyan sentiment. 
North Africa remained in turmoil after the Egyptian campaign. A religious leader, the 
Mahdi, had fomented an insurrection in the Sudan. His army surrounded General 
Gordon, who had remained in Khartoum against the Gladstone government's orders. 
Gladstone resisted demands for a relief expedition through much of 1884, yet there 
were persistent rumours of one being sent. Hutton lobbied Buller to be included in 
any such expedition. ls2 He was also devoting much thought to the development of 
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mounted infantry - he drew up a scheme at the beginning of 1883 for submission to 
the War Office and, in early 1884, wrote an article on the subject for the Illustrated 
Naval and Military Magazine. 153 He had consolidated his thoughts on the subject, 
based upon his experiences in South Africa and Egypt. In the Spring of 1884 
Wolseley asked Hutton to draw up a scheme for the establishment of a mounted 
infantry force in the event of war. 154 Hutton did so and, when the commander of the 
Egyptian Mounted Infantry broke his back riding, Hutton was invited to go to Egypt 
to prepare the force. 155 
What followed was one of the gravest disappointments of Hutton's career. Hutton's 
professional dreams, which had been established by his stepfather, nurtured by Warre 
at Eton, encouraged by Hawley in his regiment, spurred on by reforms to the British 
army itself and confirmed by experience of the Zulu, First South African, and 
Egyptian campaigns, were finally being realised with his role in the development of 
mounted infantry and his association with Wolseley. These, however, were struck an 
awful blow by his failure to live up to the manly ideal that had become another 
essential pillar of his identity. 
On his return to North Africa, Hutton assembled a force of 500 men mounted on 
camels, a feat never before attempted without native drivers. He later claimed it as a 
kind of racial victory, demonstrating 'that British soldiers could do what no other 
soldier, black or white, in the world had never yet done' and proving the 'adaptability 
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of the British soldier.' 156 It was a fine command and Hutton imagined sneaking it 
through the desert, cooperating with Bedouins, and launching a coup-de-main upon 
Abou Hamed. 1 57 Unfortunately he was struck low with severe heat exhaustion, linked 
to his earlier tropical fever. Hutton was ordered horne, a terrible setback, and he 
complained to his stepfather of having to abandon the 'finest command any young 
officer has ever [Hutton's emphasis, underlined seven times] had.'158 Hutton was 
deeply ashamed, he had been unable to fulfil the manly ideal demanded of officers: 'I 
realized that 1 had disappointed my friends, and, through my break-down in health, 
had not corne up to their expectations. 1 had failed in active work in the field which 
after all is the one and only test of an officer's value.' 159 When Hutton returned 
months later he suffered a major relapse almost immediately. He viewed this as the 
saddest moment of his life. 16o He made one final attempt, procuring a white parasol 
for the march, and was again beaten back by the sun. 161 In February 1885 this last ill-
fated trip came back to haunt him: Buller was furious, he had found Hutton a billet on 
the condition he stay put, and was now rewarded by Wolseley's accusation that he 
was 'keeping lame ducks' about.162 Hutton was ordered horne. 
If Tel-el-Kebir was the manly summit of Hutton's early career, then this Sudanese 
fiasco was the nadir. It was not just a failure to live up to the sporting, athletic ideal: 
to Hutton, this also made it a professional failure. During the Zulu war he had 
ridiculed the effete and unsporting officers who joined him on a scouting party 
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remarking that they 'could hardly saddle their own horses much less catch a meal at 
the end ofa day's work.' 163 In North Africa it was he who had failed that test and he 
despaired, 'My professional hopes of the intermediate present are dashed again rudely 
to the ground.'\64 
Hutton's notions of professionalism and manliness therefore encouraged and 
informed the character of his developing nationalism and imperialism. He conceived 
of a professional responsibility to defend the nation, respected British regulars, and 
favoured leaders who were vigorous and manly. The notions of professionalism and 
manliness - courage and skill- acted in concert to provide Hutton with a sense of 
legitimacy as an officer not based on class. If challenged in the 1880s, he might very 
well have given almost identical answers to those prescribed by the soldier's 
catechism for Cromwell's New Model Army, issued in 1644 by the British 
parliament: 
Question What are the principall things required in a soldier? 
Answer I. That hie bee religious and godly. 
2. That hie be courageous and valiant. 
3. That hie be skilfull in the Militarie profession. 165 
The one point of difference would have been the meaning implied by 'religious and 
godly.' As Huntington demonstrates, although Cromwell's army was very similar to 
the professional, national armies of nineteenth century Europe, it was distinguished by 
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its 'ideological-religious fervour.' 166 It had a religious rather than a national focus. 
Hutton himself was yet to voice the strident nationalist and imperialist sentiments that 
appear later in his career, and to that extent he remained ambivalent towards the 
nation and Empire. It was the kind of Christianity taught him by his stepfather that 
had held him back. For this reason, the change in Hutton's Christian faith during his 
early career is fundamental in an understanding of how he came to embrace late-
Victorian imperialism. 
Throughout his life Hutton was influenced by his stepfather's religious opinions. Over 
time, however, these views were challenged by exposure to a different kind of 
Christianity. At Eton and in the army Hutton discovered a religion that was 
ecumenical, nationally unifYing, and sentimental. The contest between these two 
types of faith was an essential feature of Hutton's early career. 
In this period a great change took place in British religious life for which the 1860s 
were pivotal years. Kitson Clarke describes the decade as the peak of the 'crisis of 
the nineteenth-century attack on religion.' 167 The publication of The Origin of Species 
in 1859 opened a door for the penetration into ordinary society of ideas that 
challenged fundamental tenets of Christian faith, culminating in the late 1860s with 
the battle in Britain over the status of the Athanasian Creed (the most troubling part of 
the service for many Anglicans who could no longer accept official Church 
doctrine).168 The Romantic faith of the Broad Church movement offered a way of 
resolving these doubts. This movement had its intellectual origins in Coleridge and 
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his challenging of a literal reading of the scriptures. 169 It offered a practical, rather 
than doctrinal, approach to Christianity and stressed the virtues of patriotism, morality 
and civic unity.170 In the 1860s it posed its own challenges to the established Church: 
in 1860 seven churchmen produced the influential Broad Church tract, Essays and 
Reviews, and in 1865 Seeley published Ecce Homo, a wildly popular work which 
challenged biblical literalism with its unorthodox portrayal of Jesus. The general 
result was a retreat from doctrinal, theological Christianity: by the 1880s the Anglican 
Church itself was hesitant in intellectual controversy and many of its parishioners had 
turned to the example of Christian lives, rather than doctrine, as the basis for their 
faith. I7l 
Hutton's induction in these ideas began at Eton under Warre, whose religious practice 
was tied to his notions of manly conduct. Warre favoured character over intellect and 
believed that Eton must send forth 'Christian gentlemen.' 172 Christian faith was 
essential- but it was a faith built on ethics, not doctrine. Christianity, to Warre, was 
something to be practiced rather than studied. This type of faith was witnessed in 
valour, in patriotism, and in honesty. 173 It was a type of faith that contrasted sharply 
with the theological beliefs of Hutton's stepfather, but a type offaith that Hutton 
came slowly to accept. 
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It was only in the 1880s that this religious dialogue fully matured in Hutton. Serving 
in the army of occupation in Egypt after Arabi's defeat, Hutton led an invigorating 
life: he mixed with the European community in Cairo, attended functions and dinner 
parties, and was engaged in much earnest discussion. On one such occasion the after-
supper talk drifted to matters of faith and Lord Dufferin, challenged as to his silence, 
declared theological debate to be pointless and claimed to have an unquestioning faith 
in the 'religion of my mother's knee.' 174 This resonated with Hutton who felt that 
this, 'better meets one's needs than the abstruse arguments which have been brought 
to bear on this great and vital question.' 175 Hutton wanted a practical faith, founded 
on morality rather than on doctrine. Hutton's religion of his 'mother's knee' 
answered to those needs but it was a stance directly repudiated by his stepfather: 
'There are some who will follow you with their prayers, and I hope you are going 
forth upon their responsible charges, strong in dependence upon the Lord - and this 
not in a general way, but in the apprehension of the Christ as your saviour, which 
would enable you to lay with the great apostle.' 176 
Hutton drifted from his stepfather's intellectual and theological Protestantism during 
the 1880s. So much so that when his stepfather wrote Hutton introducing a 
temperance speaker and asking for his son's assistance, Hutton replied 
sympathetically but in the negative - fearing that temperance societies created ill will 
amongst soldiers. 177 His stepfather was an active churchman and it was assumed that 
Hutton would follow him; however, at the end of 1883, when the Church of England 
Soldiers' Institute Committee approached him to join, Hutton replied that, though he 
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was concerned about soldiers' welfare, he shied from 'anything which tends to be of a 
sectarian character and which however indirectly may set one class against another' 
and that: 
My views with reference to all similar institutions are that they would 
accomplish a far larger amount of good and that to a far larger section of the 
Army if the religious element were entirely omitted.178 
In his dealings with military chaplains of different faiths, Hutton was catholic in his 
sympathies: in his letter to his stepfather, he describes a Roman Catholic chaplain, 
Father Brindle. He felt Brindle did much better work for the sick than his Anglican 
counterpart and favoured him for a position with the regiment. 179 In this attitude, 
Hutton reflected the current mainstream army view - indeed Brindle was one of the 
most popular men in the Sudan expedition and Wolseley himself tried to get him 
knighted - chaplains were valued for their utility and doctrine hardly mattered. 180 
Anderson notes this shift, which occurred from the mid-1860s, from an exclusively 
Anglican to a broadly Christian army. She links it with the recruiting crisis and the 
need to improve conditions for recruits. 181 There was another, more fundamental, 
cause. As Hanham argues, this shift was connected to the rise of nationalism - the 
soldier could finally be trusted to view their primary obligation as belonging to king 
and country. 182 
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The religious crisis had significant implications for the development of late-Victorian 
imperialism: a vital plank of the Broad Church position was its view of a church co-
extensive with the nation state.183 The Church of England, for its part, sought to 
reposition itself as the 'National Church.' 184 For Hutton personally, religious change 
was critical. It allowed his stepfather's evangelical vision of Empire, whose focus 
was the spread of civilisation and religion to benighted heathen, to be replaced with a 
vision of a white, self-governing Empire, united by a shared national religion. 
Wolseiey captured the mood eloquently in a speech in 1889, when he ridiculed those 
who disdained nationalist rhetoric on the grounds that we are all God's creatures, 
claiming, 'But I cannot for one moment believe that the strong instinct which has 
been given to me, and I daresay to most of you, of love of country and of intense 
nationality, can be in any way opposed to the teachings ofreiigion.'185 
In the years of his schooling, and the first decades of his career, nation, race and 
Empire therefore gradually assumed for Hutton the places traditionally held by class 
and a strict Protestant faith. He had attained two essential qualities that predisposed 
him to nationalist and imperialist feelings: professionalism and manliness - one 
middle class, the other pseudo-aristocratic. Throughout this period the religious 
positions of his stepfather, his school, and the army contended. This religious debate 
softened his racial views and delayed his full adoption of a nationalistic perspective. 
Hutton finally came to adopt a Christianity that identified the Church with the nation 
and allowed him to fully embrace late-Victorian imperialism. 
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It is therefore not surprising that it was in March 1885 that Hutton first referred to the 
possibility of defence assistance from the colonies, a theme which dominated his later 
career. 
The precipitating factor was the 1885 war scare with Russia. Russia had been moving 
into North-West Afghanistan, exciting British fears for the defence of India. A clash 
between Russian troops and Afghanis at Pendjeh, the key to the Herat Pass, sent 
Britain to the brink of war. British relations with Russia had been particularly tense 
over the past decade: in 1875 Russia had enrolled a quarter of its males over the age 
of 21 for fifteen years service, to create a massive conscript army; in 1877 Russian 
troops had begun to march on Constantinople - nearly triggering war with Britain; in 
1878 Russia had signed a treaty with the Afghani emir which had caused General 
Roberts to march on Kabul. Russia was viewed as Britain's most potent threat -
particularly in its designs on Central Asia.186 
This turn of events prompted Hutton to consider more closely the possibility of 
raising a mounted infantry force in the event of a national emergency. On March 7 
1885 he drafted a scheme for the raising of a brigade of mounted infantry volunteers, 
writing, 'In the event of hostilities with Russia or indeed in any national emergency 
which may necessitate a sudden and considerable development ofthe military 
resources of the British Empire.' 187 Hutton proposed that a selection of British 
volunteer forces - from the Volunteers and the Militia - be trained as mounted 
infantry in order to relieve the cavalry, which lacked sufficient reserves. His scheme 
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allowed for the creation of a brigade of 2000 mounted infantry. 188 He sent this home 
for consideration and received compliments from General Alison and the British 
Commander in Chief, the Duke of Cambridge. 189 This was an important moment in 
the development of his plans for mounted infantry. 
It was also a milestone in the development of his thinking about the Empire. At the 
time, Hutton was serving in Cairo and he had been guiding around that city a group of 
Canadian voyageurs come to assist Wolseley - he was also no doubt aware of the 
contingent sent to the Sudan by New South Wales the previous month (it arrived at 
the end of March) - and perhaps these factors excited in him the hope he expressed to 
his stepfather, that a war with Russia, 'would be the best thing in the world for the 
British Empire, and would do more to weld the units of Greater Britain to the Mother 
Country than anything else.'l90 This was a subject to which Hutton gave much 
thought over the next decade, when he consolidated the idea of Greater Britain that he 
took with him to his colonial commands. 
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3. Preparing for the Coming Struggle: 1880s and 1890s 
Gentlemen, we are warned on all sides by the leading Statesmen of this country, and 
by the political condition of our Continental neighbours, that a great crisis in the 
world's history is at hand, that, as was said by a well known and prominent military 
leader not long since, - 'a war cloud is hanging over Europe, greater than any which 
has hung over Europe before.' This crisis cannot he long deferred, and may, indeed, 
be upon us at a moment's notice, and we may then find ourselves as soldiers the 
Champions of the Unity, nay, of the very Existence, of this Great Empire, an 
inheritance which has been built up piece by piece by the successive efforts of our 
predecessors in arms, and which now stands as the vastest, the richest, the most 
intellectual, the most advanced in civilization of any empire which has ever existed in 
the world's history' 
Edward Hutton, 1889 
Edward Hutton came to this outlook by way of the influence of several men and the 
experience of many years. He did not start out this way and, as late as 1879, he had 
still clung to the old liberal view that Britain had a civilising and evangelising mission 
to the world. A mere decade later and Hutton spoke of a rich and a vast 'inheritance' 
that must be protected against rapacious neighbours and impending crisis. 
Intellectually, many of the different threads came together in Hutton's mind during 
the late 1880s and early 1890s. 
This period of creativity grew from professional failure. The mounted infantry 
distinguished themselves in the Sudan. They played a key role in several battles - on 
two occasions repulsing the enemy when the British square failed. Hutton described 
how, as selected men, the mounted infantry came to be viewed as a corps d'elite and 
'the name of Mounted Infantry a byword for all the most brilliant characteristics of 
the British Soldier.,2 It was a sentiment shared by WolseJey himself. 3 The dying 
1 E. Hutton, 'Mounted Infantry - Its Present and Its Future', Lecture 18, Military Lectures, Aldershot 
Military Society, 21 March 1889,19. 
2 Letter, Hutton to Lawrence, 1 March 1885, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50090. 
3 Letter, Alison to Hutton, 25 April 1885, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50092; Letter, Barrow to Hutton, 1 
April 1885, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50092. 
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words of General Herbert Stewart, killed on the advance to Khartoum, were 'I will 
never forget the Mounted Infantry.'4 
Wolseley and Buller, when gazetting officers for promotion after the campaign, 
however, did forget. Many mounted infantry officers were overlooked and Hutton, 
who had been unable to fight, missed out altogether. Buller assured Hutton he had 
done his best but Wolseley would not have it. 5 Lack of promotion stalled the progress 
of Hutton's career. He seemed headed back to a quiet regimental life when, in late 
1885, he was presented with an alternative. Major-General Frederick Middleton, 
commanding the Canadian militia, offered him the leadership of the Canadian 
Northwest Mounted Police. Middleton envisaged Hutton organising that force along 
the lines of the mounted infantry units he had been developing.6 
Hutton was initially unimpressed by an offer that would isolate him from the War 
Office, and promotion to a staff vacancy at home, for several years, and prevent him 
fighting in any intervening major war - the fastest track to promotion. He had also 
begun lobbying in earnest for the formation of a mounted infantry school at Aldershot 
and he hoped to be appointed to its command. Members of the Wolseley ring 
encouraged Hutton to set aside his qualms and embrace the offer. He confided to his 
friend Melgund the influence of those officers: 'I am not so particularly anxious for 
the billet - but both Lord Wolseley and Buller advise me to go if asked.' 1 Hutton 
therefore agreed to two interviews with the Canadian Prime Minister, John 
Macdonald, who fired his imagination with the great future ahead of the Northwest 
4 Letter, Gough to Hutton, 16 July 1885, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50092. 
5 Letter, Buller to Hutton, 26 May 1885, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50086. 
6 Letter, Middleton to Hutton, 9 October 1885, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50092. 
7 Letter, Hutton to Minto, 18 January 1886. NLS, Minto Papers, Ms. 12386, f. 4. 
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following the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway.8 Macdonald tentatively 
offered Hutton the job and he accepted, anticipating that the post 'will require the 
greatest tact, for as an Imperial Officer I must expect much passive resistance.,9 It 
was with surprise, and some indignation, that Hutton learned in February 1886 of his 
rejection by the Canadian government who had decided that a civilian commander 
would better suit the role. 10 
This episode was significant in focussing Hutton's attention on the self-governing 
Empire. It also demonstrates the influence members of the Wolseley ring exerted 
over his career - it was only at their encouragement that he considered accepting the 
offer. Its most important aspect, however, was in its further stymieing of Hutton's 
military progress. Frustrated and professionally inactive, Hutton turned to intellectual 
activity as the only outlet for his considerable drive. He spent the following few years 
considering a range of issues - the threat of war, military reform, professionalism, 
manliness, race, nation and empire - and adopting positions that he carried into his 
later career in the colonies. 
By the late 1880s the British Empire had become central to Hutton's worldview: he 
had witnessed colonial participation in the Sudan expedition; John Macdonald had 
awakened him to the material potential of the colonies; and by 1886 he himself was 
proselytising for the Empire. In a lecture he gave to the boys at Eton in that year, 
entitled 'Our Recent Campaigns', he spoke of the Empire's 'extraordinary growth and 
8 E. Hutton, 'Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hutton', Chapter 9, 2, BL, Hutton Papers, 
ADD50112. 
9 Letter, Hutton to Gen Harmon, 10 January 1886, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50093. This statement is 
rcrescient. Hutton later ran into severe political trouble as commander of the Canadian militia. 
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development.' 1 1 Interestingly, it was to the commercial side of the Empire that 
Hutton gave most of his attention. Discussing the Ashanti campaign, for example, he 
stressed the 'many thousands of miles of coast added, as a consequent [sic] to an 
Empire and above all the growth of a great trade with the tribes and densely populated 
values [sic] of the Niger has been hastened.' 12 Of the Sudan war, Hutton emphasised 
'the Establishment of a British protected state upon the high road to India, and in the 
future the development of a fresh market for our Manchester goods and from 
Birmingham hardware, among the dense populations of the Equatorial Provinces.' 13 
The ongoing war in Burma, again, was necessary in order to add to British 
possessions in India and to open trade routes to China so that 'fresh impetus' might be 
given to 'our manufactures and to our commerce in every branch.' 14 
This emphasis on the commercial side of empire was something of a new departure 
for him. This is evident from objections to the lecture held by his stepfather, Arthur 
Lawrence. 'You hold forth to the "Rising Generation",' Lawrence criticised, 'the 
increase of trade and coupled with the extension of our Territories which are 
unworthy objects of the ambition of a Christian people! !' 1 5 Lawrence took special 
objection to Hutton's statements about the potential of trade in Africa, arguing that 
suppressing slavery ought to be Britain's overriding concern there; and, 'independent 
ofthe slave trade I think it is taking low ground to put before us the increase of our 
trade, acknowledging the chance that we are but a nation of shopkeepers.' 16 
II E. Hutton, 'Our Recent Campaigns', Lecture read to the Boys ofEton, 13 November 1886, BL, 
Hutton Papers, ADD 50111, 136. 
I2 Hutton, 'Our Recent Campaigns', 137. 
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14 Hutton, 'Our Recent Campaigns', 143. 
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Lawrence also found Hutton's treatment of religion to be too vague. 17 Seven years 
earlier, when addressing fellow students at the Staff College about the Zulu war, 
Hutton's emphasis had been completely different - the spread of religion had been the 
chief object of Empire. 
Hutton had strayed from his stepfather's evangelical, Christian, and limited Empire to 
a vision of expansion and trade. In this he was undoubtedly influenced by the general 
economic climate of the time. The 1870s and 1880s were years of depression, tariffs 
and ever-increasing competition for Britain - particularly from the United States and 
Germany.IS British reliance on imported foodstuff made this challenge especially 
potent.19 In this context, it was natural for Hutton to stress the economic value of the 
Empire. In attaching the British army to this, and claiming for it a role as defender of 
the British Empire, Hutton challenged the common perception that it was the navy 
which defended, and extended, British trade and that the army was a barely necessary 
drain, a 'purely destructive agency entailing endless expenditure. ,20 
It was, however, the imagined military threat from Europe that gave most impetus to 
Hutton's imperial turn. By 1887 Hutton was convinced of the likelihood ofa 
European conflagration. After dining with the British resident in Berne, Switzerland, 
for example, he noted that: 
Like all far seeing politicians he looks forward to a life or death struggle 
between Germany & France - insists that our one aim should be a German 
17 Letter, Lawrence to Hutton, 16 November 1886,2, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50090. 
18 A. Thompson, 'Thinking Imperially? Imperial Pressure Groups and the Idea of Empire in Late-
Victorian and Edwardian Britain', DPhil Thesis, Corpus Christi College, Oxford, 1994,235. 
19 P. Burroughs, 'Defence and bnperial Disunity', The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 3, ed. 
A. Porter, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999,334. 
20 P. Burroughs, 'Imperial Defence and the Victorian Army', The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 15, 1986, 56. 
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alliance - that we have nothing to fear in the immediate future from Russia, but 
that we must be prepared for any act on the part of France, which her profound 
jealousy and restlessness may prompt. 
The political situation is so interesting just now from the fact that it is so open to 
conjecture, & from the knowledge that a great crisis is near at hand.2I 
This threat imperilled the Empire, a theme evident in an address entitled 'Modern 
Warfare' which Hutton delivered to the Inns of Court Volunteers in December 1886: 
To the impecunious and struggling nations on the continent of Europe this 
country with its vast wealth must present itself to their minds as a prize worth 
many risks to possess. The British Empire is the greatest inheritance which any 
generation of men have ever had entrusted to them.22 
Fear ofa great European war was widespread in Britain from the mid-l 870s and it 
was particularly common among members of the British army.23 It was based on a 
belief that the European balance of power could not be maintained given the rapid 
expansion of the continental armies (conscript forces had been introduced throughout 
Europe after the dramatic French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war). Welsh explains 
how the contemporary idea of progress - that industry and nations were advancing 
inexorably -led many to the fear that unrestrained and rapid progress in military 
science must lead to catastrophe.24 Hutton belonged to this group. 'The enormous 
and increasing armaments of the European Powers,' he cautioned, 'cannot much 
21 Letter, Hutton to Charlotte, 8 September 1887, BL, Charlotte Shaw Papers, ADD 56490, If. 82-88. 
22 E. Hutton, 'Modem Warfare', Lecture delivered to the Inns of Court Volunteers, 16 December 1886, 
BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50111,179-80. 
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longer exist and statesmen solemnly acknowledge that a great crisis is at hand. ,25 He 
wamed that, 'a war if it does come will require all the military resources that we 
possess,' echoing Colmar Von Der Goltz's theory of total war (published only a few 
years earlier), which prophesied that 'The day of cabinet wars is over. It is no longer 
the weakness of a single man, at the head of affairs, or of a dominant party, that is 
decisive, but only the exhaustion of the belligerent nations. ,26 
The maintenance of the British Empire was therefore now vitally important to Hutton. 
It was an Empire under threat, however, and Hutton's response to this challenge had 
important implications for his colonial career. This response was both a practical one 
- witnessed in his efforts at army reform - and an intellectual one: in a series of 
remarkable lectures delivered during 1886 and 1887 he promoted Britain's moral 
resources; and he met J. R. Seeley who provided an intellectual basis for his imperial 
ideas. 
The fear of European war provoked a popular concern for the adequacy of Britain's 
defences. Burroughs, examining the British navy, discovers a flurry of defence 
spending after 1884 and a dramatic change of mood: newspapers, the government and 
the British people were suddenly alive to the threat ofwar.27 The army was in an 
even more perilous position: how could it hope to successfully meet these large, well-
trained national armies? As it stood, because of a constitutional reluctance to keep a 
large standing army dating back to the days of Cromwell, Britain had a force that was 
2S Hutton, 'Modem Warfare', 179. 
26 Hutton, 'Modem Warfare', 179; C. Von Der Goltz, The Nation in Arms: A Treatise on Modem 
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in effect a 'colonial service anny.,28 The problem was exacerbated by severe 
recruitment shortfalls throughout the period. 
Hutton was acutely aware of this problem. Early in 1887 he had accepted a post at the 
British training facility at Aldershot (where Archibald Alison was now commandant). 
He immersed himself in preparations for the Aldershot Review, celebrating the Queen 
Victoria's 1887 jubilee, in which two anny corps - 58,948 men - were paraded. This 
was the largest number of British troops ever assembled in one place; yet, as Charles 
Dilke pointed out in his series of seven articles, 'The British Anny', written for the 
The Fortnightly Review, it was essentially a sham: the force was puffed up with 
volunteers and entirely lacked the necessary subsidiary services (transport, medical, 
etc.) to constitute real COrpS.z9 Hutton avidly read this series in which Dilke 
bemoaned the ill-preparedness of the British anny, argued for the necessity of 
revolutionary change, and pressed for the creation of a field force capable of serving 
effectively around the world.3o To meet this aim, Dilke advocated elements of the 
Swiss militia system and favoured the fuller use of militia and volunteers.31 
Dilke's plans for the use of militia were enthusiastically received by Hutton, who had 
been one of the first British officers to inspect the Swiss system. During the summer 
of 1887 he had been instructed to attend their manoeuvres. The War Office was 
interested in technical details such as the quality of their new magazine rifle.32 Hutton 
28 D. Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914, Johns Hopkins Press, 
Maryland, 1965. 
29 C. Dilke, 'The British Anny', The Fortnightly Review, No 252, I December 1887, 753. 
30 C. Dilke, 'The British Anny', The Fortnightly Review, No 251, 1 November 1887, 610. For Hutton 
reading series see - Letter, Hutton to Charlotte, 7 January 1888, BL, Charlotte Shaw Papers, ADD 
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3\ C. Dilke, 'The British Anny', The Fonnightly Review, No 253,1 January 1888,38 and No 255, I 
March 1888, 315. 
32 Leiter, Intelligence Departtnent to Hutton, I September 1887, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50093. 
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initially doubted the value of the visit, as the Swiss anny was not considered an 
efficient force. Witnessing their manoeuvres, however, he was astounded at the 
quality to which a well organised and equipped militia could attain with only a short 
period of training. They were far more efficient than any of Britain's volunteer or 
militia units. This experience impressed Hutton with the potential value of a partially 
trained militia; and this would later influence his assessment of the value of colonial 
militias for imperial defence.33 
Wolseley, at this point Adjutant General, was also considering the challenge facing 
the British army. He responded by campaigning, with the support of the Duke of 
Cambridge (the Commander in Chief), for the establishment of a field anny, 
comprising two anny corps and one cavalry division.34 Edward Stanhope, the 
Secretary of State for War, affirmed that aim in his famous 1888 memorandum. 
Wolseley still faced, however, opposition from a parliament perennially hoping to cut 
anny estimates. Furious, he declared 'party government' a curse and publicly 
campaigned to remove political interference from the anny.35 Frustrated, Wolseley 
resorted to the sort of expediency he had employed in the raising oftroops for his 
various campaigns. The most pressing shortage was cavalry - yet these units were 
expensive, their officers were generally resistant to change, and cavalry tactics were 
widely viewed as obsolete. Funds were not available to increase their numbers and 
the existing cavalry regiments were hostile to any reorganisation.36 Wolseley 
circumvented the problem with the authorisation of the mounted infantry school that 
33 E. Hutton, 'Report of the Swiss Manoeuvres', 15 September 1887, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50111, 
184. 
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Hutton had been proposing, a cheap means of enhancing Britain's mounted forces.37 
The school would train volunteers - picked from regular infantry regiments, Militia 
units, and the Volunteers - who could then act as mounted infantry units in the event 
of a military emergency. 
Hutton was by this stage Britain's leading mounted infantry expert. He did not invent 
the mounted infantry idea: in fact, he was not even the first to run a school (Baker 
Russell experimented with the same ideas a year earlier at Shomcliffe); yet, he did 
determine, more than any other British officer, the shape the British form of mounted 
infantry took before the Great War. 38 In March 1886 he had presented a lecture to the 
United Service Institution on the subject. Hopeful of a school for mounted infantry 
training being established at Aldershot, but believing that the Treasury stood in the 
way, he sought to publicise the issue, 'giving public opinion in military circles a 
chance to express itself.'39 Wolseley chaired the evening's discussion. Many years 
later Hutton would thank Lord Minto for his support, 'Well do I remember your 
stalwart advocacy in 1886 at my memorable lecture in the U.S. Institute with Lord 
Wolseley in the Chair, when the M.1. movement was formally launched on the waters 
of criticism & petty jealousies. ,40 According to one attendee, 'the discussion was the 
most lively one he ever heard there. ,41 
On his return from Switzerland in September 1887 Hutton was asked to draw up a 
complete scheme for the founding of his mounted infantry school. The scheme was 
37 Badsey, 'Fire and Sword', 97. 
38 Hutton, 'Memoirs', Chapter 10, I; A. Godley, Life alan Irish Soldier, John Murray, London, 1939, 
32. 
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approved and in the early months of 1888 he trained his first two companies. He 
was delighted with the command, claiming he would not exchange the position to be 
Commander in Chief.42 On 5 March 1888 the actual Commander in Chief, the Duke 
of Cambridge, visited Aldershot to inspect the result. Hutton's school was deemed a 
success - even men without previous riding experience had become serviceable 
mounted infantry.43 
This appointment demonstrates how closely Hutton had become associated with 
Wolse1ey and his ring. He had come to think of himself as one ofWolse1ey's band, 
later assuring him, 'Your Lordship will, I think, believe that I am in no way a member 
of the Old School, but rather a Progressivist of your own School.,44 Wolseley was 
happy with Hutton's work at Aldershot, promising to ensure a decent pile of 
equipment for his mounted infantry when he finally won complete control of the 
army, and praising Hutton: 'you have done wonders & it is you who have given an 
impetus to the movement which all men who thoroughly understand war now fully 
realize the importance of. ,45 
Not all officers were as supportive of Hutton's mounted infantry work. After training 
his first company he had difficulty securing the money needed to continue the 
scheme. It was a novel project and he found himself open to continual criticism: 'Our 
every act, & word (nay even adjective) is criticized unsparingly by a not too indulgent 
military public. ,46 Behind this controversy lay the central problem that the form that 
mounted infantry should take had never been agreed upon. Since their inception in 
42 Letter, Hutton to Charlotte, 26 February 1888, BL, Charlotte Shaw Papers, ADD 56490, ff98-104. 
43 Lord Minto, Diary, 16 January 1889, NLS, Minto Papers, MS 12493, 52. 
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the British army, mounted infantry had been improvised whenever emergency 
dictated: their tactics and organisation were determined, at the time, by whoever 
raised them. This was confused further by the variety of names given such troops -
mounted infantry, mounted rifles, dragoons, light horse - and by the fact that the 
cavalry themselves were beginning to train in dismounted fighting. The functions that 
mounted infantry would perform in war, such as scouting and raiding, were 
vigorously contested. Many cavalry officers feared encroachment and resented 
expenditure that they felt could be better allotted to them.47 
Hutton also excited opposition from among the volunteers. His training of Volunteer 
officers caused some Yeomanry to fear becoming submerged by a Mounted Infantry 
Corps and losing their traditional function.48 They were touchy on this subject: in 
1882 Wolseley had proposed turning them all into mounted infantry.49 The British 
volunteer forces were at that time split in three - the Militia, Yeomanry, and 
Volunteer Corps. They were poorly organised and unlikely to be of useful service in 
their existing state. The Militia, even by the late 1890s, lacked the departments 
necessary for modem war: transport, supply, even field artillery.5o There was no 
provision to allow its being sent abroad, the members would have to volunteer 
individually. The Yeomanry were antiquated - only in 1888 was legislation passed to 
allow their calling up for service throughout Great Britain (previously an attack on a 
neighbouring county was no business of the local unit).51 Hutton had been inspired 
by his attendance at the Swiss manoeuvres to improve the fighting capacity of these 
forces. He hoped, like Wolseley, to develop some of them as mounted infantry. To 
47 Badsey, 'Fire and Sword', 93. 
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49 Badsey, 'Fire and Sword', 100. 
S. J. Dunlop, The Development of the British Army 1899-1914, Methuen, London, 1938,43. 
51 Dunlop, The Development of the British Army, 53. 
89 
this end, Hutton refined the scheme for British volunteer units that he had begun in 
1885.52 
Hutton therefore responded to the threat of a coming conflict with practical efforts at 
reform: his mounted infantry school and his plans for the use of militia. These efforts 
fitted into Wolseley's broader agenda of building a field force capable of being sent 
overseas to meet the national armies of Europe. 
Hutton's other main reform at Aldershot was an educational one. At the end of 1887 
he formed a professional association there, the Aldershot Military Society. Its object 
was to stimulate professional interest by developing the camp's library and by 
arranging occasional lectures and discussions. 53 Hutton was disappointed that a 
professional spirit had not yet taken hold in the officer corps at large. Through his 
Society he sought to awaken a 'professional zeal' amongst his brother officers -
something that he sensed was latent and was just starting to come to life. 54 
In this initiative, Hutton's continuing attachment to the cult of manliness and 
athleticism, and his association of it with professionalism, is also apparent. In 
forming his society, he sought 'the best horsemen, the best cricketers, the best 
athletes' to join him, feeling these were the most dynamic and progressive men, and 
arguing, 'It could only be in the hunting field, in the racquet courts, playing cricket 
and on the race-course, among the cheerier element that one could hope gradually to 
"Letter, Hutton to Minto, 31 December 1888, NLS, Minto Papers, MS 12386, f. 141. 
" H. Cole, The Story of Aldershot: A History and Guide to Town and Camp, Gale and Polden, 
Aldershot, 1951,56. 
54 Hutton, ~Memoirs'. Chapter 11, 1-2. 
90 
change public opinion. ,55 The topics of some the Society's early lectures supported 
this. The third lecture given was presented by Colonel Onslow and entitled, 
'Physique of the Soldier and his Physical Training.' In it, Onslow referred to fears of 
the degeneration of the British race and suggested that soldiers be encouraged 'to play 
cricket and football, and all other manly games.'56 
Hutton's Society was a success. It was emulated in many other British military 
centres around the Empire. With a certain hubris he claimed, 'I am convinced that of 
all the reforms initiated at that period, there was none that had a greater or more direct 
effect amongst officers of all grades in the Army in promoting zeal and interest in 
their profession.' 57 To Hutton's immense satisfaction, it won the wholehearted 
approval ofWolseley who expressed this at a couple of the Society's meetings; on 
one occasion he proclaimed, 'I would wish to take this opportunity of congratulating 
all the officers whom I have the honour of addressing on the great success which has 
attended this Institution, which has been so recently started in Aldershot for [the) 
purpose of increasing the knowledge of officers. ,58 Yet this success was not sufficient 
for Hutton's satisfaction. He hoped to engage with a much wider audience. 
Hutton had come to conceive of soldiers as occupying a central place in the national 
community, as protectors of the national honour and defenders of its prestige. In his 
1886 lecture to the boys at Eton, Hutton described the murder of the British envoy 
that precipitated the Afghan war (1879), 'a severe lesson was required to re-establish 
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our prestige which had suffered so severe a shock. ,59 The British anny was more than 
equal to the task: 'the British Army of to-day is equal in discipline and unsurpassed in 
efficiency to any army which this country ever placed in the field. ,60 Politicians, on 
the other hand, had repeatedly betrayed the nation in their failure to protect British 
prestige; he scornfully described government policy during the first Boer war (1881), 
'when our military honour had been dragged through the mud, and when we had at 
hand a fine army of 10,000 seasoned troops the government of the day elected to 
make peace to "avoid" as was said "useless blood shed.",61 
When Hutton returned a year later to address the boys of Eton a second time he 
echoed these themes but with an even stronger tone. He boosted the Empire, 
describing it as 'a vast inheritance the like of which the world has never seen.'62 The 
connection he made between the anny, the nation, and the Empire was much more 
forthright. 'We, soldiers of today,' he enthused, 'are the nation! We are bred of, and 
we claim in fairness to represent the nation. ,63 The modem British soldier was no 
longer press-ganged or lured with bounties but joined of his own free will and, 'After 
our six years of change, and of adventure we return to the nation and to civil life. We 
are therefore essentially of the British people, and not a class apart.'64 As integral to 
the nation, the British soldier was also a vital part of the Empire: 
If it has been our lot, the lot of the British soldier of yesterday and today to 
assist in bringing this Great Empire with the blessing of Heaven to the pinnacle 
59 Hutton, 'Our Recent Campaigns', 153. 
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of Greatness, which we realize at this moment; it will be yours, my friends, in a 
few short years to defend the legacy we shall bequeath.65 
Hutton felt called to share his ideas with society at large. This was the other side of 
his response to the crisis facing the Empire. He drew on Britain's moral resources as 
he had come to conceive them - racial uniqueness, manliness and professionalism-
and he publicised them in lectures: to the Inns of Court Volunteers (1886) and to the 
boys of Eton (1886 and 1887). 
None of the European armies developed mounted infantry forces comparable to 
Britain's. Hutton came to view this as having a national significance. He believed 
that such forces could prove to be the saving grace in the coming war: 'In the next 
great war that power which makes its infantry most mobile so as to act in conjunction 
with the large masses of cavalry manoeuvring 20 & 30 miles in front of a great 
European Army will have enormous odds in its favour. ,66 Furthermore, he believed 
that the European Armies were incapable of mounting their infantry in the improvised 
manner that the British had adopted: 'Neither French, German nor Italian infantry 
could be readily Mounted a l'improviste as we do with our men. ,67 Hutton felt that 
native adaptability allowed the British alone to accomplish this and he described the 
'particular genius of our Anglo-Saxon race which possesses in so remarkable a degree 
those qualities of which we are so proud to credit ourselves with, viz., a love of 
horses, a spirit of adventure, and an adaptability to all circumstances. ,68 Hutton went 
further, saying, 'We Englishmen are, gentlemen, too apt to undervalue ourselves at 
6S Hutton, 'The British Soldier of Yesterday and Today', 216. 
66 Letter, Hutton to Minto, 6 May 1890, NLS, Minto Papers, MS 12387, f. 34 . 
• 7 Letter, Hutton to Minto, 6 May 1890, NLS, Minto Papers, MS 12387, f. 34 . 
•• E. Hutton, 'Mounted Infantry - Its Present and Its Future', Lecture 18, Military Lectures, A1dershot 
Military Society, 21 March 1889,4. 
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the expense of our neighbours. We do not, I finnly believe, rate the value of our 
soldiers sufficiently high! The quality of our officer, the physique and the 
adaptability of our rank and file are, I believe, unrivalled in Europe!,69 
Hutton expounded on this theme of a supposed British trait of individual 
resourcefulness in his public speeches. Huttenback describes a growing faith, among 
Victorian Britons, of their racial uniqueness, founded upon a 'special capacity for 
governing itself by combining 'liberty, justice and efficiency' in a constitutional 
system incapable of emulation by others.7o Hutton looked at the British soldier and at 
the British officer and he saw similar qualities. This view had developed during his 
early career - beginning with Hawley's training and continuing in experiences on 
campaign in Africa. In his speech to the Inns of Court Volunteers he described the 
'independent and sturdy character of our nation' and the 'individual courage and 
initiative of subordinate commanders and even individuals.' 71 Against the collectivist 
automatons ofthe armies of Europe, Hutton posed the individual, adaptable, and self-
reliant British soldier. These qualities gave the British army 'steadiness and valour' 
and 'the greatest power of manoeuvring' - useful qualities given the effect the speed 
and accuracy of modem rifle fire had on battlefield tactics.72 In this particular lecture, 
Hutton described these British attributes as the result of 'improved education and a 
growth of political freedom' - rather than as inherited characteristics.73 In a lecture to 
students at Eton in 1886 Hutton associated Wolseley with the independent-minded 
69 Hutton, 'Mounted Infantry', 8. 
70 R. Huttenback, Racism and Empire: White Settlers and Colored Immigrants in the British Self-
Governing Colonies 1830-1910, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1976, 15. 
71 Hutton, 'Modern Warfare', 169-70. 
72 Hutton, 'Modem Warfare', 169 & 171. 
73 Hutton, 'Modern Warfare', 169. 
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quality of British troops, arguing that in the Ashanti campaign Wolseley recognised 
the value of independence - witnessed in his use of small sections.74 
He took a much more assertively racial line when he returned a year later to address a 
second gathering at Eton. Whereas his earlier speech had emphasised education as 
the key to Britain's soldierly qualities, in 1887 he tied these virtues to the national 
character, making them uniquely British and not necessarily open to the peoples of 
other states: 
Self reliance, and a natural independence of character begotten of the national 
love ofliberty have given the British soldier that steadiness and natural 
confidence in danger which has enabled him alone of all nations in the past to 
fight in line with a quiet and impassive coolness which has won him the praise 
of all critics and military writers.75 
Extending his argument Hutton conducted a racial autopsy on the body of the British 
soldier, to identifY whence these racial characteristics had come: 
The term 'British' soldier includes the three nationalities: English, Irish and 
Scotch - each different, each of value in making up the excellence of the 
'British soldier' . 
The Englishman contributes cool courage, impassiveness, amenability to 
discipline, a fine physique, and an independent spirit. 
The Irishman contributes an impetuous bravery, an almost love of danger for 
itself, a hardy frame, and a natural aptitude for war. 
The Scotchman contributes a stern regard for duty, a rigid and almost 
mechanical discipline - not ignorant of danger but by nature callous to it, a deep 
74 Hutton, 'Our Recent Campaigns', 150. 
7S Hutton, 'The British Soldier of Yesterday and Today', 203. 
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national spirit begotten of a religious enthusiasm, a powerful and hardy 
physique. 
These national characteristics have become less marked because they have 
become more welded together in the same individual, hence the British soldier 
as we find him today.76 
Hutton was not alone in holding such views. They seem to have become quite 
common among British officers of his day. In Hutton's views the distinct influence of 
his commanding officer, Archibald Alison, can be traced. Alison voiced very similar 
sentiments in a speech in Glasgow in 1883.77 Alison bemoaned, as Hutton repeatedly 
did, the loss of British prestige following the' chequered events of the Zulu War' and 
'the defeats of the Boer campaign' and he came to the same conclusion as Hutton as 
to its remedy: speaking of 'the great influence which the principle of nationality, has 
always possessed in our army, and upon which we can always rely to carry us through 
every difficulty.' 78 And as Hutton reconciled the competing members of the British 
race, so did Alison, 'This great principle of nationality works among our soldiers to 
unmixed good. It leads to emulation only, never to discord. It has no disintegrating 
effect. We soldiers are all alike united in our attachment to the British Empire - but 
there is a keen spirit of generous rivalry amongst us, as to which nation will most 
excel in supporting it on the field of battle.' 79 
Hutton maintained a very close connection with Eton and especially with his old 
master, Dr WaITe. He assisted Warre in training the school's cadets, attending classes 
7. Hutton, 'The British Soldier of Yesterday and Today', 202. 
77 A. Alison, Speech in Glasgow, 18 October 1883, BOD, Alison Papers, MS Eng Lett e. 151, 107. 
78 Alison, Speech in Glasgow, 107. 
79 Alison, Speech in Glasgow, 108. 
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and organising field days where Eton boys drilled alongside cavalry and Royal Horse 
Artillery units from the British regulars. 8o These were grand exercises, managed on a 
large scale - on one occasion the poor boys from Eton were doing so much strategic 
marching about that they did not even get to engage the enemy.81 Remaining so 
closely in touch with Eton, Hutton was always influenced by that institution. By 
assisting in the training of new Eton boys he also helped perpetuate and re-shape 
those traditions. He sought to instil in these students the same two values that had had 
such significance in his own career, manliness and professionalism. 
'As long as the present manly tone is fostered and encouraged at all our great public 
schools,' Hutton claimed in the first of his Eton lectures, 'so surely will a race of men 
be produced, who are ready and able not only to maintain the legacy of this great 
Empire left us by our forefathers, but also still further to extend it.'82 Manliness 
entailed courage - both physical and moral. This part of Hutton's presentation was 
permeated with talk of race. Hutton claimed that courage was a common virtue 
among Anglo Saxons.83 As well as being courageous the soldier must possess the 
virtues of command and obedience, as opposed to simple discipline. Hutton believed 
these qualities could best be imparted through sport, 'upon the River and in the 
Cricket field.'84 Sport trained youths to be ideal warriors: 
In your football, in your cricket, in your boating in all your manly pursuits you 
are learning instinctively the qualities which won for the Greeks their warlike 
renown, for Rome the empire of the World, and which is at this present moment 
80 Letter, Hutton to Warre, 15 July 1888, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50093. 
81 Letter, Hutton to Warre, 14 February 1889, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50093. 
82 Hutton, 'Our Recent Campaigns', 135. 
83 Hutton, 'Our Recent Campaigns', 160. 
84 Hutton, ~Our Recent Campaigns', 162. 
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giving way to [the 1 Saxon race, a dominion incomparatively [sic 1 vaster than 
·th 85 el er. 
Hutton again warned of an impending great conflict. Cultivation of these qualities 
was therefore an urgent matter: 'Consider therefore gentlemen, that you are now 
preparing yourselves for the great struggle which must inevitably fall to our lot as a 
nation within the next few years. ,86 Manliness was now much more than simply a 
means for Hutton to establish his legitimacy as an officer. Its connection with his 
adoption oflate-Victorian imperialism is evident in the way he linked manly virtues 
firmly to the Anglo Saxon race and to the grave imperative of defending the Empire 
against the threat of the coming war. 
Hutton also promoted his professional ideal to the Eton boys. He advocated the 
professional officer type - arguing that study was the only way to reach real 
distinction as a soldier. He placed particular emphasis on the value of education. 'To 
be a successful soldier,' he preached, 'you must work and work thoroughly and 
conscientiously. War is an art, which must be studied - the knowledge of men and 
how to deal with human events is the result of study, reflection and constant hard-
work. ,87 War was also, for Hutton, a 'science - fighting, for which the soldiers exist, 
is the trial of his strength - the best examination at the end of his course of instruction 
and study.'88 In order to be a successful leader, and in order to gain the confidence of 
his men, an officer, Hutton argued, must know his profession: 'men will not believe in 
those whom they know to be ignorant. ,89 Hutton repudiated the image of the 
85 Hutton, 'Our Recent Campaigns', 162. 
86 Hutton, 'Our Recent Campaigns', 162. 
81 Hutton, 'Our Recent Campaigns', 157. 
88 Hutton, 'Our Recent Campaigns', 157. 
89 Hutton, 'Our Recent Campaigns', 157. 
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dilettante, aristocratic officer: the 'military profession is not' a life of pleasure and 
idleness' as many conceive it to be.'9o 
Hutton practised what he preached. His own professionalism is evident in the flurry 
of romantic activity in which he engaged in this period. During these years he 
enjoyed a prolonged flirtation with Charlotte Payne-Townshend (who later married 
George Bernard Shaw) and professed his love to that lady, 'I have yearned for a 
woman to whom I could look for sympathy and help in the long continual battle of 
life, - one who could fathom my thoughts and understand my ambitions,' and had 
assured her that, 'If in after life I ever achieve anything great or good you may very 
safely feel that you, you only, have been the sole woman, who ever had the power to 
exercise a real and lasting influence over my life. ,91 Hutton had waited until his very 
late 30s, when his career was finally on a stable footing and his professional 
ambitions were beginning to be fulfilled, to pursue love. Not all officers had such 
patience: Evelyn Wood, upset at his own son for tying the knot, hailed Hutton as an 
example of a soldier for whom duty had come first.92 In his letter to Charlotte, Hutton 
longed for a woman who would accommodate his careerism, his ambition; and, in his 
future wife, Eleanor Paulet, he found it. Hutton met Eleanor at the end of 1888 and 
they quickly married. Her family were aristocrats, a fact that would lend Hutton 
additional social cachet, especially in his later commands in the colonies. However, it 
was another quality that he remarked upon in his memoir, 'From the very beginning 
of our married life she realized that professional duty is the first consideration in all 
circumstances of a soldier. ,93 
9OHutton, 'Our Recent Campaigns', 158. 
91 Letter, Hutton to Charlotte, 16 July 1887, BL, Charlotte Shaw Papers, ADD 56490, ff73-79. 
92 Letter, Wood to Hutton, 9 March 1893, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50086. 
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Hutton's imperial identity, the values that were bound up in that, and his sense of a 
mission to share those with the general public were all powerfully affirmed by the 
British historian, J. R. Seeley, the most important intellectual influence on Hutton's 
burgeoning imperialism. 
Seeley was foremost among the late-Victorian theorists of Empire. Hutton admired 
Seeley's major work The Expansion a/England as an 'epoch-making book' which he 
claimed to have 'carefully studied.'94 This book was a bestseller, selling 80,000 
copies in its first two years in print. Although Seeley spent most of the work dwelling 
on British problems in India and America, it was the self-governing colonies that he 
viewed as being vital to the Empire's future. Clive argues that these colonies were in 
fact his essential theme.95 Seeley asserted an essential unity between Britain and these 
colonies. He expounded the notion of Greater Britain, suggesting that the British 
should stop thinking of the Empire as an assortment of colonies but rather as 'a new 
state, English in race and character. ,96 Seeley suggested that bonds of 'nationality, 
language and religion' constituted 'natural ties which unite Englishmen.'97 Seeley 
confirmed Hutton in the opinion that Britain shared with its white settlements a 
common racial heritage that bound them together. It was a British nationalism that 
incorporated the self-governing Empire. 
Seeley's position was non-prescriptive. Although he was a member of the Imperial 
Federation League, and looked to the eventual embodiment of Greater Britain in a 
94 Hulton, 'Memoin;', Chapter 13, 2"" Draft, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50113,296. 
95 R. Clive, 'Introduction', in J. Seeley, The Expansion of England, ed. 1. Gross, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1971, xiv. 
% Seeley, The Expansion of England, 17. 
97 Seeley, The Expansion of England, 234. 
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political federation, he believed that the work of the League itself should be primarily 
educational. He never promoted a particular scheme for imperial unification, 
believing that closer ties would naturally evolve from the basic, cultural connection.98 
If this process could not be structured, it could be encouraged, and Seeley believed 
that civic education was vital. He argued that only a broad education compassing 
moral, as well as intellectual, cultivation could enable Greater Britain to achieve its 
'potential as a world power' . 99 Seeley's conception of Greater Britain fused together 
many of the different strands of Hutton's own developing worldview. Seeley shared 
Hutton's enthusiasm for 'manliness' - an essential component, for Seeley, of a 
schooling in character. IOO Just as Hutton favoured a broad, inclusive Christianity that 
would bond soldiers together, rather than divide them, Seeley believed in a national 
church that would promote national unity. 101 In his two major religious works, Ecce 
Homo and Natural Religion, Seeley offered an essentially Romantic response to the 
problems posed to traditional Christianity by the Rational age and scientific enquiry. 
He drew from Coleridge's distinction of 'reason' and 'understanding' to argue for an 
emotional understanding of religion. 102 People were born to their religions, in the 
same way they were born to their nationality: religions to Seeley, as Wormell 
describes it, were simply 'nationalities in an idealized form.' 103 Seeley conceived of 
98 P. Burroughs, 'John Robert Seeley and British Imperial History' , Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 1, 1973, 202; D. Wonnell, Sir John Seeley and the Uses of History, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980,96 and 167. 
99 D. Wonnell, 'John Robert Seeley (1834-95): Educational refonner, historian and political scientist', 
PhD Thesis, University College London, 1977, 99-101. 
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the nation state as a sacred institution, above politics, which all manly, moral, 
Christian men (including soldiers) must protect. 104 
Hutton accepted Seeley's views whole piece. He invited the author to present a 
lecture to the Aldershot Military Society, an occasion he remembered reverently: 'I 
was an enthusiastic disciple, and even now recall with a glow the peroration of his 
address. ,105 In his address, Seeley reiterated the fears of officers like Hutton and 
Wolseley of an impending European conflict: 'we watch with dismay the gradual 
approach of a struggle between civilised nations which seems likely to eclipse in 
magnitude all that has hitherto been known among barbarians.' 106 
Hutton took up not only Seeley's aim of an Empire more tightly knit; but also adopted 
Seeley's means - education to assist a process of natural evolution. Hutton was 
encouraged by the role Seeley allowed for soldiers in this process. Seeley overturned 
the traditional idea that the army must be neutral and stand outside of the national 
debate; instead, he encouraged the assembled officers to consider themselves not just 
specialists, but also 'citizens and patriots.'107 He attacked the notion that the army 
was a burden on the economy, asserting that it was essential to the expansion of trade, 
and he challenged colonial reluctance to assist in imperial defence: 
You may tell English trade that you have been from the outset its instrument, 
that you sprang into existence along with the trading policy of England, and 
grew with its growth. You may tell the Colonies that it has been your great 
work from the outset either to found or to protect them, that England has not 
104 Wonnell, 'John Robert Seeley', 309. 
105 Hutton, 'Memoir', Chapter 13, 2nd Draft, 296. 
106 J. Seeley, 'The Empire', Lecture 17, Military Lectures, A1dershot Military Society, 24 April 1889, 
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engaged in European wars against their interest, but that the wars of England 
have been from first to last undertaken in the cause of the Empire, so that it 
would be far truer to say that the Colonies have dragged England, than that 
England has dragged the Colonies, into war.108 
Hutton was deeply affected by this. He quoted extensively from the passage in his 
memoir. 109 At the conclusion of Seeley's address he was the first (besides the Chair) 
to respond. He rose, claiming to speak for the 'rising generation,' to assure Seeley 
that British officers felt keenly their role 'with reference to the Empire here and 
throughout the world:' 
I can only assure Professor Seeley that we feel our responsibility deeply, very 
deeply, and in the discharge of our duties as officers towards those superior to 
ourselves and towards those whom we command we have the maintenance and 
welfare of the Empire profoundly at heart, and that we are in the best sense of 
the term both patriots and citizens. 1 10 
Seeley therefore gave Hutton a goal, a means, and also permission to act. 
In earlier stages of Hutton's career he had begun to grapple with the problems of 
nation and Empire. As he had become increasingly sensitive to the maintenance of 
British prestige, his racial perspective had grown harder. Hutton's growing awareness 
of threats of European war through the I 880s, the challenge posed by international 
rivalries, drove him to a new awareness of the Empire. In his lectures of 1886 and 
1887 he considered these problems of Empire. Hutton owed something of his 
conception of that threat to Wolseley and his response was very similar to Wolseley's: 
blaming politicians for failing to uphold British prestige, attacking parliament for 
lOS Seeley, 'The Empire', 12. 
109 Hutton, 'Memoir', Chapter 13, 2nd Draft, 296. 
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refusing to allocate money to the army, and seeking to mobilise public opinion by use 
of the press. Hutton's development of mounted infantry, and his ambitions for British 
volunteer units, fitted into Wolseley's broader agenda of seeking to work around 
chronic under-funding by expedient means (such as training infantry in the tasks of 
cavalry) and thereby attempting to cobble together a field force that could fight these 
continental foes. When Hutton later served as a colonial commandant he kept that 
aim in mind. Hutton had also discovered Seeley - a Cambridge don who shared his 
views on manliness, religion, and the British character - and in whom he found a 
vision of Empire that synthesised his developing sentiments into an intellectual whole. 
Seeley ratified Hutton's concerns for the Empire, justified his desire to maintain it 
whole and, by situating soldiers within the national debate, he gave Hutton permission 
to act. Seeley, it might be said, sent Hutton off to the self-governing colonies. 
104 
4. Patriot and Citizen: New South Wales 1893 to 1896 
New South Wales was a defining chapter in Edward Hutton's career. From May 1893 
to March 1896 he served as General Officer Commanding the New South Wales 
Military Forces. He brought to this command modern military ideas and late-
Victorian imperial aspirations. During his service in New South Wales he was 
confronted with the realities of colonial politics and colonial opinion, of imperial 
sentiment and colonial self-interest. The result was a fusion of his imperial dreams 
with colonial realities.' He moderated his own views, accommodating the colonial 
perspective, and he sought to engage with colonial opinion and educate the public. 
Out of this experience he developed a model for colonial armies, his 'Co-operative 
System for the Defence of the Empire', which he took to his later commands and 
championed for the rest of his life. 
By the time of his appointment Hutton had come under the influence oftwo men: 
Seeley and Wolse1ey. He shared Seeley's imperialism - a vision of a white, self-
governing Empire already essentially united as Greater Britain. Closer cooperation 
should be encouraged by education and not forced with prescriptive measures. 'We 
are in the best sense of the term both patriots and citizens,' Hutton had proclaimed, 
echoing Seeley's assertion that soldiers shared in the responsibility of promoting a 
united Empire.2 Likewise, Hutton, as a member ofWolseley's clique of reform-
minded officers, agreed on the need to build a British field army, capable of fighting 
wherever British interests dictated, to meet the threat of European war. Wolse1ey had 
worked around the financial strictures imposed by a parliament intent on economy 
I Phrase borrowed from R. Moyles and D. Owram, Imperial Dreams and Colonial Realities. British 
Views of Canada, 1880-19/4, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1988. 
2 J. Seeley, 'The Empire', Lecture 17, Military Lectures, Aldersbot Military Society, 24 April 1889, 4. 
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with stopgap solutions such as Hutton's mounted infantry school. Hutton shared 
these expedient methods, seeing a role for volunteer forces in the proposed field army. 
He also shared Wolseley's suspicion of politicians and readiness to mobilise public 
opinion through appeals to the press and through war scares. 
There were other influences on Hutton. He had been inspired to apply for the New 
South Wales command after meeting with a group of British parliamentarians 
interested in military affairs. These men, including Howard Vincent and John 
Columb, had suggested that as military commander Hutton could assist in moving the 
Australian colonies towards a national federation by working for a closer cooperation 
between the various colonial military forces. 3 Hutton also consulted with Captain 
Peacocke, Secretary to the Colonial Defence Committee, who introduced Hutton to 
the writings of Colonel Sydenham Clarke. Hutton would later claim that: 
It was a close study of those papers which more than ever inspired me 
with the ambition of taking a share in so vastly important a work, and 
of putting its principles into effect in a practical form through, in the 
first instance, a system of co-operative defence between the six States 
of Australia, and ultimately into a complete federation of the Island 
Continent.4 
Clarke shared Wolseley's fears of a coming great war and he supported W olseley in 
his ambition to form a field force capable of meeting that threat. 5 Clarke fused those 
ideas with the Empire by arguing that the white, self-governing colonies could 
3 E. Hutton, 'Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hutton', BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50112, 
Chapter 12, 6. 
4 Hutton, 'Memoirs', Chapter 13, I. 
5 G. Clarke,lmperiai Defence, Imperial Press, London, 1897, xiv & 217. 
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usefully contribute to such a force. 6 Clarke favoured federation for defence purposes 
as a stepping-stone to a wider political Imperial Federation.7 In these respects, Clarke 
acted as a bridge for Hutton, translating his Wolseleyan agenda to the colonies. 
Before he left for Sydney Hutton received instructions from the Permanent 
Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, Robert Meade. Meade informed Hutton that 
his primary object in New South Wales was to organise the local defences for the 
protection of the colony itself. However, he also encouraged Hutton to press for an 
Australian federal defence arrangement, to foster imperial sentiment in the colonies, 
and to prepare a mobile force for possible overseas service. Hutton made this 
summary of Meade' s instructions: 
1. Defence of the Colony itself. 
2. Federation of the colonies for Defence purposes 
3. In the possible event of Imperial War complications an 
expeditionary force for service in the Pacific. 
4. In the remote contingency of the safety of the Empire being 
compromised, a contingent of Troops for Imperial Military 
O . 8 peratJons. 
Meade suggested that Hutton tread lightly in pursuing this agenda, warning him that 
'a party of opposition to any imperial policy is apparent in each colony' and advising 
him to 'omit, as a question of practical Imperial policy, any reference to the 
6 Clarke, Imperial Defence, 218. 
7 Clarke, Imperial Defence, 232. 
g E. Hutton, 'Memorandum of Conversation with Robert Meade', 9 March 1893, BL, Hutton Papers, 
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possibility of Colonial Forces being necessarily expected to take part in Imperial 
military operations.,9 
Hutton took these instructions seriously. In implementing them, however, he did not 
act as an imperial automaton. Most historians who discuss Hutton's command in 
New South Wales portray him as a single-minded and dogged imperialist who 
attempted to foist metropolitan British policies onto the colonial periphery.1O In 
judging Hutton in this easy manner they miss opportunities to reflect upon the nature 
of British policy and to test colonial sentiment fairly. This chapter will examine 
Hutton's intentions, studying his conception of his role in the colony, his plans for 
New South Wales, Australia, and the Empire, and his actions while commandant, and 
thereby attempt to place the colonial response in a richer context. 
Soon after arriving in the colony Hutton held a major review at the recently opened 
Centennial Park. The response to his review caused the reporter from the Australian 
Agriculturalist to opine that, 'Young Australia was "British yet" ... the true country 
colonial gentleman, rich or poor man, will be known by his race feeling and 
federation sentiment.' II Not everyone who attended was so enthusiastic. The Sydney 
Morning Herald's correspondent, taking quite a different angle, reported 
dissatisfaction among the military officers present. These unhappy officers were 
concerned by Hutton's 'imperialising tendency' made evident by his supposed 
ambitions to assimilate the colony's troops to the Imperial model, preparing them for 
service overseas. They feared the colony's being left naked and at the mercy of the 
9 Hutton, 'Memorandum of Conversation with Robert Meade', 252. 
10 See survey of historiography in Introduction. 
II 'The Yeoman Under Arms', Australian Agriculturalist, 25 July 1893, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press 
Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 6, 52. 
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enemy while its anny fought 'the battles of the mother country' overseas; and they 
declared that, 'their view of patriotism is confined to the country in which they reside; 
at all events, they say, that country should have their first care.' 12 This criticism was 
based on a desire to retain local control over the use of the colony's army. 13 
These two different responses to the Centennial Park review illustrate the fundamental 
problem with most accounts of Hutton's imperialism and the colonial response. 
These accounts posit a simple dichotomy between Hutton's 'imperialism' and 
'colonial nationalism' - any opposition to Hutton or his imperial agenda is taken to 
indicate an early form of Australian nationalism. This neat equation accounts for 
neither the subtlety of Hutton's imperialism nor the complexity of colonial opinion. 
In the wake of the Centennial Park review one joumallauded British race feeling 
while another feared the sacrifice of colonial autonomy to the British cause. This 
pattern was repeated throughout Hutton's command and it illustrates the duality of 
colonial identity: a cultural and sentimental attachment to Britain and to the British 
Empire coexisted with a concern to protect local interests. 
Hutton's response to the Centennial Park review row indicates the way in which he 
gradually became attuned to these separate loyalties of culture and interest. He 
responded to the Centennial Park review critics on their own grounds, claiming that 
he was only interested in economy and efficiency, having been brought up in the 
12 Sydney Morning Herald, 19 August 1893, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 6. 
13 It ought to be briefly noted that much of the criticism arose from frustrations that had nothing to do 
with imperial politics. The officers voicing complaints were unhappy with the pay reductions Hutton 
had recently forced and resented the fact that Hutton had publicly criticised their professional abilities, 
reserving all praise for the horsemanship and skill of the troops themselves. That praise was itself 
characterised as something sinister and they suggested that Hutton wanted these horsemen transferred 
to India to maintain the British Empire, beguiling the colony into expenses unnecessary for its own 
defence. 
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'British school' where 'nothing ... is done by the military authorities except on 
absolutely the most stringent lines of economy.' 14 In this reply he neatly reconciled 
British cultural sentiment with local interests - economy became a British trait. 
Hutton was not always so adept in straddling the two planks of colonial identity and a 
study of his successes and missteps in New South Wales provides useful insights into 
the nature of pre-federation colonial identity. 
In a very similar way, the British were themselves divided in their imperial identity. 
As Burroughs suggests, 'just as colonial sensibilities coexisted with Imperial 
sentiment, so British self-sufficiency jostled with collaborative impulses.'ls 
Thompson agrees, arguing that the British electorate was just as wary of sacrificing its 
interests for the Empire as the colonists were. 16 They too had a sense of identity that 
was sentimentally bound to the Empire but also conscious oflocal British interests. 
Both Thompson and Burroughs conclude that as a result of this dual identity there 
existed an ambivalence in Whitehall that prevented a consistent approach to the 
problem of imperial military integration.'7 In the absence of such a clear policy, 
Hutton was able to act as a relatively free agent in New South Wales: besides 
Meade's broad instructions he received little advice from London. 
Like that of his compatriots, Hutton's view of the Empire was a mix of pure imperial 
sentiment, concem for the general defence, and a desire to enhance the security of 
Great Britain (as the centre of the Empire). This becomes quite apparent when 
14 Sydney Morning Herald, 23 August 1893, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 6. 
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16 A. Thompson, 'Thinking Imperially? Imperial Pressure Groups and the Idea of Empire in Late-
Victorian and Edwardian Britain', D.Phil. Thesis, Corpus Christi College, Oxford, 1994,234. 
17 Burroughs, 'Defence and Imperial Disunity', 327 and 336 and Thompson, 'Thinking Imperially?', 
234. 
110 
discerning the separate influences of Seeley and Wolseley on his actions. In New 
South Wales it was Seeley's influence that helped Hutton engage with colonial British 
race patriotism: Seeley minimised questions of interest and emphasised instead the 
fostering of imperial sentiment. Wolseley, however, had taught Hutton expediency 
and had impressed on him the desperate need to bolster the British army against a 
coming war on the continent. Navigating these competing influences, interests, and 
sentiments would prove a challenging task. In much of Hutton's work, especially in 
his practical military refonns, he sought to enhance the colony's ability to defend 
itself (as a part of the Empire); at other times he looked to the possibility of colonial 
assistance in a general war; and, finally, Hutton also worked to foster a common 
British imperial sentiment. 
Hutton was the youngest acting major-general in the British army at this time. He had 
been made an aide de camp to the Queen just before his appointment. He and his 
charming new wife were to become very popular in Sydney society. He was 
dynamic. He came to Sydney keen to make changes and to shake-up the colony's 
militia. He saw himself as a refonner, in the mould ofWolseley, and he sought to 
implement his modern professional ideas in New South Wales. These plans had been 
stimulated, during the voyage from England, by his study of the findings of the 1892 
Military Service Inquiry Commission. 18 This commission had inquired into the state 
of the colony's defence forces and, discovering them to be 'unsatisfactory,' urged 
prompt and extensive refonns such as restructuring the political administration of the 
department to make the naval and military commanders responsible advisers to the 
Minister, rationalising the forces to reduce expenditure, replacing the permanent 
J8 Hutton, 'Memoirs', Chapter 13, 2. 
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officers in command of the artillery, drafting a complete defence scheme for New 
South Wales, and convening a meeting of representatives from all the colonies to 
discuss federal defence. 19 
On his arrival Hutton immediately initiated a string of practical military reforms. 
Many were along the lines recommended by the Commission. The Commission had 
pointed to problems in the defence department (at this stage the Chief Secretary's 
Department), commenting on the notoriously bad relations that had plagued the 
colony'S military commanders and their ministers.2o To alleviate this, Hutton 
removed the bureaucratic layers intervening between him and the Chief Secretary, 
making himself directly responsible to that minister and becoming the sole adviser on 
defence matters: 'All correspondence for the approval of, or for the information of the 
Minister of Defence, will in future pass through my hands.'21 This reform had the 
flavour of British changes urged over the previous decade by Wolseley - through the 
Stephen Royal Commission of 1887 and the Stanhope reforms of 1888 - which 
clarified the role of the Commander in Chiefby making him the central point for all 
communication with the minister and directly responsible for all matters of personnel 
and materiel.22 
Perry notes the dispiritedness of the troops found by Hutton and concludes that, over 
the course of his command, he, 'gave to the Colony's small army an experience and a 
19 'Report of the Military Service Enquiry Commission' with Despatch, Jersey to Colonial Office, No 
936, received 18 January 1893, TNA, PRO, CO 201/613. 
20 'Report of the Military Service Enquiry Commission' with Despatch, Jersey to Colonial Office, No 
936, received 18 January 1893, TNA, PRO, CO 201/613. 
21 E. Hutton, 'Memorandum to P.U.S. to be forwarded to Minister for Defence', 16 June 1893, BL, 
Hutton Papers, ADD 50084, 197. 
22 E. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1992,44; 
H. Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, 120. 
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confidence it had previously lacked. ,23 Many of Hutton's reforms were directed at 
simply improving the morale of his forces. He planned training camps, organised 
tournaments, hosted tattoos, led frequent troop inspections, encouraged the 
development of rifle clubs, and communicated with the press and public. Hutton 
drafted for New South Wales its first defence scheme. It gave his troops a sense of 
purpose by assigning, 'to every blue jacket and soldier his particular post and duty, so 
that each knew where to go and what to do should anything happen. ,24 The 
centrepiece of the scheme was the creation of a mobile column, complete in all arms, 
to be assembled at Centennial Park in the event of war, and to act as a reserve for the 
whole colony.25 
Hutton encountered manifold difficulties in attempting to effect his reforms. To a 
great extent this was due to the impoverished state of the colony's finances. A 
prolonged drought had depressed the economy and Hutton was continually advised to 
lower his defence estimates. Parliament had been slashing the annual military vote 
over the preceding years: in 1890 it was £246,000; in 1892, £225,366; and by 1894, a 
mere £174,372.26 In lean times the army was an easy target for a group of politicians 
who were only too willing to move reductions, believing that the colony's best 
protection was its body of 'citizen soldiers' and that 'gold laced soldiers' could be 
dispensed with.27 Sentiments such as these would have a far greater impact, years 
later, when Hutton returned to command Australia's federated army. 
23 W. Perry, 'Military Refonns of General Sir Edward Hutton in New South Wales, 1893-96', 
Australian Quanerly, 28, 1956,69 & 75. 
24 Sydney Morning Herald, 12 November 1895, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, 
Vol. 7 
2S E. Hutton, Defence of New South Wales, Govennnent Printer, Sydney, 1894,7. 
26 W. Perry, 'Military Refonns in the Colony of New South Wales, 1893-96: The Work of the 
Commandant, Major-General E.T.H. Hutton', 1996, NLA, Warren Perry Papers, MS 8655/2, 33. 
27 Speeches of Chapman and Haynes, 14 March 1894, NSWPD, Volume 70,1544. 
113 
In Britain, the anny faced similar financial constraints and Hutton was prepared to 
work within a budget, as one reporter perceptively noted, 'the General will doubtless 
find his training in the Wolseley and Evelyn Wood school of incalculable service [in 
that respect]. ,28 Hutton successfully induced his headquarters staff, the permanent 
artillery, and the partially-paid militia to accept reductions in pay and allowances.29 
He encouraged the rifle clubs to cooperate with the government to form an 
economical reserve. 30 In his first year Hutton made savings of approximately 
£40,000: allowing for the new expense of £30,000 for an Easter training encampment 
while still managing to cut the defence bill by £10,000.31 The Easter camp was one of 
the few occasions when the colony's militia could practice large-scale manoeuvres 
and Hutton believed it vital for military efficiency. He was therefore furious when the 
colony's Premier, George Dibbs, peremptorily removed the required funds from the 
budget - cancelling the camp. It was a particularly galling cut for the fact that he had 
relied on the promise of a camp to persuade his troops to accept the economies 
originally demanded by the government.32 Finance remained a problem and by 1895 
Hutton was worried that the continuing pay cuts, especially affecting his staff officers, 
would ruin his force. 33 
Hutton ineffectually attempted to counter government parsimony by stressing the 
importance of defence to the colony's financial position. The colony was very 
sensitive to its financial standing, being heavily reliant on British credit and keenly 
28 Hobart Mercury, 12/2/94, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 6. 
29 Sydney Morning Herald, 23 August 1893, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 6; 
Daily Telegraph, 4 November 1893, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 6. 
30 Daily Telegraph, 2 September 1893, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 6. 
31 Daily Telegraph, 4 November 1893, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 6. 
32 Daily Telegraph, I November 1894, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 7. 
33 Letter, Hutton to Reid, 19 May 1895, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50084, 90. 
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aware that investor confidence detennined the rates of interest charged.34 Hutton 
argued that the security of Sydney's ports was a matter of great interest to those 
investors. In 1893 he warned that, 'Any feeling of doubt as to the defensive power of 
the colony would be inevitably followed by a want of confidence on the part ofthose 
foreign capitalists who have so largely promoted commercial enterprise in the 
colony. ,35 In his 1894 Scheme of Defence he stressed the necessity of securing the 
colony 'beyond all possibility of doubt' so that capital would not flee were Great 
Britain ever involved in a war. 36 
As well as stressing the danger of commercial doubt, Hutton encouraged it: fuelling 
popular fears of conflict with Japan, Russia and China to push his reform barrow. He 
had learned from Wolseley the value of such fears and how to use the press to exploit 
them. 'There is a sulphurous smell in the air even here. These Colonies,' he confided 
to Buller, 'are curiously subject to Panic, and if we should have even a symptom of a 
war scare we soldiers will boom. ,37 He spoke disingenuously to a Herald 
correspondent of the threat from Russia, 'I have no desire to raise groundless fears; 
but I cannot refrain from expressing the opinion that the present aspect of affairs is 
very threatening, and makes the necessity for a combined system of defence more 
pressing than ever. ' 38 
34 L. Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, conflict and compromise 
in the late nineteenth century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, 56. 
3S 'Our Defences: General Hutton's Views', Australian Star, 31 August 1893, NLA, Hutton Letters and 
Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 6. 
36 E. Hutton, Defence of New South Wales, Government Printer, Sydney, 1894, I. 
37 Letter, Hutton to Buller, 29 October 1894, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50086. 
38 'Russian Aggression and Australia: Major-General Hutton on the Situation', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 29 October 1895, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 7,117. 
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Finance was not Hutton's only problem. There was a second obstacle to Hutton's 
refonn program, one that he found even harder to tolerate. Commanding the colony'S 
pennanent artillery were two aging officers, Spalding and Airey. Hutton judged these 
men 'technically and professionally ignorant. ,39 They offended his professional 
sensibilities. Both were ex-Royal Marines who had served in the colony for decades, 
falling out of touch with the science of modern artillery and lacking the professional 
qualifications now deemed necessary for higher-level command. The artillery 
command was vital to Hutton: it was the only permanent unit in the colony and, as 
such, it was responsible for manning the forts, maintaining equipment, and for 
training the militia. Furthennore, Colonel Spalding, as the second ranked officer in 
the colony, would succeed to the command in the event of the Commandant's 
incapacity. Hutton therefore deemed it essential that these two officers be replaced 
with one suitably qualified officer from the Royal Artillery. In his three annual 
reports he recommended their replacement. It was a constant source of friction 
between Hutton and his two governments, the Dibbs and Reid administrations, who 
proved reluctant to remove them. Spalding and Airey were both well connected in the 
colony and had patrons in parliament. Furthermore, parliament was unwilling to vote 
them both the expensive pensions necessary for their removal given the economic 
climate. 
Hutton, however, made their dismissal the sine qua non of military refonn. He 
applied great pressure on both his governments to win the point. In a confidential 
minute attached to his 1893 annual report he warned that he was not prepared 'to 
guarantee the defence of this Colony nor of the Naval Base of Sydney in time of war' 
39 Letter, Hutton to Buller, 13 November 1893, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50086, 33. 
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unless a new artillery commander were appointed.4o He included the same disclaimer 
in both his 1894 and 1895 annual reports, but now putting it in the actual body of the 
reports.41 He informed the British Admiral on the Australian Station that, without a 
new artillery commander, Sydney could not be considered safe as a naval base and 
requested that he 'put every pressure possible so as to secure the change. ,42 By taking 
this line Hutton deliberately took advantage oflocal fears that the British might move 
its naval base from Sydney.43 Hutton applied additional pressure by writing to the 
Commander in Chief of the British Army, the Duke of Cambridge, inviting him to 
attend 'to that portion of my Report [1894 annual report 1 which bears upon this 
subject.'44 He wrote to the Governor of New South Wales, Lord Hampden, 
suggesting that the British Government intervene.45 He wrote in similar fashion to 
Wolseley and to the secretary of the Colonial Defence Committee.46 Despite all this 
bluster, all his threats and his petitions home to England, he never got rid ofthe two 
officers. The expedient measures he used mirror his Wolseleyan use of the press and 
betray a cynical view of politicians and parliamentary processes. 
Hutton's constant attention to this problem poisoned his relationship with Dibbs. As 
well as being its Premier, Dibbs was also the colony's Chief Secretary - the minister 
responsible for New South Wales's defences. However, growing friction meant that 
they rarely saw one another. In September 1893 Hutton formally complained of the 
lack of personal interviews, pleading, 'It is quite beyond my power to do what is best 
40 Confidential Minute, Hutton to Colonial Secretary, undated, SRN, Colonial Secretary Letters 
Received, 94/15258. 
41 'Report for the Year 1894' and 'Report for the Year 1895' both sent with Despatch, Hampden to 
Colonial Office, 25 February 1896, rnA, PRO, CO 2011619. 
42 Letter, Hutton to Bridge, 24 October 1895, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50094, 250. 
43 Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism, 148. 
44 Letter, Hutton to Cambridge, 22 April 1895, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078. 
45 Letter, Hutton to Hampden, 28 October 1895, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50082,187. 
46 Letter, Hutton to Wolseley, 28 October 1895, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50085, 100; Letter, Hutton to 
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in the interests of the Colony unless I have personal access to you as the Minister to 
whom I am responsible.'47 By November, when Dibbs withdrew the funds necessary 
for the Easter camp, their relationship had practically broken down and they 
descended to trading insults in the press. Hutton gave a newspaper interview warning 
that the popularity of his force would suffer without a carnp.48 In a memo to Dibbs he 
railed against the budgetary cuts and fumed at not being consulted, warning that his 
'responsibility [to the government for the efficiency of the forces] must cease if the 
Estimates for which I, as Military Adviser to the Colony, arn responsible are altered or 
arnended without my being consulted. ,49 Dibbs shot back a reply deprecating 
Hutton's 'dictatorial' tone and gave his own press interview, publicly censuring 
Hutton: 'he writes and talks too much.'5o On 13 November Dibbs and Hutton finally 
met to resolve their differences. Hutton was in such a state of agitation that he 
brought his service revolver to the meeting. 
No shots were fired in that interview and Hutton and Dibbs managed to paper over 
their differences.51 For a few months their relations normalised and Dibbs even 
requested Hutton draft a scheme for federal defence. 52 This rapprochement did not 
last, however, and things soon soured in 1894. Dibbs discovered in February that 
Hutton had sent a copy of his Defence Scheme directly to the Governor, as the 
Queen's representative and therefore the official Commander in Chief. Dibbs was 
incensed, insistent on the predominance of the responsible minister. 53 By May Hutton 
47 Minute, Hutton to Dibbs, 27 September 1893, SRN, Colonial Secretary Letters Received, 93/12762. 
48 Australian Star, I November 1893, SRN, Colonial Secretary Letters Received, 93/14404. 
49 Minute, Hutton to Dibbs, 2 November 1893, SRN, Colonial Secretary Letters Received, 93/14404. 
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complained that, 'I have constantly to exercise the greatest forbearance in my 
relations with Sir George Dibbs - such forbearance indeed as I should find hard to 
show if I did not very keenly realize the importance of maintaining my position here 
on Imperial grounds. ,54 
Hutton's difficulties with Dibbs ended in August 1894 with the latter's electoral 
defeat by George Reid. Hutton had a happier time with Reid and J. N. Brunker, the 
new Colonial Secretary. In his memoir he wrote of Reid, 'Never have I served any 
political chief for whom I have had a more sincere admiration, or a warmer personal 
regard. ,55 Reid and Hutton shared similar imperial sentiments. The unity of the 
British Empire, Reid urged in 1896, 'is not derived from schemes of this or that kind 
of Imperial Federation, but upon the kinship of the peoples which make up the British 
race. ,56 When Hutton accepted the command of the Canadian militia in 1898 Reid 
wrote him, encouraging him in his mission of fostering imperial strength and unity: 'I 
was hoping that you would soon have scope for your commanding quality and believe 
that the Canadian Command will give you many chances of "building up" our 
Colonial Empire in military strength and discipline.,57 Brunker proved Hutton's ideal 
minister, 'He knows nothing of military matters, is always attentive to argument, and 
never interferes. ,58 On a personal level, relations were very amicable between Hutton 
and his new masters. 
5. Letter, Hutton to Buller, 28 May 1894, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50086. 
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The underlying conditions, however, had not materially changed. The Reid 
government faced the same economic difficulties and Spalding and Airey retained 
their political influence. Hutton became increasingly frustrated with colonial politics. 
In 1895 he had difficulty getting his annual report for the previous year tabled in 
parliament because of his insistence that Spalding and Airey be retired. He 
complained to Cambridge that, 'The Premier, Mr Reid, and the Chief Secretary, Mr 
Brunker, both tell me personally that they accept my recommendations, but have 
hitherto not said so officially, in spite of constant representations.,59 Hutton 
increasingly expressed disgust with politicians. He described 'Parliamentary log-
rollers,6o and despaired that, 'their action depends not only upon the slightest breath 
of Public Opinion, but upon local wire-pulling.,61 Hutton was frank in expressing his 
low opinion of colonial politicians on his departure from the colony. At a staff picnic 
farewelling him he spoke of his hope that the New South Wales military would soon 
be part of an Australian force where it would be above 'local influences, ... local 
political influences, and ... personal influences. ,62 
Hutton, therefore, did his best to fulfil what Meade had described as his primary duty 
in the colony: defence of the colony itself. He had instituted a series of reforms and 
made many important, lasting, and beneficial changes. In doing so he had been beset 
with personnel and financial difficulties. Underlying these particular problems lay the 
general issue of control. 
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Hutton followed Wolseley in his understanding of the position of a General Officer 
Commanding. This was based on an idea ofthe British model in which parliament 
voted funds, and laid down policy, while the Crown - represented by the Commander 
in Chief - controlled appointments, discipline and had the direct command. Hutton 
sought an independent sphere of command, bounded by a defined policy set by a 
responsible government. 'My anxious endeavour,' Hutton assured Dibbs, 'has been 
to do what is best in the interests of the Colony and its Defence Force, within the lines 
of the policy of the Government.' 63 Furthermore, as an expert, Hutton expected his 
government to listen to his opinion when deciding that policy: 
The politicians in Australia like the Press require to be educated 
gradually to necessary changes. Both are, I have found, most 
susceptible to practical sound sense, if put clearly and finnly before 
them, and then left to assimilate itself into their intelligence. This can 
only be compassed by a man who will take an initiative!!64 
This view had infonned his restructure of the department to make himself sole adviser 
to the minister and it lay behind his requests for regular interviews. Hutton's 
understanding of his position as General Officer Commanding infonned his tireless 
efforts to retire the artillery officers (in the belief that he should control appointments) 
and his struggles to hold training camps (he was charged with the efficiency of the 
force). His frustration at not receiving the level of control to which he felt entitled 
fuelled his Wolseleyan distrust of politicians (especially Dibbs); and led to his 
attempts at circumventing his governments by appeals to the public, war scares, and 
threats of investor panic. 
63 Minute, Hutton to Dibbs, 27 September 1893, SRN, Colonial Secretary Letters Received, 93/12762. 
64 Letter, Nathan to Hutton, 19 January 1896, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50087. 
121 
The colonial understanding of the role of a General Officer Commanding proved quite 
different. Hutton's governments tended to view him as an employee, entirely 
subordinate to them. Dibbs, especially, refused to admit to any check on his own 
control and he publicly dismissed Hutton's arguments with the statement: 'No 
subordinate in this office has a right to find fault with the way the estimates of my 
department are treated by me.'65 This was not anti-imperialism; it was simply a 
different interpretation of proper civil-military relations. In their view parliament was 
supreme. Huntington notes that this type of contest was a fundamental problem with 
the old British system of dual control and was only resolved in Britain itself when 
parliament finally abolished the position of Commander in Chief.66 Furthermore, as 
Wilcox demonstrates, this problem was exacerbated in the colonies by the nature of 
their forces: they were not predominantly regulars, as in the British army, but militia, 
and as such they shared the British citizen soldier tradition, which dated back to 
Cromwell, in which it was parliament's duty to restrain the power of the monarch.67 
This was a problem that plagued Hutton in each of his colonial commands. 
Hutton's main initiative, in his New South Wales command, was the development of 
a scheme for federal defence. This is evident, two decades later, in his reaction to the 
death of Major-General William Bridges, who had been mortally wounded by a 
Turkish sniper while touring the lines at Gallipoli. Bridges died on 18 May 1915, 
becoming the first Australian general to perish on active service. Hutton received the 
sad news in England and, on hearing of the financial straits in which the family of his 
old friend was left, he set about petitioning the Australian government to vote Lady 
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Bridges a pension. He wrote to Andrew Fisher, the Australian Prime Minister, 
describing Bridges's services to the Australian nation. Oddly, he made little mention 
of Bridges's recent role as General Officer Commanding the Australian Imperial 
Force; he hardly even described the important role Bridges filled on Hutton's own 
staff when commanding the new Australian army after federation; instead, Hutton 
devoted the bulk of his plea to detailing what could be fairly described as a minor 
footnote in Bridges's military career: his position as secretary to two forgotten 
colonial military conferences of 1894 and 1896. Hutton concluded that, 'It is not, 
therefore, too much to say that Major General Sir William Bridges directly 
contributed in no small degree to the evolution of the Commonwealth as it stands 
today,' on the basis of that role. 'This first practical step towards Federation,' Hutton 
claimed, 'was effected by means of the Report of a Military Conference held at 
Sydney on the 24th October 1894, and out of the Movement thus initiated evolved the 
creation of the Commonwealth which was consummated five years later. ,68 Of 
course, what Hutton was really implying was that he himself, as the architect and 
main factor at those conferences, was a key figure in the movement towards 
Australian federation. 
The significance that the two federal defence conferences held for Hutton was not 
merely a product oflate-life reminiscence. It informed many of the military reforms 
he introduced during his command. The mobile column, for example, that formed the 
heart of Hutton's Defence Scheme for New South Wales was perfectly placed to 
participate in his scheme for Australian federal defence. He admitted as much to 
Admiral Bridge, 'In N.S.W. since my arrival I have had to re-construct and re-
68 Letter, Hutton to Fisher, 28 May 1915, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50084,133-4. 
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organise the whole Force, and this I have done with a fixed regard upon the future 
requirements for Federation of all the Australian Colonies. ,69 
Hutton's federal defence scheme was originally drafted at Dibbs's request in January 
1894. It was first publicly aired in a speech of that same month at Bathurst where 
Hutton claimed that, while 'committees, speeches, and reports [had] availed little [in 
advancing federation],' federation for defence 'was distinctly within practical 
politics.'70 The scheme was most fully expressed in Hutton's draft 'Australian 
Federal Defence Agreement. ,71 It involved each colony dividing their units into two 
distinct forces: a garrison-type local defence force and a mobile field anny capable of 
joint action anywhere in Australia (and potentially abroad, as Hutton's critics 
suspected). A federal defence council would administer these combined field forces 
and appoint a Federal General Commanding to lead them. Hutton promoted his 
federal defence scheme at two separate commandants' conferences (October 1894 and 
January 1896), presented his draft Federal Agreement to the second, and the whole 
matter was considered by the Australian colonial premiers in 1896. 
The scheme was never adopted; the premiers decided in 1896 that a solution to the 
problem of federal defence must await full political federation. Its only concrete 
achievement was to encourage South Australia to pass an act allowing its troops to 
serve throughout Australia.72 It was, however, a milestone in Hutton's own thinking 
on imperial defence cooperation and it formed the basis for his later schemes. The 
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imperial intent of Hutton's Australian federal defence scheme is also the main source 
of his characterisation - by historians such as Mordike and Trainor - as a single-
minded, British-centred imperialist.73 They rely on the failure of the scheme to imply 
a countervailing local nationalism.74 Hutton's intentions in pursuing this scheme and 
the reasons for its failure are therefore vital to an understanding of his role in New 
South Wales. 
Hutton evinced three reasons for proposing his federal defence scheme. He believed 
that it was the most efficient means of achieving Australian continental defence, that 
it would facilitate any contributions the Australian colonies might make to imperial 
wars, and he felt it would encourage federation on the wider issue. 
In its underlying concept, Hutton's federal defence scheme was not at all new. In 
large part it was based on the report of Bevan Edwards, a British general who had 
examined the state of Australian defences in 1889. Edwards stressed the importance 
of a federal approach to defence and mooted the possibility of an Australian mobile 
force, about 30,000 strong, being available for imperial service.75 A meeting of 
Australian commandants echoed these recommendations in 1890. In 1892 the British 
commandant in Victoria, Major-General Tulloch, led the Royal Commission into the 
state of the defence forces of New South Wales and again recommended a federal 
defence policy.76 Federal defence was a sensible solution to the problem of 
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Australian defence. Separate defence acts, equipment, uniforms, and training meant 
that, were the colonies ever required to cooperate against an aggressor, legal and 
military impediments would intervene. For example, in December 1892, shortly 
before Hutton anived, when the Echuca Company of the Victorian Rangers was 
invited to visit the town of Moama, across the Murray in New South Wales, it 
required the assent of both colonial parliaments and both commandants.77 Bringing 
the colonial armies together under the control of a central council would strengthen 
Australian continental security. 
It also promised to be of advantage in an imperial context. Due to British naval 
supremacy it seemed unlikely at that time that Australia would ever face an invading 
force. The mobile force that Hutton proposed for the protection of Australia against 
possible foreign incursion would therefore have little chance of actually being 
deployed for this purpose. It was, however, potentially very useful as a ready-made 
Australian expeditionary force that might, in the case of Britain being at war with a 
European power, attack foreign assets in the region, especially the European Pacific 
colonies. At the second commandants' conference the definition of' Australia and 
Tasmania' was enlarged to include a large segment of the Pacific with this very end in 
mind.78 Furthermore, this force - provided its members volunteered for such service 
- could, if necessary, support British forces anywhere in the world. Nathan, the 
secretary of the Colonial Defence Committee, wrote that since there was no likely 
Australian defensive need for a mobile force, the expeditionary function of such an 
army was 'the chief raison d'etre of the whole scheme. The Military Defensive 
77 B. Nicholls, The Colonial Volunteers: The defence forces of the Australian Colonies, Allen and 
Unwin, Sydney, 1988, 151. 
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justification for it is far less obvious, the conference having accepted the principle 
"that the most probable form of attack on the Australian littoral would be by means of 
raids of an enemy's cruisers.",79 Hutton replied confidentially to Nathan, and in full 
agreement: 
I have kept this object steadily in view throughout all the Schemes, 
both for N.S. Wales, and for Australia, which I have drawn up, but I 
have never dared to hint publicly at the possible necessity of moving 
Australian Troops out of Australian Waters, until the 31 st ultimo, when 
at a Banquet I indicated the principle as applied to England. This has 
not been adversely criticized, and I propose to go a step further upon 
the next occasion that offers!80 
At Aldershot, Hutton had developed - at Wolseley's instigation - ad hoc mounted 
forces to supplement the British cavalry and so contribute to a British field force able 
to meet the armies of Europe. In the expeditionary aspect of Hutton's Australian 
federal defence scheme, he seemed to have kept that end in view. It is significant that 
a third ofthe mobile field force Hutton planned in his federal defence scheme would 
be mounted.81 Hutton took a special interested in the colony's mounted forces. He 
showered constant praise on colonial horsemanship. On his 1893 Northern inspection 
tour he described Australians as the 'finest material for cavalry he had ever seen. ,82 
He tied this ability to the natural racial qualities of the Anglo-Saxon; the colonies, he 
proclaimed, were filled with natural horsemen who, 'while hardy and of independent 
79 Letter, Nathan to Hutton, 27 November 1895, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50087,150. 
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character, have all those British characteristics which have made and are now making 
an Empire and a race without parallel in the history of the world.'83 If Hutton's plans 
had been successful, his mobile field force would have been a useful accession to the 
British army's mounted strength, and this was certainly one of his aims. 
There was third reason that Hutton pushed Australian federal defence and this was to 
give impetus to Australian political federation. At the time of the first defence 
conference he wrote letters to England making this clear: 'if Federation for Australian 
Defence is carried through in the manner suggested by the Military Conference, 
Federation on the larger and far more important issue will be brought nearer' 84 and 'I 
can not help thinking that federation is now likely to come about by "natural 
evolution" rather than by a national cataclysm and that Federation for Defence is the 
first stage of development to that end.'85 He confided to Henry Parkes, 'Humble 
individual as I am, may I assure you of my anxiety to assist in however small a degree 
to achieve so great an end [federationj.'86 
Australian political federation was such an important part of Hutton's federal defence 
plans that the consummation of federation convinced Hutton that he had been 
successful. He would later describe himself as a father of Australian federation and 
was disappointed that this was not recognised in Australia. Hutton based his claim 
on the contention that, even though his scheme was not taken up, it won Reid over to 
the federal cause and it prompted Reid to call two Premiers' conferences (January 
83 E. Hutton, The Defence and Defensive Power of Australia, Angus and Robertson, Melbourne 1902, 
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1895 and March 1896). His case, however, does not hold much water. Reid was not 
greatly influenced by the issue of defence. Hutton was shocked to discover that when 
Reid published his memoirs defence was never mentioned. In 1915 Edmund Barton 
felt compelled to write to Hutton to dispel his federal claims, arguing that Reid was 
not fully converted to the Australian federal cause until 1898. 'Believe me,' he 
warned, ' ... there was never a greater mistake than to suppose that support given by 
Sir George Reid to any measure, military or other, was given out of a desire for 
Federation.,87 
In fact, Hutton's scheme, if successful, might have disrupted the federal movement. 
To try to attempt a union of colonial militaries before political union threw up all sorts 
of constitutional difficulties. Both the leading Sydney newspapers, the Sydney 
Morning Herald and the Daily Telegraph, agreed on the necessity of establishing a 
national legislature before a defensive union.88 Without a federation of the Australian 
governments there would be no responsible body in control of the force. Several 
people tried to intimate to Hutton these difficulties. The Governor of New South 
Wales advised: 'It is obvious, as you say, that without a 'Federal Council' with 
supreme power in case of emergency the whole scheme would be unworkable. Is it 
within the scope of the present Conference to make a recommendation for the 
consideration of such a Council? This seems to me to go to the gut of the whole 
question. ,89 
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Hutton's 'Federal Council' was ill-defined: he proposed that two members be 
appointed by New South Wales and Victoria and one from each of the other colonies 
- but never elucidated the manner, tenure, or timing of the appointments - and 
proposed that these members be assisted by three ex-officio members: the Federal 
General Commanding and the Chief of the Military Staff (both to be appointed by the 
council itself) and a naval officer to represent the Admiral on the Australian Station.9o 
The Federal General Commanding would enjoy the sort of powers Hutton fancied for 
himself as General Officer Commanding: the entire responsibility for 'discipline, 
organisation, minor allotment, and the distribution of troops, apart from the policy of 
Australian defence. ,91 It was a poor substitute for an elected parliament, as the 
Herald editorialised, 'To call into existence an army subject to the orders of no 
responsible Government would be opposed to the traditions and principles of 
Englishmen.' The same editorial damned Hutton's system as step away from 
federation, an attempt 'to pluck the fruit of federation before we have planted the 
tree' .92 
This was why the colonial premiers opted for full federation. It was, once again, the 
issue of control that disrupted Hutton's plans. Colonial resistance to Hutton's scheme 
for Australian federal defence is not evidence of colonial nationalism beating back 
unwelcome British imperialist advances. It represents a colonial determination to 
preserve control over the military forces for which they were paying: local control -
as opposed to imperial - and parliamentary control - as opposed to military. 
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Hutton's relationship with Henry Parkes illustrates that this protection oflocal 
autonomy did not equate with an assertion of a unique colonial identity. Parkes was 
one ofthe sternest critics of Hutton's scheme. He worried that it would damage 
federation's prospects and he warned Hutton, 
The ground you take up is all old ground with us which has been 
examined time and time and virtually abandoned ... There can never be 
a Federal army except by the creative powers and under the direct 
control of a Federal Government. That has been thought out by all the 
men who have grasped the difficulties of Federation. If any person in 
authority adopted your idea at this late hour of the day, the attempt to 
give effect to it would take more time and labour than would be 
necessary for the far higher object of completing the union of the 
colonies which it must not be forgotten is more than half achieved.93 
Hutton was stung; he had hoped that he would have the statesman's sUpport.94 In his 
memoir he attributed Parkes's opposition to old age: 'To delay an improved system of 
Defence because no Statesman in Australia was strong enough to force on Federation 
seemed to me the height of imbecility; and in this opinion I had the sympathy of the 
great mass of thinking Australians. ,95 
Parkes's opposition meant that, for Mordike, he became a champion of the Australian 
nation. 'Sir Henry Parkes,' he writes, 'was insistent in placing national claims on any 
93 Leiter, Parkes to Hulton, 26 January 1894, BL, Hulton Papers, ADD 50084, 168. 
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future Australian force.'96 Yet, although Parkes was careful to retain local control 
over the Australian forces, and to protect Australia's political integrity, he never 
turned his back on the British Empire. He shared with Hutton a British imperial 
cultural identity, agreed with Hutton on the likelihood of a European war, and 
believed that in such a conflict Australia must playa part. He addressed the New 
South Wales Legislative Assembly months later in words that could have as easily 
been Hutton's own: 
The British Empire has got a very perplexed and stormy future before 
it. I, believing myself to be a loyal Englishman, which means a loyal 
Australian - to speak more plainly, believing myself a loyal subject of 
the greatest Sovereign that ever lived, my Queen; believing all that. I 
cannot but be anxious about the future of the Empire of which we form 
part. It is impossible to close our eyes, let us try how we may, to the 
startling fact that five great Powers have 20 millions of men under 
arms ... We will best be prepared for any eventuality that may happen 
by doing our duty as faithful members of a common country. We will 
best be prepared by schooling ourselves, if I may so use the term, to 
face the necessity.97 
Parkes did not see Australian Federation as a step away from the Empire. He believed 
in maintaining the bonds of Empire and the political rights of the colonies. In that 
same speech: 'The spirit which I think ought to pervade the policy of England and 
her relations to us is exactly the spirit which ought to animate us as a congeries of free 
96 Mordike, An Anny for a Nation, 37. 
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colonies in this question of federation.' 98 This was Parkes's only point of difference 
to Hutton - they were allied in sentiment but differed on questions of control and 
interest. 
It is therefore not surprising to find that Parkes, far from being an inveterate, 
nationalistic opponent of Hutton's, was actually one of his staunchest supporters in 
the colony. Parkes gave Hutton great encouragement in his military reforms, 'I am so 
thoroughly alive to the necessity of making our Defence Force adequately effective 
that you may rely upon me for any support I can give.'99 When Hutton came under 
fire in parliament for his insistence on retiring the artillery commanders it was Parkes 
who defended him, 'Major-General Hutton was a thorough and genuine soldier, and 
from what he had heard of him he believed he was the most efficient general who had 
ever commanded in these colonies.' 100 Parkes lent Hutton fulsome support in his 
efforts at popularising the colonial military. 'Everything possible should be done to 
make the Military forces popular - to identify them with the permanent interests and 
the public liberties of the people,' he wrote. 101 He believed that only the military 
could 'cultivate a true spirit of self-sacrifice amongst our people. ' 102 
In his scheme for Australian federal defence, Hutton did enjoy one influential source 
of support. This was from the new Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, a Liberal 
Unionist and member of Salisbury's 1895 government. Between the two 
commandants' conferences, when it had seemed that the impetus towards federal 
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defence was flagging, Chamberlain had taken a personal interest in the matter and had 
asked the Colonial Defence Committee to forward its opinions on the subject to 
Australia to hasten discussion.103 Chamberlain shared much in common with Hutton. 
He was one of the first middle class politicians (he had made his fortune in screw 
making) to reach high office. Like Hutton he was a professional, arguably the first 
professional politician in Britain; he pioneered modem party and electioneering 
techniques. 104 He was, above all else, passionate about the Empire. He had 
unsuccessfully begged Gladstone for the Colonial Office in 1886, when it was not 
considered a position worth begging for; and in 1895 he refused the more senior roles 
offered him by Salisbury in order to take it. With Hutton, he saw the defensive 
potential of Greater Britain: 
In the next 50 years, perhaps in less, there will be in Greater Britain, if it still 
holds together, an Anglo-Saxon population of something like 100 millions of 
beings, and if it be understood that any insult or any attack upon any member of 
this great family would be resented by all the reset - that, I venture to say, 
would be a greater security for peace than all the arms and all the fortifications 
with which it might be supported. lOS 
And like Hutton, he was a disciple of Seeley, believing imperial federation to be the 
goal, but one that could not be imposed from above; it must be the 'realisation of a 
universal desire.' 106 
A complete picture of Hutton's role in the colony must take into account his own debt 
to Seeley. This influence is most apparent in Hutton's speechmaking. In addressing 
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the troops and speaking to the general public Hutton demonstrated a clear ambition to 
increase the imperial sentiment of the colony. Towards the end of his command, 
emboldened by his impending departure, he was not afraid to declare himself' an 
Imperialistic soldier,' a role he defined as serving, 'the colony and her Majesty the 
Queen,' and he begged, 'to remind all the military people in Australia that they were 
really British soldiers.' 107 Such sentiments were partly motivated by his desire to 
secure colonial contributions to imperial defence; just as he had promoted an 
Australian defensive union - in part - to encourage a colonial contribution to imperial 
defence. Yet he also pursued a more altruistic imperialism of the kind taught by 
Seeley. 
Hutton's idea of Greater Britain is the key to understanding this. Following Seeley, 
Hutton believed in the development, in the nurturing, of the British nations 
comprising Greater Britain through education and through the cultivation of civic 
values. Hutton felt an almost paternal interest in the budding Australian nation. He 
was excited by the potential for national growth: 'The existing phase of national life 
and development here is most interesting!' 108 Australian political federation was one 
of Hutton's goals in pursuing his federal defence scheme precisely because of this 
concern. As a means of ensuring that the colonies send troops in an imperial crisis, 
complete federation was unnecessary - the federal defence scheme would alone 
suffice for that - Hutton desired the further step of federation because he believed it 
vital to the future national growth of Australia. 
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Seeley had urged his audience at his Aldershot lecture in 1889 that 'it is surely all-
important that you should consider your profession not merely as specialists but also 
as citizens and patriots.' 109 Hutton believed, with Seeley, that soldiers had a role, as 
citizens, in educating the public towards national greatness. From his memoir: 
Humble individual though I was, some inner voice seemed to force me 
into undertaking the mission of showing that military service is the 
main factor for training democratic communities in their primary 
duties of citizenship. It was a new role for a soldier to undertake: its 
very audacity appealed to the Australian mind. I 10 
As we have seen from his dealings with the Dibbs and Reid administrations, Hutton 
felt that politicians were untrustworthy, expedient, and quite unable to fulfil their 
national duty. A soldier, however, could act as statesman and patriot. To Parkes, 
Hutton wrote, 'a soldier in a position of responsibility, whether in this Colony or in 
Great Britain should be accepted by the Public as quite removed from any connection 
with politics or political partisanship.' III 
In his public speeches in New South Wales, Hutton appealed to race, to common 
kinship, to religion, to what Seeley believed were the 'natural ties which unite 
Englishmen [and which will] resume their influence as soon as the counteracting 
pressure is removed.' 112 He was eager to engage with the sentimental side of colonial 
identity. He promoted values he himself held dear - martial virtues and manliness -
in the belief that these would aid national growth. 
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Hutton spoke of the racial unity of the Empire. He mixed racial with familial imagery 
to assert this bond: 'we are but one large family, and that, for the British race, the 
world is beginning to be almost too small.' 113 To another audience he claimed that, 
'He felt that all the Australian colonies - of which this was the principal- were part 
of one great family of which England was the head.' 114 And later, when receiving a 
Cavalry Team about to represent the colony in England, he enthused: 
We must always recollect this. that whatever we are we are portions of 
a great British family. For the time being I am in the antipodes, and to 
all intents and purposes an Australian, but I am also an Englishman. 
You who have just come from the old country will agree with me that 
you are none the less English, none the less British, because you are 
Australians. 115 
With kinship came obligation (though here he was careful not to arouse colonial fears 
for the loss of their military autonomy): 'He could only say this, that we were only a 
portion of the great Anglo-Saxon family, and we could not disassociate our interests 
from the great empire of which we formed a part, and it was our duty to guarantee the 
defence of this portion of the Empire.' I 16 
National unity, in Hutton's opinion, also derived from a shared religion. As 
commandant he encouraged Christian worship among his men. He held church 
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parades and organised a cathedral service for the troops in Sydney. This was not a 
proselytising, doctrinal affair (of the sort Hutton's stepfather would have appreciated), 
but an ecumenical, nationally unifying service in line with the way Hutton's own 
Christianity had developed. The Dean of Sydney wrote Hutton on the subject of this 
ceremony, claiming to be 'with you in thinking that such services for the troops are 
valuable in a national point of view, strengthening the loyalty, and helping the 
cultivation of religion, which is after all the greatest bond of union, and the strongest 
incentive to duty.' 117 When Hutton left the colony the Bishop of Newcastle sent him 
a fond farewell: 'You have not only taught the seriousness of service and so have 
lifted the whole thing out of the popular notion of play but you have got behind sheer 
discipline and have kindled the fine spirit in which such discipline can be best 
exercised and endured." 18 
Hutton travelled throughout New South Wales during the course his command. In 
1895 he made his longest trip, out into the Western rural heartland of the state. He 
did it to show the people of the bush of what stuff Imperial soldiers were made: to 
'show the residents of these districts that as soldiers we make light of such physical 
difficulties as exist.' 119 Hutton was gratified by his reception and wrote home 
describing the strong imperial loyalty of the bush folk: 'I can assure you that I have 
never in any other part ofH.M's dominions experienced so much loyalty or such 
sound British sympathies.' 120 He made speeches during this tour referring to the 
connecting link between the British army and the people of New South Wales. He 
linked the army and the nation: 
117 Letter, Dean of Sydney to Hutton, 14 August 1894, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50094. 
118 Letter, Bishop of Newcastle to Hutton, 25 February 1896, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50095. 
119 Letter, Hutton to Reid, 29 September 1895, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50084, 103. 
120 Letter, Hutton to Wood, 3 November 1895, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50086,173. 
138 
He [Hutton] believed in the cultivation of a military spirit, so that 
when, as an independent people, they became dominent [sic] in this 
portion of the world, they would have the power that had made 
England what she was. 121 
The ordeal of war was, for Hutton, essential to national progress: 
It appeared to me that public opinion was regarding military service from an 
erroneous point of view. They looked upon it as a species of past-time rather 
than as the educating medium of the spirit of self-sacrifice and national duty. 
Far removed from the arena of European wars and of international 
complications, the public was losing grip of the fundamental laws of national 
greatness. Some inner voice seemed to urge me to undertake the mission of 
convincing the Australian public that military service is one of the main factors 
for training democratic communities in their primary duties of citizenship, and 
pointing out that, as such, it is a duty to God as well as to the State. 122 
In his efforts at inculcating martial virtues in the colony, Hutton connected these to 
his idea of manliness. 'The military spirit represents what has made England 
foremost amongst the countries of the world,' Hutton declared in a public speech, 'it 
fosters those manly instincts which go to make a man or a nation. Love of country, 
duty or honour, and discipline, these are the principles which constitute a nation's 
greatness.,123 Manliness bred national success. Hutton spoke of 'manly qualities 
which are vital to the well-being of any great people' 124 and 'manly instincts which go 
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to make a man or a nation.' 125 He felt that military forces were especially important 
in focusing and fostering manliness. In a speech to a Sydney institute for boys in 
1895 Hutton linked this to race: 
The British Empire did not become great by the production of frozen 
mutton or the production of butter in large quantities, but by the 
development of the manly qualities which had always been apparent in 
the race. 126 
He encouraged the boys to play cricket and football in order to nurture that portion of 
their racial inheritance. 
All this rhetoric was not simply about greasing the wheels for the forcing upon New 
South Wales of definite military commitments. For Hutton these speeches had the far 
greater and more permanent value of educating the colonial public towards national 
greatness. Like Seeley, Hutton had come to value sentiment as much as schemes. 
National education was as worthwhile as any definite agreement. 'We are,' he 
suggested to Cambridge, 'I venture to think most likely to reach our ideal of military 
perfection by a system of evolution, and by educating public opinion to our ultimate 
requirements rather than by expecting a species of cataclysm to attain our ends which 
only an acute war crisis would give us.' 127 The fact that Hutton trusted as much to 
sentiment as to schemes is evident in the care he took not to risk that sentiment in his 
attempts at implementing federal defence. Bevan Edwards had promised a troop of 
30,000; Hutton, on the other hand, was far more circumspect. 128 In the minutes of the 
federal defence conference of 1894, Hutton is revealed as the most conservative of all 
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the colonial commandants in his objectives. It was he, for instance, who amended 
Clause II of the report to ensure that the colonies would control their forces at all 
times apart from 'national emergency.' 129 Hutton demonstrated this conservatism in a 
letter to Cambridge written after the conference, 'we have endeavoured in our Report 
to ... propose just so much as the existing condition of public opinion is likely to 
concede to us.' 130 To the secretary ofthe Colonial Defence Committee he wrote: 
I would wish to observe that in all the proposals, Federal or otherwise, 
made by me, I have endeavoured to submit only those which Public 
Opinion, advanced by a short stage from the existing condition, would 
be likely to sanction. To attempt anything in the shape of a Military 
ideal, ignoring existing political conditions in Australia, would be to 
court destruction to any scheme. 131 
In his New South Wales command Hutton had introduced practical military reforms 
and had promoted Australian federal defence. He was confronted by the problem of 
control in both of these endeavours. Hutton's colonial hosts were wary of ceding 
colonial autonomy to imperial schemes and parliamentary control to their military 
commander. In his expectations for the powers of his office and his hopes to exact a 
colonial contribution to imperial defence the distinct influence of Hutton's military 
mentor, Wolseley, can be traced. But Hutton had another angel whispering in his ear 
and this was Seeley. On his return from New South Wales Hutton warned fellow 
imperialists in Britain that: 
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A certain influential body of those who are pressing Imperial 
Federation seek to bind all portions of the empire hand and foot to one 
given policy both of defence and of finance. Attractive as this may 
seem, a sojourn in our Colonies, even of short duration, will soon 
demonstrate the impossibility of such a system being accepted by the 
majority of our fellow subjects of Greater Britain. 132 
Hutton's 'sojourn' in New South Wales had taught him the true value of Seeley's 
emphasis on the sentimental bonds of Empire. He did attempt to translate colonial 
loyalty into practical military assistance; but in the absence of such a commitment he 
was willing to accept that in a moment of crisis the essential ties of Empire would 
impel the colonies to Britain's aid. Furthermore, securing assistance for British 
imperial defence was not Hutton's sole ambition in the colony. In their focus on the 
military contribution, radical nationalist scholars dismiss, as mere means to that end, 
elements of Hutton's command which were of great importance to him - elements 
such as encouraging federation and the up-building of the Australian nation. These 
elements point to the distinctive character of late-Victorian imperialism: it was not, 
primarily, an imperialism of the despotic, grasping, oppressive mould; but, rather, a 
type of nationalism, a sense of shared belonging to a common nation, Greater Britain. 
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5. Conflicts ofInterest: Canada 1898 to 1900 
I doubt if you in Canada can ever realize what it is to us Imperial soldiers of, after all, 
more or less experience: more or less age: and more or less service: to have to serve 
Ministers who have only their own little pettifogging ambitions and axes to grind, 
and not the good of the country nor the Militia: and to have to be at the beck and call 
of such men: and to serve at a pecuniary loss: to get insults and abuse: and really to 
get not one single benefit out of it. I 
General Gascoinge, Hutton's predecessor in Canada, 1899 
No man of any independent value or of any manly individuality as a soldier would 
ever consent to accept the position ofG.O.C. as it exists at present in Canada.2 
General Hutton, 1901 
In New South Wales Hutton had actively reformed the militia, contended with 
political influence, had discovered the significance oflocal interests and had 
attempted to foster imperial loyalty alongside those interests. During his short period 
of command in Canada Hutton worked along similar lines but because of the extent of 
political influence in Canada, and the effects of the Second South African war, he met 
with even more dramatic results. Hutton's professionalising zeal was evident in the 
practical reforms that he pursued: restructuring the militia along modem departmental 
lines, reviving annual training camps, and generally improving instruction. It was 
also evident in his efforts to combat perceived political patronage in the militia. 
Hutton promoted the idea of a 'national army' in Canada, motivated principally by 
Seeley's call to educate the people of Greater Britain. He also boosted the Empire 
and encouraged a Canadian contribution to imperial defence. The local response to 
these initiatives was initially quite positive. In the latter stages of his command, 
however, especially after the outbreak of the Second South African War, his attacks 
on patronage and his imperial rhetoric began to generate friction between Hutton and 
his government, creating the conditions for his dismissal from office. These two sides 
to the Canadian response to Hutton make this colonial command a particularly 
I Letter, Gascoigne to Jarvis, 20 June 1899, NAC, Ernest Frederick Jarvis Fonds, E258. 
2 Letter, Hutton to Minto, 27 March 1901, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50081. 
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interesting one - what do they reflect of Canadian identity and of Canadian loyalty to 
the Empire? 
During the three years between his New South Wales and Canadian appointments 
Hutton came to conceive of his federal defence scheme for the Australian colonies not 
only as a solution to the limited problem of Australian defence, but as a broadly 
applicable model for Empire-wide defence cooperation. In three separate lectures he 
developed and publicised this idea. 
He presented the first, 'Our Comrades of Greater Britain', to his own old comrades at 
the Aldershot military society in November 1896; a lecture that reveals the great 
intellectual debt Hutton owed both Seeley and Wolseley. The lecture ranged over the 
entire self-goveming Empire, arguing for the essential unity of soldiers from Britain, 
Canada, Australia and Africa, and it discussed practical problems such as the extent of 
political influence in the colonies, the importance of forming complete field armies 
from their armies, and the necessity ofpopularising these forces. 3 Hutton impressed 
upon his audience the grave danger of a great war breaking out and of the importance 
of imperialist sentiment in meeting that threat, 'This is not the spirit of bluster or pride 
which has been deservedly stigmatised as "Jingoism;" it is a national purpose, it is a 
national and indeed a natural instinct of self preservation!,4 The military could 
contribute to the education of Greater Britain by teaching, 'those manly qualities 
which are vital to the well-being of any great people,' qualities which had established, 
3 E. Hutton, 'Our Comrades of Greater Britain', 24 November 1896, A1dershot, in E. Hutton, The 
Defence and Defensive Power of Australia, Angus and Robertson, Melbourne, 1902, 25, 28 & 34-35. 
4 Hutton, 'Our Comrades of Greater Britain', 37. 
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and protect, 'our freedom and free institutions.'5 Hutton suggested that the imperial 
sentiment of the colonies might be harnessed, but he warned of the dangers of 
attempting to impose any single, fixed military or financial policy on the Empire.6 
The solution, he believed, must be flexible and he concluded that his own cooperative 
system best harnessed the type of nationalist sentiment that he had witnessed in New 
South Wales, a combination of imperial loyalty and an awareness of local interests: 
Those who, like myself, have had peculiar facilities for knowing the real feeling 
existing in our Australian Colonies can alone realize the depth ofloyalty and 
generous affection for, and pride in, the old country. England, throughout 
Australia, is always known and spoken of as "Home," and with that word are 
embraced all that makes a "Home" dear to the distant members of a family. 
Entwined, however, with this deeply rooted loyalty for and love to the old 
country, is that truly British love of liberty and that freeborn and independent 
spirit which resents an injury and brooks no interference - a spirit which is and 
has been for the last three hundred years the heritage of our race. Overlying all 
lies that very human failing of self-interest. Having realized the important 
influences ofloyalty, sentiment, and self-interest which exist, we shall find it is 
wisest in the best interests of the Empire to base our schemes upon these and 
upon the force of public opinion, which has nowhere in the world so quick and 
intelligent exponents as in the Australian press. 
A co-operative system of defence it is which seems best adapted to fulfil our 
objects, such, for instance, as that which I have sketched as proposed for the five 
Australian Colonies and Tasmania. A co-operation based on loyalty to Her 
, Hutton, 'Our Comrades of Greater Britain', 38. 
6 Hutton, 'Our Comrades of Greater Britain', 44. 
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Majesty the Queen and to our common country, upon the sentiment of race and 
of common birth, and upon self-interest. 7 
In this lecture, therefore, Hutton combined his professional, manly, and nationalist 
ideas into a coherent vision of the Empire, harmonising the ideas of both Seeley and 
Wolseley, and creating from that potent mix his cooperative system for the defence of 
the Empire. In two subsequent speeches he pursued this thesis. 
A year later Hutton returned to Aldershot to give his second lecture, 'The German and 
French Military Manoeuvres. Some Retrospective Deductions.'8 This lecture is 
notable for the renewed urgency with which he viewed military reform. His 
inspection of the French and German national armies in training, Hutton declared, had 
shown him that, in their current state, the Empire's auxiliary forces, on whom would 
rest the bulk of the defence, were not capable of an adequate resistance and that, as a 
result, 'the existing condition of the military defence of the United Kingdom and the 
Empire is nothing less than perilous.'9 He again asserted that these forces must be 
reorganised according to a cooperative system, based on the Militia Act.1O 
Hutton gave the final speech to a more diverse, civilian audience at the Royal 
Colonial Institute on Primrose day, in April 1898. In it he proposed that Great Britain 
reach an agreement with her self-governing colonies whereby each allots a fixed 
number of troops to the general defence, utilising the militias, organised along the 
7 Hutton, 'Our Comrades of Greater Britain', 44. 
• E. Hutton, 'The German and French Military Manoeuvres. Some Retrospective Deductions', 
November 1897, Aldershot, in E. Hutton, The Defence and Defensive Power of Australia, Angus and 
Robertson, Melbourne, 1902,44. 
9 Hutton, 'The German and French Military Manoeuvres', 80. 
10 Hutton, 'The German and French Military Manoeuvres', 82. 
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same lines as his Federal Defence Scheme for Australia. I I Once again Hutton faced 
the vexed issue of control; parliamentary democracy, he admitted, prevented 'the 
establishment of an ideal system', ways must be adapted to means. 12 His answer, the 
creation of a 'central controlling council', gave no detail, he simply hoped that the 
bonds of sentiment would find a way: 
Surely in the case where the sentiment of race, of religion, of language, of 
political inclinations are common to all, it should not be difficult to so plan a 
central controlling authority which would make possible a system of cooperative 
defence, such as that framed in, the Australian Federal Defence Scheme. 13 
The intractability ofthis problem had hamstrung his plans for Australian federal 
defence and problems of control would haunt Hutton in his Canadian and Australian 
commands, just as they had in New South Wales. 
This Primrose Day speech marked the final form of Hutton's 'Co-operative System 
for the Defence ofthe Empire' and he used the occasion to publicise the idea. By 
commencing and concluding his address with quotes from Joseph Chamberlain, the 
imperial-minded Secretary of State for the Colonies, he positioned his paper as a 
practical response to that statesman's calls to 'keep alive the torch of Imperial 
patriotism.,14 In a later account, Hutton signalled his willingness to pursue these 
plans alone, if need be, evoking his two mentors as justification: 
No statesman under either Liberal or Conservative administrations had up to that 
date (1898) enunciated a military defence policy or laid down the requirements 
for the military defence of the Empire. It was left, therefore, to the members of 
11 E. Hutton, 'A Co-operative System for the Defence of the Empire', April 1898, Royal Colonial 
Institute, in Selected Papers, No. 1105, Royal Canadian Military Institute, Toronto, 2005, 5. 
12 Hutton, 'A Co-operative System for the Defence of the Empire', 3. 
13 Hutton, 'A Co-operative System for the Defence of the Empire', 4. 
14 Hutton, 'A Co-operative System for the Defence of the Empire', 1&6. 
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the Wolseley school of military experts to frame such a policy for themselves 
and to act thereon ... The disciples of the great Seeley, no less than the followers 
of the Wolseley school of military thought, were thoroughly in accord with these 
primary principles of defence. 15 
Hutton departed for Canada with this scheme in mind: 
I had the fixed determination in my mind, during the whole period of my 
command in New South Wales, to be appointed if possible to succeed Major 
General Herbert in command ofthe Canadian Militia, and thus establish in 
Canada the principle of co-operation which I had originated in New South 
Wales and the other five States of Australia ... it was the principles embodied in 
this scheme [system of co-operation for defence] which it was my aim to carry 
out in Canada as being the first step towards that larger federation for defence of 
the whole Empire which has been the burning question with imperialists ever 
since the days of 'The Imperial Federation League' under the presidency of 
16 Lord Roseberry. 
He hoped to find fertile soil for his ideas in Canada, encouraged by speeches Wilfrid 
Laurier, the Canadian Prime Minister, had made in England a year earlier, speeches 
seemingly in close sympathy with Chamberlain's ideas, 'As thoughts of separation 
disappear, thoughts of union, of a closer union, take their place. To-day the sentiment 
exists in Canada in favour of a closer union with the motherland.' But Laurier went 
on to sound a warning note, discouraging any attempts at formalising that connection, 
'It is not in the genius of English history to write Constitutions and to devise theories, 
"E. Hutton, 'John Gilbert, 4" Earl of Minto. Governor General of Canada, 1898-1904. A Narrative,' 
BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50081, 237-38. 
16 E. Hutton, 'Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hutton', Period V, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 
50113,124. 
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but it is in the genius of English history, and it is in the genius of the British race to 
proceed slowly ... to proceed only so far as may be necessary to meet existing 
exigencies.' 17 
In his first year in Canada Hutton accomplished a great deal for the militia. Morale 
had deteriorated during the lethargic command of his predecessor, Gascoigne, and so 
Hutton made it his first priority to tour the military districts and meet all the officers 
under his command. The speeches and parties with which he feted his subaltems 
during his months on the road boosted spirits and established his authority. Seymour, 
the British General Commanding British Troops in Canada, wrote to the Governor 
General in November, 1898, noting Hutton's success: 'Hutton with his activity of 
mind & body, since his arrival 2 months ago, seems to have already obtained a 
personal influence amongst the Officers of the Force many of whom were hitherto 
lukewarm.,18 Spreading his personal influence was certainly important to Hutton. 
This is clear from the basic draft speech that he gave to soldiers throughout Canada: 
The successful command of any army, such as we have in Canada and in other 
Colonies of the Empire, can only be insured by means of that personal touch 
which should bind all grades into one harmonious whole, thereby creating a tie 
which should bind the General, the Officers Commanding Districts, the 
Commanding Officers, and the junior officers into one body actuated by one 
single impulse. 19 
17 Times, 14 June 1897, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 9. 
18 Letter, Seymour to Minto, 9 November 1898, in P. Stevens and J. Saywell (eds), Lord Minto's 
Canadian Papers: A Selection of The Public and Private Papers of the Fourth Earl of Minto, 1898-
1904, Vol I, The Champlain Society, Toronto, 1981,10. 
19 Address by Major-General Hutton, Commanding Canadian troops, to the District Officers 
Commanding and Commanding Officers of Regiments and Adjutants at his first inspection of the 
Military Districts of the Dominion No. 10 (Winnipeg), II (British Columbia) and 12 (Prince Edward 
Island), during September and October 1898, NLC. 
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One of Hutton's aides marvelled at his commander's energy during these months of 
inspection, describing working days beginning at 9:30am and ending at I am, 'The 
General's knowledge of detail is something extraordinary, he must be not unlike 
Kitchener, but probably talks more. He will go into a stable, and point out a hundred 
little things wrong, go into a store, and find out things in five minutes, that have had 
sweet quiescence for the last four years. ,20 
Hutton instituted concrete reforms. In an early memorandum to his minister, Dr 
Frederick Borden, he described a militia in 'a state of paralysis and chaos,' lacking 
modern administrative departments, a properly trained general staff, and with a stores 
department in an utter shambles.21 He vigorously set about remedying these 
deficiencies, seeking to create out of the hodgepodge of existing individual units a 
new militia army complete in all its necessary parts. To that end he promoted the 
establishment of new transport, supply and medical corps. Hutton was very fortunate 
in his minister. Borden was a great supporter ofthe force - he himself served as a 
surgeon with the King's County Militia - who had introduced important reforms even 
before Hutton's arrival, instituting the holding of annual camps and placing a limit on 
the tenure of officers. 22 With Borden's active support Hutton made much progress in 
setting up an Army Medical Corps during 1899.23 Hutton's proposed Army Service 
Corps, on the other hand, failed to materialise until 1902.24 Hutton built armouries, 
established new units, and amalgamated old ones. He turned the small force of 
20 Letter, Bell to brother, 12 October 1898, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50098,124. 
21 Memorandum, Hutton to Borden, 2 November 1898, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50083, 93. 
22 C. Miller, 'The Public Life of Sir Frederick Borden', MA Thesis, Dalbousie University, 1964, 9; N. 
Penlington, 'General Hutton and the Problem of Military Imperialism in Canada, 1898-1900' in 
Imperial Relations in the Age of Laurier, ed. C. Berger, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1969, 
50. 
23 Hutton, 'Memoirs', Period V, 17; D. Morton, Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian 
Militia, 1868-1904, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1970, 137. 
24 A. Warren, Wail for the Waggon: The Story of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps, McClelland 
and Stewart, Canada, 1961,29. 
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permanent soldiers into an instructional cadre. He created new opportunities for 
senior officers, establishing a staff course at the Kingston military academy, 
organising staff rides, and conducting large unit training. 
As in New South Wales, Hutton sought to augment his own control within the 
department and to expand the functions of its military branch. To this end he 
envisaged (without success) establishing an Ordnance Supply Corps to wrest control 
over stores from the civil branch.25 He instituted a central registry of correspondence 
at headquarters and ordered that all correspondence from the military branch to the 
civil bear his signature (or that of an officer signing for him).26 In the most extreme 
of these measures - and one that would prove controversial during the period of his 
dismissal - Hutton privately instructed his Adjutant General and Quartermaster 
General to avoid interviews, wherever possible, with the Minister, and to directly 
report to him any conversations that did take place.27 
Hutton was assisted in his reforms by the report of the Leach Commission, a group of 
British and Canadian officers and politicians who examined the state of the Canadian 
militia during the first few months Hutton held office. Its findings, particularly 
regarding the necessity of reorganising the militia department and establishing 
departmental corps, echoed many of the reform proposals Hutton himself made in his 
2S Letter, Huttott to Harrisott, 7 April 1899, BL, Huttott Papers, ADD 50087, 22; N. Pettlittgtott, 
Canada and Imperialism, 1896-1899, Uttiversity of Torottto Press, Torottto, 1965, 172. 
26 Toronto Globe, 3 December 1898. 
27 H. GUttdy, 'Sir Wilfrid Laurier attd Lord Mittto', itt Imperial Relations in the Age of Laurier, ed. C. 
Berger, Uttiversity of Torottto Press, Torottto, 1969,29. 
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1898 annual report.28 This dovetailing was not coincidental and Hutton deliberately 
used the report's findings to push the barrow of his own reforms. 
There was one important difference between Hutton's approach and the Leach 
Commission's, one he confided to the secretary of the Colonial Defence Committee, 
'I have gone further [than the Commission] and dealt with the military situation in 
Canada upon broad national Iines.'29 Hutton's attempts at engaging with a Canadian 
sense of national identity were essential to his whole reform agenda. He consciously 
and explicitly referred to the militia as Canada's national army. In doing so he 
deliberately echoed the Canadian Prime Minister: 
Sir W. Laurier in his speech during the jubilee year in England repeatedly 
alluded to "Canada as a nation". I therefore embodied the same idea & 
proposed that the Canadian Militia should be reorganized as a National Militia 
Army complete in all parts, & that as a national institution the Canadian army 
should be placed on a plain above all party political influences, & above all that 
political interference which is the Upas tree that destroys all that comes within 
its baneful influence.3o 
He used this national language to justifY his reorganisation of the militia - as a self-
contained citizen army - and to combat party political influence.31 He also used it to 
mobilise public opinion behind his reforms. In early 1899 he wrote of the imperative 
of mobilising public opinion through the press to secure government funding and 
concluded, 'I have therefore lost no opportunity when speaking in public to allude to 
28 Letter, President Defence Committee of Canada to Under Sec of State for War, 30 November 1898, 
Report No 3: Precis of recommendations attached as Appendix A, TNA, PRO, WO 32/6366. 
29 Letter, Hutton to Harrison, 7 April 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50087, 22. 
30 Letter, Hutton to Parkin, 23 February 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50083, 200. 
3J D. Morton, A Military History of Canada, Hurtig Publishers, Edmonton, 1990, 112; G. Stanley, 
Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People, Macmillan, Toronto, 1960, 290 
152 
the Canadian Militia as "the National Anny" charged with all the weighty 
responsibilities of Canadian Defence.' 32 In large part, therefore, Hutton deliberately 
used this language to push his reform agenda. But was this the only reason he used 
such language? Preston suggests that Hutton's national anny was merely his 'best 
line' -language designed to hoodwink the Canadian public into going along with his 
imperialising reforms.33 
There was more to it than that. Despite his ulterior motives, there was additionally a 
good deal of genuine intent underlying Hutton's use of the language of national 
sentiment. His calls to make national military service 'a sacred privilege and a 
national duty' were too heartfelt to have been entirely insincere.34 In a private letter 
to Theodore Roosevelt, Governor of New York during Hutton's period of command, 
he contended, 'The success of the Canadian Militia is a triumphant illustration of what 
you have always, I believe, held, and of what I have been preaching both in Australia, 
in Canada, and in Great Britain, viz: that a National Force such as Militia is the true 
form for an anny of any Anglo-Saxon State. ,35 Canada, Hutton believed, as an 
'Anglo-Saxon State' needed, for its national health, a strong military force. This was 
a theme he pursued on many a public platform. 'No nation was ever great on 
agriculture or pastorage alone,' he declared on one such occasion. 'History teaches 
that to become great a nation must be martial. ,36 He enacted this in his reforms as 
well as his rhetoric, particularly in the professional opportunities he created for 
32 Letter, Hutton to Coleridge Grove, 9 January 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50096, 7. 
33 R. Preston, Canada and 'Imperial Defense ': A study of the origins of the British Commonwealth's 
defense organization, J 86 7-J 9 J 9, Duke University Press, Durham, 1967, 251. 
34 Ottawa Citizen, 15 February 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50096, 227. 
35 Letter, Hutton to Roosevelt, 17 October 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078,144. 
36 Toronto Globe, 13 February 1899. 
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Canadian officers serving within Canada.37 With the 'national army' Hutton was not 
promoting a separate Canadian identity, nor was he merely cloaking a hidden imperial 
or reforming agenda; fundamentally, by seeking to educate the public in military 
values, he was attempting to further Seeley's vision of Greater Britain in Canada. 
Protestant Canada, as Penlington notes, responded enthusiastically to this national 
vision.38 French Canada was less impressed yet Hutton still sought to include them. 
'The French-Canadians are very ignorant, and their education is entirely in the hands 
of an Irish-French priesthood,' he wrote to Chamberlain, 'the militia system can form 
a great "educating medium" to inculcate "the spirit of military enthusiasm and 
patriotism.',,39 He believed the aloofuess of French Canada was due to the traditional 
neglect of the military authorities. His national army, he was careful to explain, 
meant Canada as a whole, the English and French acting as one complete military 
machine.4o In these early stages of his command Hutton was very attentive to the 
French Canadian units. He himself spoke French fluently and he encouraged 
bilingualism amongst his officers. By incorporating them in his military reforms 
Hutton hoped not just to excite a military spirit but to also encourage, 'the all essential 
feeling of National Patriotism in French Canada. ,4] 
Seeley lay behind Hutton's 'national army' but Wolseley, as ever, was not too far 
away. Civic education was not enough for Hutton and he used his 'national army' to 
promote Canadian defence contributions to the general defence of the Empire. He 
37 Toronto Globe, 6 March 1899. 
J8 Penlington, Canada and Imperialism, 147. 
J9 Letter, Hutton to Chamberlain, 2 November 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078, 200. 
40 Toronto Globe, 4 March 1899. 
41 Letter, Hutton to Harrison, 27 July 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50087, 40. 
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promoted the idea that with nationhood came responsibilities.42 These 
responsibilities, he confided to Chamberlain, Canada had hitherto shirked: 
It is very obvious that since the withdrawal of the Imperial Troops, and the birth 
of the Dominion no serious effort has been made by Canada to place her 
defences upon a footing worthy of a Nation. [A new act is needed to j meet the 
new conditions imposed upon Canada by her responsibilities as a Nation, and by 
her aspirations to be considered as the chief promoter of Imperial union and 
inter-colonial identity [referring to Laurier's speeches at the recent Colonial 
Conferencej.43 
Hutton's early reforms in Canada had a strong imperial hue. In his speeches to 
soldiers and to the public Hutton made it clear that he envisaged Canada assisting in 
the defence ofthe Empire. Initially he did this in a rather tentative fashion, speaking 
of a national army designed for national defence that might 'possibly' also assist in 
imperial defence.44 He was wary of a negative response, especially given a flurry of 
TUmours that he had been sent to Canada to reorganise the militia along imperial 
lines.45 Gradually Hutton grew bolder and, in a speech given when accepting the 
presidency of the Officers Association of the Militia of Canada, he publicly set out his 
views on a connection between Canadian national identity and participation in the 
Empire. He spoke of the need to develop defence alongside 'development of Canada 
as a Nation:' 
Public opinion in Canada as in other Colonies with responsible Government 
under the Crown realizes with a growing sense of individuality that each and 
every part of the Empire must not only insure its own defence, but must be 
42 Toronto Globe, 13 February 1899. 
43 Letter, Hutton to Chamberlain, 20 February 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078,172. 
44 Daily Free Press, 19 October 1898, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 9, 134. 
45 Halifax Herald, 18 September 1898, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 9,120. 
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prepared, when called upon to share in the defence of that Empire to which all 
h . b·rth 46 owe t elr I . 
Hutton gave these views official expression in his first annual report as General 
Officer Commanding. Hutton always held that the great value of this report lay not in 
the specific reforms outlined but in the general statement of principles governing 
Canadian defence. He described two principles on which any organization of 
Canadian defence must be based: firstly, the defence of Canadian soil; and secondly, 
the ability to participate in a general defence of the British Empire. These principles 
resembled those of an 1896 Colonial Defence Committee memorandum, drafted as a 
means of 'educating public opinion', that had advised the colonies to focus primarily 
on local defence; but that looked to a time when 'the increasing strength and resources 
of the self-governing Colonies will enable them to materially assist the mother-
country' and that hoped for colonial military assistance in the event of an imperial 
emergency in which their own shores were not threatened.47 In its emphasis on 
imperial assistance, however, Hutton's statement of principles exceeded this 
memorandum: 
It is justly claimed for Canada that she is now a nation. In establishing this 
claim it must equally be accepted that with her birth as a nation are indisputably 
born the responsibilities of self defence ... Canada is, moreover, a part of that 
larger empire which has given her birth, and it is the pride of Canada that in the 
past, whenever British or Imperial interests have been threatened, she has been 
the first to offer her assistance. If public opinion has been rightly judged there 
46 E. Hutton, Speech on accepting presidency of Officers' Association of the Militia of Canada, 181, 
BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50095, 181. 
47 D. Gordon, 'The Colonial Defence Committee and Imperial Collaboration: 1885-1904', Political 
Science Quarterly, 77,1962,533; 'Colonial Defence', 19 May 1896, TNA, PRO, CAB 811, 
Memorandum No 57M. 
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is, at the present time, a universally held determination to uphold at all costs the 
integrity of the empire, and at all hazards to maintain its interests against hostile 
aggression or foreign interference.48 
As commandant in New South Wales Hutton had certainly envisaged colonial 
military assistance but he had never been so bold as to state this in his official reports 
nor claim it as the basis of a new defence arrangement. He had been always mindful 
of local sensibilities and had justified his reforms by referring purely to local needs. 
Hutton's annual report was submitted to the government, received his minister's 
signature, and his estimates were passed by parliament with hardly even a debate. 
Hutton was fairly astonished, believing he owed his success to the pressure of public 
opinion upon a reluctant cabinet.49 He declared a great victory, 'The success of the 
bold step which was thus taken in making these clear, showed that the psychological 
moment for pressing the question of co-operation for defence upon imperial lines had 
arrived so far as Canada was concerned.'50 He wrote proudly to Chamberlain in July 
1899 describing the surprisingly calm reception of his report and suggesting that it 
gave' good ground for the hope that Canada purposes to take a foremost part in 
solving the question of a Co-operative System of Defence for the Empire. ,51 
Why was the Canadian government so accommodating? Firstly, contrary to Hutton's 
claims, the Canadian members, in allowing him to express these views, did not 
necessarily assent to them. Not even Borden, one of the more imperial-minded 
48 'Report for the Year Ended December 1898', Department of Militia and Defence for the Dominion 
of Canada, 40, TNA, PRO, CAB 18/4. 
49 Letter, Hutton to Wolseley, 31 December 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50085,146. 
5. Hutton, 'Memoirs', Period V, 13. 
" Letter, Hutton to Chamberlain, 28/7/99, BUL, Joseph Chamberlain Collection, JC 29/2/2/156. 
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members of the Canadian cabinet, actually agreed with Hutton, but he was quite 
willing to let him talk: 
He is of course quite within his right in making speeches ifhe is particularly 
anxious to do so, on occasions of military gatherings, provided of course he 
does not encroach too much upon the prerogatives of other people. His report is 
his own. This has always been the rule with regard to the Report of the General 
Officers Commanding, who are Imperial Officers. I saw his Report before it 
was published and pointed out the respects in which I thought it impossible to 
have his suggestions adopted, but gave him permission to have the whole 
published, as he prepared it. I thought it only just to him to do this.52 
Despite his boasts to Chamberlain and the proud claims of his memoir, Hutton was 
probably himself aware at the time of the limits of parliamentary approval. In fact, he 
seems to have been slightly upset that his report was received so quietly, hoping to 
have created more of a splash. He sent a proof copy to Dr George Parkin, a principal 
figure in the Canadian imperial federation movement, claiming that although he had 
the 'good will' of Cabinet he would need 'Public Opinion' on side to have any real 
effect and asking Parkin to lend the report his 'powerful support' in the public arena.53 
He wrote in a similar fashion to Bevan Edwards and to Sydenham Clarke. 54 Clearly, 
if Hutton needed public sympathy to push his reforms, he cannot have been too 
convinced of government support. 
Nevertheless it is still significant that the Canadian government allowed Hutton to 
publicise the case for imperial cooperation. They seemed to have fewer of the 
"Letter, Borden to Chipman, 10 April 1899, PANS, Borden Collection, Borden Letter Book 9, MG 2 
90,456 [Borden's emphasis]. 
53 Letter, Hutton to Parkin, 13 March 1899, NAC, Parkin Fonds, 3839. 
54 Letter, Hutton to Bevan Edwards, 12 February 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50096, 38; Letter, 
Hutton to Clarke, I March 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50\08, 257. 
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Australian fears of becoming embroiled and entangled in imperial commitments 
against their will, or losing control over their defence forces. In March 1899, for 
example, discussing British contingency planning for a possible war with France, 
Laurier surprised Minto by assuring him that in his opinion the British government 
was entitled to mobilise the Canadian militia for service overseas. 55 Hutton's actions 
offended neither Canada's sense of cultural identity, nor her sense of her own 
interests. 
There are a few reasons why Canada differed from New South Wales on this point. 
Firstly, it made strategic sense for the Canadian govemment to accommodate the 
British as far as possible. The 1895-96 Venezuelan War Scare56 had awakened the 
Canadian people to the possibility of war with the United States, and the only realistic 
defence Canada had was the British navy. This had forced the incoming Liberal 
administration to take defence more seriously and had sparked moves to re-equip the 
militia with modem rifles, machine guns and artillery pieces.57 The Canadians also 
relied on British power to press their claims in boundary disputes with America over 
Alaska. Some members of cabinet, particular Borden and Richard Cartwright, felt 
that Canada should reciprocate and participate in some form in the defence of the 
Empire.58 Britain had also become vital to Canadian trade, especially since the 
introduction of the McKinley tariff in the United States in 1890, and this had sparked 
55 Memorandum of conversation, Minto and Laurier, 27 March 1899, Lord Minto's Canadian Papers, 
44; Letter, Seymour to Under Secretary of State for War, 14 December 1898, TNA, PRO, WO 
32/6367, Despatch C 112. 
56 In 1895 the American Government sent the British Government a peremptory note, the Olney note, 
insisting she go to arbitration regarding a long running boundary dispute between Venezuela and 
British Guinea. 
S? D. Morton, The Canadian General: Sir William Oller, Hakkert, Toronto, 1974, 156. 
58 Letter, Hutton to Chamberlain, 20 February 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078,174: 'The 
Minister of Defence (Doctor Borden) Sir Richard Cartwright, and several other members of the Cabinet 
have, in conversation, repeatedly said that the Reforms made should be such as would not only 
guarantee the security of Canadian soil, but would enable Canada to participate in the defence of the 
Empire.' 
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Laurier's interest in imperial preferential tariffs. 59 Secondly, the Canadian 
government was happy to go quite far because in peacetime the militia was of very 
little importance to them. As Durrans points out, the militia was simply not a priority 
for Laurier and his government (before the Second South African War), whose efforts 
were bent almost wholly towards economic growth.60 Even his minister showed only 
a moderate interest in Hutton's early activities: somewhat bemusedly, Borden 
commented to a friend in December 1898 that he had hardly seen his new general at 
all, and did not expect to until the New Year. 61 In 1898 Canada spent less per capita 
on its defence than any other country in the world.62 Laurier could therefore assure 
the British of their right to call out his militia in the secure knowledge that in its 
current under-funded and ill-trained state the Canadian militia was hardly likely to do 
anyone any good. 
In Canada, Hutton operated quite independently from British control. He received 
letters of encouragement from home, yet was left to work on the details of reform 
entirely under Canadian supervision. Occasionally Hutton took stances contrary to 
British policy: for instance, he resisted efforts by both Wolseley and Chamberlain to 
have a British regiment, the Leinsters, depoted in Canada, fearing that this would 
disrupt his own plans to build a national militia army. Despite this autonomy of 
command, Hutton pursued some policies with the expectation of British approval. 
Before leaving Britain for Canada Hutton had interviews with prominent statesmen 
and soldiers, including Lansdowne (Secretary of State for War), Chamberlain, 
59 G. Maclean, 'The Imperial Federation Movement in Canada, 1884-1902', PhD thesis, Duke 
University, 1958, 87. 
6() P. Durrans, 'Imperial Defence: The Canadian Response during Joseph Chamberlain's Tenure of 
Office as Colonial Secretary 1895-1903', MA Thesis, Carleton University, 1964, 121. 
61 Letter, Borden to Scully, 15 December 1898, PANS, Borden Collection, MG 2 89, 196. 
62 PenIinton, 'General Hutton and the Problem of Military Imperialism in Canada', 45. 
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Wolseley, Hamilton (President of the Colonial Defence Committee) and Ardagh 
(Head of the War Office Intelligence Department). The most important point these 
men attempted to impress upon Hutton was the need to overcome political 
interference in the militia. In 1897 Ardagh had written a memo to Chamberlain 
bemoaning 'the intrusion of political considerations into defence matters' in Canada, 
claiming this had prevented past British officers sent to command the militia from 
effectively reforming the force. 'It has been stated,' Ardagh wrote, 'that in the 
provision of arms, equipment, and clothing, military necessities have been 
subordinated to party exigencies'; and, 'It is, however, rather with regard to personnel 
than to materiel that the Commandants appear to have felt most keenly the effects of 
political interference.' He concluded, 'In short, no effort at reform, no attempt to 
secure efficiency, however small, can be made without its being checked by the 
baneful influence of political expediency.'63 Chamberlain agreed. He believed that 
Canada's increasing economic strength behoved a concomitant increase in her 
military strength and feared that 'political exigencies' were the real obstacle to that.64 
In each interview Hutton was encouraged to minimize political interference in the 
militia; beyond that he received little direct instruction.65 Hutton also outlined in 
these interviews his own plans to construct a complete militia army capable of rapid 
mobilization, generally receiving nodding approval. 66 
Remarkably, given later accusations against Hutton of a want of tact made by these 
same leaders, during the early period of his command they encouraged him to 
.3 Ardagh to Chamberlain, 10 July 1897, BUL, Chamberlain Collection, JC 9/2/IC/2. 
64 see Letter, Chamberlain to Denison, 20 April 1899, NAC, Denison Fonds, 3724 . 
• 5 Minutes of meeting, Hutton and Wingfield (P.U.S. for the Colonies), 10 August 1898, BL, Hutton 
Papers, ADD 50078, 256: Hutton summarised the main points of these interviews. 
66 Record of interview, Hutton and Chamberlain, 8 August 1898, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078, 168; 
Record of interview, Hutton and Lansdowne, 3 August 1898, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50085, 4. 
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mobilise public opinion against the scourge of political patronage.67 Chamberlain 
wrote to Hutton in March 1899 promising to help in publicising militia reform: 
I think, however, that considering your military position you are justified in 
speaking frankly on the subject, and I do not doubt that your public utterances 
will have great weight. I am glad to see that they have been well received by 
the public and the press, and I hope that your forthcoming Report will 
strengthen the impression. I propose to support you as far as possible, and as 
soon as I get the Report of General Leach from the Colonial Defence 
Committee, I contemplate the preparation of a memorandum, based on the 
material which this Report will provide, which I can send to the Governor 
General in a public Despatch with a request that he will get his Ministers to 
publish it.68 
In the same month Wolseley also pressed Hutton on: 
Politics influence army efficiency in this country as you know, but in Canada 
they not only do so far worse, but the patronage of Militia appointments is used 
for purposes of party jobbery. If you can induce the ministry to surrender into 
your hands all militia appointments, you will have made the first great move 
made in any time towards sound military administration in Canada.69 
Shortly after Hutton's arrival in Canada a new Governor General took office. Lord 
Minto and Hutton were in many ways kindred spirits. Eton old boys both, they shared 
a passion for sports and were, as Hutton puts it, 'congenial in our manly tastes.'70 
They had formed a close friendship in the 1880s when they had served together in 
67 Minutes by Anderson, Cox and Wingfield, 9 March 1899, BUL, Chamberlain Collection, JC 
29/4/8/8 . 
.. Letter, Chamberlain to Hutton, 14 March 1899, BUL, Chamberlain Collection, JC 29/4/8/9. 
69 Letter, Wolseleyto Hutton, 17 March 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50085,128. 
70 Hutton, 'John Gilbert, 4th Earl of Minto' , 242. 
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Egypt and afterwards had worked together in the development of mounted infantry. 
They were disciples ofWolseley and both owed their new positions in Canada to his 
influence.71 Hutton suggested that they had 'every military instinct and idea in 
common.'72 Minto also shared Hutton's admiration for Seeley and they viewed 
similarly the problems of the Empire.73 For Hutton, Minto was a 'soldier-statesman' 
who wielded his authority with the sole aim of benefiting the state.74 Before arriving 
in the country Minto had assured Hutton, 'you may depend on me to back you heart 
and soul in whatever line we decide on ... I think there is a big game in front of us -
both in the larger questions of defence and in the more detailed questions of militia 
organisation.' 75 In Canada, Minto and Hutton discussed militia problems in earnest 
and on several occasions Minto wielded his authority as Governor General on 
Hutton's behalf. Minto was, for Hutton, an 'ever-constant confidant and strenuous 
backer in all my efforts.'76 After an early favourable reception of Hutton' s reforms 
Minto became more involved, as he put it to Wolseley in April 1899: 
As for myself I was anxious at first not to appear too military - there seemed 
some suspicion that I might try with Hutton to force on military questions here-
which might have done harm and I felt the necessity of being quiet - but there is 
no fear of this now, and I have been doing all I can to encourage militia officers 
to feel that they are soldiers, and also by bringing them forward socially as 
officers to bring society to see that as officers their standing and profession 
should be recognized. 
71 for Hutton, see Letter, Lansdowne to Chamberlain, II May 1898 'Wolseley regards him as well 
suited for Canada', JC 29/2/2/106, Chamberlain Collection, University ofBinningham; and for Minto 
see Stevens and Saywell, Lord Minto's Canadian Papers, Vol I, I. 
n Hutton, 'Memoirs', Period V, 9. 
73 E. Hutton, 'Appreciation of the 4th Earl of Minto' , BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50081, 215. 
74 Hutton, 'Appreciation of the 4th Earl of Minto' ,217. 
75 Letter, Minto to Hutton, 25 August 1898, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50080, 31. 
76 Hutton, 'Memoirs', Period V, 9. 
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But I finnly believe a few years will see a change for the better here, but it will 
be very necessary to ensure the continuance of any re-organization on sound 
lines. There will always be political attempts to gain patronage in the force, and 
it will always take much tact and strength to keep things straight. 77 
The militia was the only area of Canadian politics in which Minto deeply involved 
himself.78 For Minto, patronage had long been the bete noire of militia efficiency. 
He had served as Military Secretary to the Canadian Governor General in the l880s 
and had noted it even then. 79 Minto determined to combat this evil in his own tenure 
as Governor General. He wrote to Seymour suggesting that the 'two great 
difficulties' with which Hutton must contest were the 'abominable custom of political 
patronage which has so shamefully influenced the Militia Department - and the 
attempt on the Civil side ofthe Dept. to assume military control in questions with 
which the G.O.C. should deal at any rate in the first place.' 80 A month later he spoke 
publicly on the issue, encouraging the public to get behind his old friend Hutton, 'It 
rests with the people of Canada to support him in his command. It rests with the 
people of Canada to insist upon the fact that to obtain military efficiency military 
machinery must be entirely unhampered by political interference.' 81 
Patronage had been for many years endemic in the militia. Promotions and 
appointments were made along party lines and supply and building contracts were 
awarded to party members. This was the case for all the government departments and 
was so established that each possessed a 'patronage list': a register ofpolitically 
friendly businessmen to be given important contracts. According to Gordon, 
77 Letter, Minto to Wolseley, 21 April 99, Lord Minto's Canadian Papers, 58. 
78 Stevens and Saywell, Lord Minto's Canadian Papers, xxvi. 
79 Durrans, 'Imperial Defence', 28. 
80 Letter, Minto to Seymour, 22 November 1898, Lord Minto's Canadian Papers, Vol. I, 18. 
81 Toronto Globe, 15 December 1898. 
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patronage in the militia was a necessary evil, to ensure parliamentary support 'from 
the legislators of an overwhelmingly unmilitary people.' 82 It was pervasive during 
Borden's time in office but it was not shameless. Borden practiced a sort of 
enlightened patronage. When he took office he announced a policy of giving all 
contracts to the lowest tenderer, regardless oftheir party affiliation.83 This left him 
some wriggle room, as he put it to one MP in mid-I 899, 'We always give our 
contracts to the lowest tenderer unless there is some good reason for the contrary, 
such as the inability of the lowest tenderer to perform the work & c. However, 
sometimes there are equal tenders and in this case we exercise the option in favour of 
our friends. ,84 Borden was sometimes forced to defend this mild approach against 
liberal colleagues demanding a greater preference: 
One sentence of your letter I do not understand. It is that in which you refer to 
the fact that it is better to retain old friends than to seem to favour Tories, etc. I 
must say that I do not think this applies to me, nor do I believe it applies to the 
Government generally. I am not aware of having appointed any Tories to 
office. It is true Tories still remain in office just as ... Liberals remained in 
office during the Tory regime.85 
Borden was initially willing to meet Hutton's desire to further minimise political 
influence. On one early occasion, for instance, he allowed Hutton his way over a 
dispute as to the rank of Major Cartwright, the son of his cabinet colleague.86 
B2 Gordon, 'The Colonial Defence Committee and Imperial Collaboration', 537. 
83 Miller, 'The Public Life of Sir Frederick Borden', 56. 
84 Letter, Borden to Campbell, 22 May 1899, PANS, Borden Collection, Borden Letter Book 9, MG 2 
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It was in his efforts to combat political influence that Hutton received the one major 
check in the early phase of his command. The case involved the forced retirement of 
a Liberal politician, Colonel Domville, from command of the 8th Hussars. The 
incident peaked mid-way through 1899 and generated much tension between Hutton 
and Borden, with Hutton at one point threatening resignation.87 Domville had passed 
the limit of time allowed a senior officer in command but refused to retire, unwilling 
to hand his command over to a political opponent, Major Markham. Hutton 
attempted to force Domville out by handing over the regimental stores to Markham 
but Borden intervened on Domville's behalf. Eventually a compromise was reached 
whereby Domville was allowed to retain his command for some months. Hutton, 
convinced that 'immoral political pressure' was at work, forced a crisis in late May 
1899 by unilaterally placing Domville on leave pending his retirement. 88 He felt 
secure in doing so, having Minto's promise that, 'If the matter does not solve itself as 
I think it will, it must corne before me, and I am sure you know you will have my 
most thorough support. If the militia is to exist at all as an efficient armed force, it is 
absolutely necessary that political rule of the force must cease, and I believe the 
Canadian public thoroughly realizes this. ,89 Borden and Laurier met with Minto and 
eventually new terms for Domville's retirement were agreed upon. The whole 
incident generated acrimony between Hutton and Borden, somewhat compromised 
Minto's position and had little real effect on Domville's actual retirement. Hutton, 
however, saw it as a great moral victory against political influence in the militia, 
describing it to one friend as his 'Battle of Waterloo' .90 He wrote triumphantly to 
Minto in late June claiming Minto's 'firm stand has done more to restore discipline & 
87 Letter, Hutton to Borden, 31 May 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50083, 93. 
88 Letter, Hutton to Minto, I June 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50079, 77. 
89 Letter, Minto to Hutton, 3 June 1899, Lord Min/o's Canadian Papers, Vol. 1,74. 
90 Letter, Hutton to Coleridge Grove, 16 July 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50096,117. 
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real efficiency into the Canadian Army than all the humble efforts of myself and 
others. This political interference & wire-pulling is a very Upas-Tree91 which must 
inevitably wither up all that is good sound and really valuable in an Army. As regards 
the Cabinet I fully realize the delicacy of my position. Each month will render it less 
likely that I shall be troubled with their interference as regards discipline. I must 
however have about me those whom I can trust, & who are loyal. ,92 Minto saw it in a 
similar light. His military secretary described Minto's determination to use his office 
to 'purify officialdom,' especially in the militia, and wrote, 'There is no shadow of 
doubt that this is the first time Ministers have had to fight a battle of "righ! & 
principle" against "wrong & corruption" with a man strong & determined to have the 
Right done, & no less, and it has surprised & shaken them.'93 
The almost religious fervour with which both Hutton and Minto tackled the problems 
of political influence and patronage is significant. Why were they both prepared to go 
so far in their opposition? Partly it was a matter of professionalism. Hutton believed 
it impossible to instil discipline and a professional ethic in the militia when politics 
corrupted promotions and patronage distorted the functioning of his departments.94 
Political influence disrupted his reform program. These were valid concerns but do 
not explain why the issue became so heated. Hutton and Minto became passionate 
because, essentially, they were fighting for control of the militia. Hutton envisaged a 
91 A tropical Asian tree, the milky sap of which has been used as arrow poison and for ritual purposes; 
also, in folklore, a Javanese tree alleged to poison its surroundings and said to be fatal to approach. 
[Q.E.D.] 
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National Army in service not to the government but to the nation, beyond political 
interference: 
To create such an army [Hutton's National Army] however under any form of 
British Constitution would only be justified upon the understanding that while 
strictly under control of parliament it should be maintained & jealously kept on 
a plane above all party politics & apart from all those political influences which 
must necessarily wreck discipline, destroy the feeling of comradeship & render 
any real military efficiency impossible. 
Under any other circumstances it is easy to conceive that such an army would be 
liable to be made use of by any party in power to the detriment of the liberty of 
the people.95 
Of course, as Morton points out, to remove politics from the army would be to leave it 
in the hands of its British commander, a constitutional problem Hutton never solved 
(just as he never had satisfactory answers regarding control of his Australian Federal 
Force or imperial Cooperative Force).96 Hutton was not dismayed by these 
constitutional quibbles, as he put it to Minto, the important thing was to defeat the 
corrupt colonial politicians: 
You are one of the few men who are imbued with the same anxious and earnest 
detennination to do good and to raise the instinct of military service to the 
highest plane which a Nation or an Individual is capable of. You and I know 
and feel that we are working with a purely disinterested object, but the Canadian 
politician cannot understand such motives.97 
In taking this line Hutton and Minto challenged a fundamental Canadian interest, the 
government's right to control its own militia. 
95 Letter, Hutton to Foster, 12 February 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50096, 212. 
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The Domville controversy demonstrates the naivety in their approach. Hutton and 
Minto were convinced that the Borden and the Laurier ministry tried to keep 
Domville in command for sheer partisanship. The situation was in reality more 
complex. Borden was as convinced as anybody of the need to be rid of Domville.98 
He was just forced by the exigencies of politics to take a diplomatic approach. 
Domville should 'undoubtedly retire', he wrote to a colleague, but unfortunately he 
had, 'declined to do so and you can very well understand that it would have been an 
unpleasant thing for me to force a brother Member and supporter of the Government 
to do that which he was disinclined to do. ,99 Borden also favoured Markham, a 
political opponent, taking over the command, arguing that ifhe did not, 'the Militia 
and the public could never be persuaded that politics was not at the bottom of it; and it 
is our duty I think as prudent men to take this into account.' 100 Borden attempted to 
navigate the minefield of political influence in a moderate way never appreciated by 
Hutton or Minto. Before blundering into the affair Hutton actually flaunted his 
ignorance of the case, 'The whole situation is so complicated by the personal and 
political considerations at issue between Colonels Domville and Markham that I am 
unable to differentiate.' 101 Hutton was very lucky that on this occasion his resignation 
was not accepted - subsequent battles for control over the militia would lead to his 
recall. 
This early phase of Hutton's command in Canada was therefore marked overall by a 
surprising degree of success. He succeeded in implementing important professional 
98 C. Miller, The Canadian Career of the Fourth Earl of Minto: The Education of a Viceroy, Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, Waterloo, 1980,68. 
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reforms, he publicly announced national and imperial policies, and he had struck what 
he felt was a decisive blow against political influence in the militia. He was able to 
achieve such success largely because his govermnent had little interest in the militia 
or the issues surrounding it. Imperial rhetoric was tolerated because in a Canada 
heavily dependent on a sound relationship with Britain it was not especially 
controversial. Even his ham-fisted attempts at cleansing the militia of political 
influence were finally permitted because of the relatively progressive attitude Borden 
himself took towards patronage. Circumstances changed dramatically at the end of 
1899, however, with the outbreak of the Second South African War and Canadian 
involvement. Suddenly the militia became one of the most important departments, 
with Laurier himself taking a direct interest. As Laurier struggled to maintain 
harmony between the French Canadian population and the violently pro-war British 
Canadian population, questions of imperial commitments became highly charged. 
Additionally, with all the new money, contracts, and appointments to distribute, 
demands for patronage became overwhelming and Hutton's insistence on challenging 
them became all the more trying for Borden. Hutton's honeymoon was over and his 
relations with Borden and the ministry soon simmered towards boiling point. 
Tremors of an approaching war touched Canadian shores in July 1899. Chamberlain 
wrote Minto describing the deteriorating relations between the British Government 
and the Transvaal Boers over the rights of the Uillanders, who were predominately 
British subjects. Spurred on by offers from Australia, he sought offers of military 
assistance from the other self-governing colonies as a demonstration of the Empire's 
solidarity and to enhance the moral force of any ultimatum that might be given.102 
102 Leiter, Chamberlain to Minto, 3 July 1899, Lord Minto's Canadian Papers, Vol. 1,92. 
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Minto duly sounded out his government and was forced to reply that, though he 
believed the public favoured involvement, he was doubtful of the government's 
approval. 103 Laurier was happy to allow volunteers to raise their own contingents yet 
baulked at the expense of an official government contingent and the risk of alienating 
key French Canadian electorates. 104 
Hutton was tremendously excited by the possibility of war. He believed that' such a 
war would meet his [Chamberlain's 1 views of unifying and consolidating the Empire 
more than any scheme of federation for co-operative movement that could be 
devised.,105 The despatch of contingents from the self-goveming colonies, he hoped, 
would prove the viability of his cooperative system for the defence of the Empire. 
Despite the Canadian government's unwillingness to cooperate, Hutton, at Minto's 
private request, drew up secret plans outlining the form a Canadian contingent might 
take. These plans were quite elaborate, outlining not just the size of the contingent (a 
partly mounted force of 1209 men) but the units that might go, the names of officers, 
and the cost. It was important to Hutton that the contingent should form a complete 
field force, representative of Canada as a young British nation, fulfilling the role he 
had set out in his cooperative system, and demonstrating the full value of colonial 
defence assistance. Hutton duly wrote to Chamberlain and Wolseley describing his 
force; only in September, however, did he finally disclose these plans to his 
•• 106 
mllllster. 
103 Letter, Minto to Chamberlain, 20 July 1899, BUL, Chamberlain Collection, JC 29/2/2/137. 
104 Paraphrase of telegram, from Minto, 20 July 1899, TNA, PRO, WO 32/8208. 
lOS Hutton, 'Memoirs', Period V. 19. 
106 Morton, The Canadian General, 162. 
171 
Hutton was not the only one in Canada to plan a contingent. Several of his militia 
officers volunteered to serve and to raise their own volunteer forces. The most 
prominent of these was the offer Colonel Sam Hughes sent on 24 July to Hutton, to 
Borden, and to Chamberlain, and publicly aired in the newspapers.107 Hutton was 
incensed at what to him was a breach of the chain of command; he was, moreover, 
threatened by an offer that, if accepted, might dampen calls for an official contingent; 
and he was adamant that, to be of any use, colonial troops must be well organised, 
trained, and properly led. Hughes's volunteer contingent represented Canada's 
'militia myth', something both Miller and Gordon describe as the idea that Canadian 
irregulars were natural fighters, better even than the British regular. 108 After his 
dispute with Hutton, Hughes gave voice to this myth: 'History shows that the 
Yankees, whom Canadians could always defeat, though with great odds against us, 
repeatedly dressed and combed down British troops, led by British officers;' and he 
related it to South Africa: 'Imagine the Boers catching Canadians as the British were 
bagged at Bronkhurst Spruit, Laing'S Nek, Ingogo or Majuba Hill. A few Canadians 
would have seen the traps laid, and would have endeavoured to catch the enemy 
instead of being caught.' 109 Such sentiments were professionally offensive to Hutton, 
they challenged his plans to create a self-contained and efficient militia army, and-
by threatening to replace an official contingent with a volunteer one - they 
undermined his hopes of proving the viability of his cooperative system. Hutton did 
everything he could to oppose Hughes's scheme, launching a feud that lasted for 
months. He compared it to the Domville affair: 'No one but Your Excellency and I 
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will ever realize the magnitude of what has been achieved by the over-throw of first 
Domville, the Liberal Military Rebel, and second Hughes, the Conservative 
Insurgent.,11O This was apt, for, like that earlier incident, the dispute achieved little of 
substance but contributed to the souring of Hutton's relations with his government. I II 
The situation in South Africa became increasingly tense and by September war 
seemed likely. In Canada the issue had become highly politicised: Tupper, the leader 
of the Opposition, took charge of the movement to send a contingent, strongly backed 
by an impassioned Conservative press. I 12 Chamberlain continued to enquire about the 
possibility of Canadian aid but Minto continued to report in the negative. III When 
war finally broke out much of the English speaking population clamoured to assist 
Britain. 114 Laurier continued to resist these calls but matters came to a head when 
Chamberlain cabled Canada on 3 October with thanks for a contingent that had not 
yet been offered. This caused a furore in Ottawa. Minto and Hutton were in tum 
suspected by an angry cabinet of making secret offers home. Hutton was touring the 
West at the time and was interrogated by cable. The situation was exacerbated by a 
leak to the press, at almost the same time, of Hutton's contingency plan for a 
Canadian contingent. Hutton was likely innocent on both counts. Morton 
demonstrates that Chamberlain's cable was probably the result of a mix up between 
the British Colonial and War Offices and that no secret offer was ever made. I IS It is 
harder to account for the press leak though it is possible that it actually came from a 
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member of Borden's personal staff. I 16 The wave of public enthusiasm for the war 
was fuelled by the Chamberlain cable and by the press leaks and the Laurier ministry 
was finally forced to offer a contingent of 1000 men, the last of the self-governing 
colonies to do so. 
Preston contends that the reason Hutton was dismissed from Canada in February 1900 
was the lingering resentment felt by cabinet for his role in forcing their hands in 
sending a contingent. Undeniably, Hutton's popularity with the cabinet suffered 
during this episode. Laurier suspected 'military men' of orchestrating a campaign to 
force his hand and his deputy, Scott, vigorously disapproved of Hutton. I 17 This 
cannot in itself, however, explain the dismissal. An explanation of that must account 
also for Borden's falling out with Hutton and at this stage their relationship, if not 
friendly, was at least a working one. Borden was one of the members of cabinet who 
did actively favour Canadian involvement and for over a month he had been privately 
encouraging Laurier to send troops. I IS Borden was pleased with the eventual 
Canadian decision and even, to an extent, with Hutton's role, as is evident in a letter 
he drafted to Lansdowne a month later: 
There was not a serious hitch from beginning to end in carrying out our 
arrangement and our system, imperfect as it is claimed by some to be, 
responded admirably to the severe test applied to it. 
Of course we had to some extent anticipated the event & had taken care to have 
clothing & equipment in readiness. Moreover General Hutton had taken steps 
to inform himself as to the capabilities & character of officers who might be 
116 Stevens and SayweU, Lord Minto's Canadian Papers, Volume One, xlii. 
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required to serve. So well had this work been begun that, although General 
Hutton was absent from Head Quarters on a tour of inspection in the West & 
British Columbia, the acting Chief Staff Officer Lt Col Foster (Quarter Master 
General) was able to complete it in a most satisfactory manner. I 19 
Nevertheless, if Hutton's supposed role in the decision to send troops did not disturb 
Borden, Hutton's role in the actual raising of the troops did increasingly frustrate him. 
Hutton became increasingly vociferous in his imperial sentiments and he became 
increasingly truculent in his opposition to patronage at a time when Borden was 
becoming increasingly involved in the running of his department, and therefore 
decreasingly tolerant of his subordinate's excesses. 
Hutton's recklessness in this period was exaggerated by his own desire to go and fight 
in South Africa. Even before the war's outbreak he had prevailed on Minto to 
transmit his offer of service to Chamberlain. Hutton eagerly desired the command of 
all the colonial troops that might be sent, believing it the perfect opportunity to prove 
the value of his cooperative system. 120 He wrote to Wolseley in September pressing 
his case. 121 The British favourably considered the offer, though the Canadian 
contingent was deemed too small a command for an officer of his rank, and Wolseley 
advised that if other colonial units were grouped with it into one command Hutton 
might be the man to lead it. 122 Minto had misgivings about losing his general, 
however, fearing that in his absence the Canadian militia would backslide. 123 On 
balance, the Colonial and War Offices agreed, feeling that Hutton was too valuable in 
Canada to be sent. This caused Hutton great anguish and he confided in Ardagh his, 
119 Letter, Borden to Lansdowne, 10 November 1899, PANS, Borden Collection, MG2/151 60141F1. 
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'intense disappoinbnent & disgust at being tied hand & foot here, while this campaign 
is being carried on.' 124 The Canadian government, interestingly, enthusiastically 
endorsed Hutton's offer of service. By December Borden was practically urging 
Hutton out the door, suggesting that, 'In view of the grave crisis to which you have 
referred I can only repeat that the Government cannot think of placing any obstacle in 
the way of Her Majesty's Government receiving the benefit of your skill and 
experience.' 125 
This was because, by December, Hutton's relationship with Borden had deteriorated 
significantly. In October the two clashed over the disciplining of an officer of the 
Field Battery discovered embezzling funds. The offending officer had strong political 
connections and Borden overruled Hutton's attempts to set up a Court of Inquiry, 
resulting in a sharp correspondence. 126 Just a few days later, on October 26, Hutton 
was called before cabinet to explain his refusal to countenance Sam Hughes receiving 
a place in the first contingent. It was a particularly heated meeting, during which 
Scott called Hutton a 'martinet', and it added to the growing antipathy between 
127 . Hutton and his government. Hutton finally consented to allow Hughes to travel 
with the contingent but in a non-official capacity. 
Hutton's propensity to speech also contributed to the souring of his relationship with 
Borden and the Canadian government. His imperial rhetoric, tolerated in the early 
phase of his command, now riled a government struggling to maintain harmony 
124 Letter, Hutton to Ardagh, 2 November 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50096,160. 
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between the French and English speaking populations. Hutton, excited by the war, 
had also ratcheted it up, something he admitted to Parkin, writing in November, 'I 
have moved forward another step which frightens some of the Govt I believe.' 128 
Hutton viewed the participation of colonial troops as both culmination and vindication 
of his, and Chamberlain's, imperial policies. He was eager to boost the Empire in 
public forums. In October Borden attempted to curb Hutton's public profile, ordering 
that all his department's communications with the press go through the Deputy 
Minister's office. 129 Minto informed Chamberlain of Hutton's problems with the 
government, sounding an ominous note: 
One of the most annoying symptoms of recent transactions has been the bitter 
feeling of some members of the Govt against General Hutton. His position is a 
strong one and they are jealous of it, and I am constantly expecting serious 
difficulties as to which I may have to write to you. 130 
Hutton could not restrain himself. Just days after that note, in a speech to farewell the 
first contingent, he proclaimed that the thousand men Canada was despatching were 
too few and that Canada must be prepared some day to send 50,000 or even 100,000. 
'Canada,' he urged, 'lives, moves and has her being in maintaining the British 
Empire.' 131 Hutton used the platform to demand that all remaining suggestions from 
his last annual report be implemented. Soon after, moved by Hutton's speech, and his 
attacks on political interference, Borden drunkenly abused his general and brawled 
with a militia officer who intervened on his behalf. I32 Laurier expressed his 
displeasure in a more restrained fashion. On reading press reports of the speech he 
128 Letter, Hutton to Parkin, I November 1899, NAC, Parkin Fonds, 3997. 
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protested strongly to Minto a week after, urging him to bring Hutton into line and 
warning that Hutton was verging onto political territory.133 Minto again warned 
Hutton, but confessed his fears to Lansdowne that Hutton may soon get into trouble: 
The govt. here would I feel sure be most anxious to get rid of him ... Hutton has 
done a great deal of good here - he is full of energy, & most popular with the 
general public, but the reverse with my Minister, due very much to two causes -
his public speaking, & the use he has made, undoubtedly I think, of the press. 
He has spoken far too much, speaks very well, but too often ... & I have told him 
so more than once & Sir Wilfrid has spoken to me very strongly about it, on the 
grounds that he has touched on political questions. 134 
Another of Hutton's close friends in Canada, Kitson, shared these fears and years later 
he urged Hutton not to make the same mistake in Australia: 
It was your public speaking that first of all put your Govt against you in Canada. 
Your ambition led you away, your ideas were too great and you talked ofthem 
too much: you wanted to be a great power in the country; you wanted to make a 
corrupt government honest and naturally they did not like it.135 
Patronage was not a large issue with the first Canadian contingent. As it was 
composed of infantry, and prepared in just 17 days, not many new contracts were put 
up for tender. Borden wrote to a colleague in late November that he felt it 
'outrageous' that Departments in the past had paid inflated prices for goods to 
political friends and he claimed, 'I accordingly instituted a very much stricter method 
of purchase and shall regret very much if our Liberal friends are going to suffer in 
133 Letter, Laurier to Minto, 7 November 1899, Lord Minto's Canadian Papers, Vol. I, 183. 
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their loyalty to the party because they are not allowed to take out of the Government 
more than they can get from ordinary purchasers. ,136 The force was composed largely 
of the officers whom Hutton had picked as suitable in his contingency plan. This 
meant that there was only limited scope for giving appointments to party friends. 
Borden faced criticism from, among others, the Toronto Liberals who felt 
underrepresented, and he argued: 
I have already explained that the selection was practically made by Colonel 
Otter, but I may add our good friend James Sutherland was present with me in 
Toronto when the matter was discussed and agreed to what was done. Whatever 
may be the case in Toronto I am satisfied that almost everywhere else 
throughout the Dominion the selections made have given satisfaction not only to 
the public but to our political friends. So far as politics are concerned we have 
tried to put them to one side when questions of fitness were involved but I 
believe it will be found that the Liberal Party has not been neglected in the 
selections which have been made. 137 
Borden therefore seems to have attempted to apply his enlightened version of 
patronage to the selection of men for the first contingent. Minto boasted to his wife 
that he and Hutton had played a role in restraining political appointments to the first 
contingent by warning Borden of the disaster that might result from unfit men being 
sent to war. 'The General came back and we have got every single officer we want,' 
he noted triumphantly.138 This statement is interesting for it belies the fact that 
though Minto and Hutton both railed against personal or political influences bearing 
on appointments, both were in differing measures guilty of it themselves. Minto 
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conspired with Hutton to ensure his friend Buchan got a berth on the first contingent 
and Hutton secured a place for a nominee of his friend, Parkin.139 
In mid-December, following the dramatic British reversals of Black Week, the British 
Government accepted a Canadian offer to send a second contingent. This one caused 
more problems of patronage than the first. It was only slightly larger than the first 
but, because it had not been decided in advance who should go, appointments were 
more of an issue. Hutton did eventually have his own way again but his stem refusal 
of Borden's nominees must have further widened the breach between them. 140 
Supplies proved even more divisive. Opportunities for patronage were more diverse 
for the second contingent. It was mounted and hundreds of horses had to be 
purchased. It also spent greater time in Canada awaiting embarkation than the first 
and therefore needed much more provisioning (the British army took over the bills 
once the units arrived in South Africa). 
Hutton and Borden increasingly clashed over patronage for the second contingent. 
Boots for the contingents were manufactured by the militia department's existing 
supplier and, like all stores, their selection and inspection was controlled by the 
department's civil branch. Hutton received complaints about these boots from the 
commander of the first contingent, Colonel Otter. He brought this to Borden's 
attention on New Year's Day, 1900.141 Borden refused to change manufacturers and 
the bad boots were also sent with the second contingent. Hutton continued to harass 
the civil department over this issue, however, and he later warned the banker in 
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charge of purchases of Strathcona's contingent of horses about the problems. Borden 
tried in vain to forestall this stating 'most positively' that the boots were 'entirely 
satisfactory' and that' I would prefer if you approve to take the boots for the 
Strathcona Force from our Manufacturer in as much as we are doing this with regard 
to all other articles of equipment.d42 Hutton did not last in Canada long enough to 
see the end of this issue, but, on this one question, he seems finally to have prevailed. 
Strathcona received a letter in February from his banker proudly stating that his 
contingent would be as well supplied as the first two, and in the matter of footwear 
'very much better ... This seems to have created some difficulty in the Department, 
and they have since admitted that the boots supplied to the second Contingent were 
also very defective.' 143 Vindication for Hutton, finally, but he had no opportunity to 
savour it - he was already on a boat bound for England. 
It is clear that by this time Hutton's relations with Borden had deteriorated, but how 
did they get so bad that on 17 January Laurier approached Minto to ask for his recall? 
144 Hutton's relations with his government had foundered during the course of the 
war. They worsened dramatically with the New Year. Writing to Chamberlain in 
early January of the growing strains between Hutton and Borden, Minto feared that 
'matters may come to a head any day.' He attributed this to Hutton's public speaking: 
'it has given offence as he has been accused of treading too much on political 
subjects ... there is extremely great friction now in the Militia Department.' 145 Laurier 
visited Minto on 10 January to discuss the tension in the militia department.146 
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Hutton's propensity to speech and his tactless opposition to patronage had fuelled this 
rising tension. Extraordinary pressures on Borden, both from his ministerial duties 
and his private business interests, only increased the strain. One of the reasons Hutton 
had had such a free hand during his early period in office was Borden's loose 
supervision. Borden spent much of his time in conducting his private business affairs. 
Until October 1899, and the outbreak of war, his ministerial duties were slight. 
Suddenly his workload exploded. Reflecting this, monthly totals of Borden's official 
correspondence for the last three months of the year averaged seven times greater than 
for the first nine months. Borden was thrown into the work of the department, 
struggling to organise the contingents; and at that very moment, as he found himself 
under an immense amount of pressure, his private business interests collapsed, 
threatening his livelihood and his career. In late December Borden, in severe debt and 
facing legal action from creditors, secretly arranged to have his Nova Scotia-based 
company supply meat contracts for the second and Strathcona contingents. 147 This 
subterfuge, his parlous finances, and over-work all contributed to Borden's 
impatience with his high-strung general. 
Clearly Hutton and Borden were at odds. Hutton was continually testing an already 
over-burdened Borden. But what precipitated the crisis that resulted in Hutton's 
dismissal? It was no light thing to sack a general in wartime, with a parliament only 
weeks from reconvening, and a second contingent in the throes of departure. It is a 
curly question and most secondary material is quite vague on the point. Yet it is very 
important to set right: this was, undoubtedly, the most dramatic incident of Hutton's 
147 See Appendix, 'Borden's business and the later contingents'. 
182 
colonial career and has been used by historians as an instance of Canadian 
nationalism resisting British imperialism. Is this what Hutton's recall really 
represents? 
In the absence of a compelling immediate cause most have fallen back on general 
explanations. Some contend that a lingering resentment with Hutton for his 
(imagined) role in forcing the sending of the first contingent was the reason; but this 
is inadequate, it might explain the antagonism much of the cabinet felt for Hutton but 
not why Borden, who favoured involvement, turned on Hutton. 148 Others correctly 
suggest that Hutton's outspokenness during the war angered his hosts; this is 
insufficient, however, as it does not explain the timing of the government's 
decision.149 Morton provides a very good account, demonstrating the course of 
Hutton's relationship with the government, giving the correct timing of the 
government's decision to rid itself of Hutton, and raising the issue of control of the 
Strathcona Horse. 150 Morton's trigger, the horse purchases, however, does not fully 
account for Hutton's dismissal. 
The horse purchases were divisive. It was a large order and a large prize for any 
Liberal friend that might secure it and Hutton, by insisting on military protocol, 
threatened to upset the political apple cart. Militia Order No 265 of20 December left 
it to boards of officers to purchase the horses necessary for their own unitS.151 This 
was the usual practice in the British Army and Hutton attempted to insist that it be 
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followed in Canada. 152 Hutton left in early January for Toronto to supervise one of 
these boards and lend a hand in choosing horses fit for purchase. Borden's political 
friends were furious at what they perceived to be a Conservative bias in the choosing 
of horse tenderers by the boards and Borden was compelled to intervene. He 
therefore sent one of his colleagues, Liberal M.P. Robert Beith, a horse dealer who 
had unsuccessfully bid for the contract, to ensure that Liberals were represented.153 
Hutton initially refused Beith unfettered access to the horses. This angered Borden, 
prompting a curt telegram and Hutton's backdown. Hutton returned to Ottawa on 12 
January and, after talking it over with Borden, it seemed that all was well- Borden 
even apologised for the tone of his cable. 154 The next day, however, Borden abruptly 
about turned and sent six questions on the horse purchases to Hutton who, mildly 
offended, replied that most of the answers resided in Borden's own office. Borden, 
apparently even more offended, returned Hutton's reply on 15 January as 'most 
unsatisfactory, if not inestimably rude. ,155 
Could this dispute have truly triggered Hutton's egress? Hutton was quite astonished 
when he was called before Laurier on 16 January and told of an irreparable 
breakdown in his relations with his minister. 156 He was not aware of it; he had 
certainly been a bit truculent, but not insubordinate: he had immediately deferred to 
his minister on receipt of the Beith telegram and his reply to the memo was at worst 
short. Hutton had had a friendly appointment with Laurier the day before and been 
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assured that Laurier would talk to his minister. I 57 Laurier admitted to Minto that the 
situation would be 'easily adjustable' were Hutton and Borden on better speaking 
terms. 158 Borden, months later in a memo explaining his actions to Chamberlain and 
Lansdowne, never even referred to the horse purchases, preferring to justity himself 
by citing claimed indiscretions of Hutton's that were only discovered after it had been 
determined to dismiss him.159 Minto's precis of the situation for Chamberlain seems 
accurate: 
The statement against General Hutton is based on accusations of want of tact, on 
repetitions of remarks made in private conversations, and on the assumption he 
has been too self-assertive in his relations with his Minister. He is charged with 
no particular mistakes, except of the most trivial nature, and even admitting to 
some extent the charges of want of tact there would appear to me to be nothing 
to justity the summary action of my Ministers. 160 
Laurier later explained the reasons for his government's difference with Hutton to 
parliament, 'General Hutton was insubordinate and indiscreet, and deliberately 
ignored the authority of the Minister in the administration of the department ... [the 
GOC] is to be regarded as the adviser, but not as entitled to control the Department of 
Militia.,161 If Hutton was indeed dismissed because it was feared he sought to control 
the Department of Militia then the raising ofthe third Canadian contingent to South 
Africa, the Strathcona Horse, seems a much more likely trigger. Penlington raises this 
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issue as one of the incidents that led to Hutton's recall but he does not give it the full 
emphasis it deserves. 162 
At the end of 1899 the Canadian High Commissioner in London, the wealthy Lord 
Strathcona, had signalled his intention to the Canadian government to raise at his own 
expense a squadron of mounted men to be sent to South Africa. 163 Laurier presumed 
that his government would be given the responsibility of raising these men (and the 
privilege of distributing another large chunk of patronage). 164 However, it was 
Strathcona's money and presumably he could raise the contingent in whatever way he 
liked. Strathcona did have other ideas. On 12 January his agent in Canada, a 
Montreal banker named Clouston, cabled him privately: 'Rumoured here you are to 
equip a squadron of cavalry would suggest all arrangements be left in hands of His 
Excellency and Gen Hutton in order to prevent political appointments.' 165 Strathcona 
shared Clouston' s anxiety that, ifleft to the government, patronage would 
compromise his contingent. He cabled back in full agreement. 166 On 13 January 
Strathcona cabled Laurier with plans for his contingent. While he could not 
reasonably employ Minto without undermining his vice regal position he did attempt 
to ensure that Hutton had a discretionary control over the constitution of his force. He 
warned Laurier that his contingent must be 'entirely non-political; only qualifications 
being thorough fitness and suitability of officers and men for services required.' He 
continued: 
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Will appreciate if can have benefit of experience of Gen. Hutton in the selection 
of men and purchase of horses, arms and equipment; officers to be nominated by 
him and names and particulars submitted my approval. All accounts connected 
with the Force till its embarkation endorsed by Gen. Hutton, will be paid by 
Edward S. Clouston, General Managaer, Bank of Montreal. 167 
The suggestions contained in Strathcona's cable were in several ways offensive to 
Laurier and Borden. Firstly, the thinly veiled accusation of patronage operating in the 
organization of the first two contingents galled Laurier. In his reply to Strathcona, 
Laurier was adamant that, 'There has been no politics in raising of two contingents, 
and even Conservative Press admits it.' 168 Strathcona's suggestion that Hutton 
authorise accounts and select men was just as offensive. If permitted, it would have 
subverted Borden's position in the department, giving to Hutton what had been 
hitherto been ministerial prerogatives. It would have also given Hutton a new public 
authority, and a perch from which he might well have further embarrassed the 
government. And it would have prevented the government exercising patronage in 
distributing among tenderers what in the end amounted to around $265,000 
(excluding shipping contracts). 169 Incidentally, part of that money went straight into 
Borden's hip pocket: he arranged for his own company to supply provisions to the 
Strathcona contingent. 170 
Clearly, neither Laurier nor Borden would have cared to entertain the possibility of 
Hutton exercising the role that Strathcona envisaged. The difficulty, however, was in 
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preventing it since it was, after all, Strathcona's money and Strathcona's own 
contingent. The contingent was not covered by Canada's Militia Act but was raised 
as a temporary unit of the British Army. 171 The solution lay in exploiting the tension 
that already existed between Hutton and Borden. Therefore, in his reply to 
Strathcona's cable Laurier wrote on 15 January (the very same day that Borden sent 
his 'inestimably rude' memo) that, if the Militia Department were to be involved at 
all, then the minister should have control and, 'Government think you should be 
informed that Hutton's relations with them are so unsatisfactory that his co-operation 
with Minister of Militia cannot be relied upon.' 172 
Hutton's recall from Canada stretched over the following three weeks. Minto resisted 
Laurier's entreaties that Hutton be quietly removed for service in South Africa, 
insisting that if his friend were to be dismissed then it must be done publicly so that 
Hutton could defend himself and so that the problems facing British General Officers 
Commanding in Canada be exposed. Unable to justify sacking Hutton on the basis of 
the horse dispute Borden spent the three weeks in accruing a scatter shot of charges 
against Hutton. Finally, the British government consented to Laurier's wish that 
Hutton be recalled, and on February 10 Hutton was selected for special service in 
South Africa.173 
Hutton's command in Canada was characterised by his quixotic attempts to impose on 
the Canadian militia his ideal of a professional, modem and independent force able to 
assist the Empire within his grand scheme of a Cooperative Defence System. 
Initially, he was remarkably successful, thanks to the happy confluence of a Canadian 
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government more interested in economics than in defence, a Canadian people reliant 
on British power to assert themselves against their southern neighbour, and a minister 
determined to limit patronage to reasonable levels. But essentially he was playing in 
an empty sand box and when the Second South African war broke suddenly everyone 
became interested in the militia. His minister became more intimately involved in the 
department, patronage became more of an issue, and the government became 
increasingly sensitive about the imperial relationship. This was not the resistance of a 
local Canadian nationalism but of a harried government, jealous of its control over the 
militia department, vying with a zealous and erratic commander. As in New South 
Wales, it was the issue of control -local versus imperial and parliamentary versus 
military - that determined the Canadian response to Hutton. Hutton's dismissal is an 
excellent example of this; Strathcona's intention to give Hutton control over his 
contingent's formation threatened the precarious balance and the Laurier Government 
finally resolved to rid themselves of him. 
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6. A Dream Brigade: the Second South African War 1900 
The Second South African war shook the confidence of the British Empire. In late 
1899 General Redvers Buller had landed in South Africa with an anny of British 
regulars. Anticipating an easy victory over the ad hoc annies ofthe Orange Free State 
and the Transvaal, Buller launched a triple offensive - in Natal, the eastern Cape, and 
in the west. Over six days in December, Boer commandos defeated all three of those 
thrusts in victories at Colenso, Stonnberg and Magersfontein. This was Britain's 
'Black week' and it pricked the bubble of her military prestige. She now seemed 
more vulnerable than ever to the conscript annies of Europe, especially given the 
general European hostility to British policy in South Africa.) Colonial loyalty was the 
silver lining on the cloud of South Africa. Offers of assistance from the self-
governing colonies helped bolster British prestige and many hoped that a more 
closely-knit Empire might hold its own against rising powers like Gennany, Russia 
and America.2 While the crisis in South Africa therefore sapped Britain's confidence, 
and heightened her fears, at the same time it offered the solace of imperial solidarity, 
and the hope that the Empire could be fashioned into a true source of security. 
The war caused British politicians and soldiers to rethink their defensive and imperial 
arrangements. Some envisaged a mobile field anny, prepared during peacetime, and 
ready to meet Britain's next crisis.3 Plans for an imperial federation were mooted. 
Imperial defence arrangements were examined and many hoped to capitalise on 
I J. Dunlop, The Development of the British Army 1899-1914, Methuen, London, 1938,81. 
2 A. Thompson, 'The Language of Imperialism and the Meanings of Empire: Imperial Discourse in 
British Politics, 1895-1914', Journal of British Studies, 36, 1997, 151 and C. Wilcox, Australia's Boer 
War: The War in South Africa 1899-1902, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2002, xiii. 
3 Dunlop, The Development of the British Army, 123. 
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colonial support by forming some kind of imperial reserve from colonial militiamen.4 
Wolseley expressed a widespread sentiment when he said that, 'This war has 
federated the Empire of which we have talked for years and hoped for but never 
exactly saw our way to.' 5 
The British made several overtures to the colonies with these schemes in mind. In 
March 1900 Chamberlain made one of the first of these attempts at formal ising the 
imperial sentiment that had arisen during the war. In a letter to Lord Minto, he 
suggested that something 'practical might be done towards that closer union which we 
have constantly kept in view', offered to consult the colonies on the post-war 
settlement, and made the weightier suggestion that they be permanently included in 
imperial decision-making through the formation of an Imperial Council, to sit in 
London.6 He asked Minto to sound out Canadian opinion on these questions. This 
proposal arose from Chamberlain's belief that the war in South Africa provided the 
opportunity to unite that region into a single nation, as the first stage in the process of 
consolidating the whole Empire.7 
Chamberlain proceeded no further than Canada with his proposal. Minto's reply in 
April threw cold water on it. He advised 'great caution' and forwarded a 
memorandum from Laurier that assured Chamberlain of Canada's loyal assistance but 
insisted that it must be given voluntarily and at the time of need. 8 Nevertheless, it was 
a significant step forward in British efforts at more closely knitting together the 
4 A Thompson, Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics c. 1880-1932, Pearson Education, 
Essex, 2000, 127 and Wilcox, Australia 's Boer War, 310. 
S Letter, Wolseley to brother, 23 March 1900, Hove, Garnet Wolseley Papers, WfW.4/122. 
• Letter, Chamberlain to Minto, 2 March 1900, quoted in R. Wilde, 'Chamberlain's Proposal of an 
Imperial Council in March, 1900', Canadian Historical Review, 37, 1956, 227. 
7 R. Hymn and G. Martin, Reappraisals in British Imperial History, Macmillan, London, 1975, 132. 
, Wilde, 'Chamberlain's Proposal of an Imperial Council in March, 1900',230. 
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Empire and, interestingly, Hutton was centrally involved. Wilde has studied this 
question and he argues that the immediate trigger for Chamberlain's proposal was an 
interview he had had the day before with Hutton.9 On his return home from Canada 
Hutton met with Lansdowne and Chamberlain to discuss Canadian military affairs 
and he took the opportunity to outline his plans for a Canadian militia army complete 
in all its parts and ready to take the field as an independent field force participating in 
a cooperative defence of the Empire. lO Chamberlain asked Hutton whether the British 
army might be refonned in a similar way, with the creation of its own field artillery 
and cavalry, and Hutton had assured Chamberlain that 'the only possible method of 
ensuring a satisfactory military defence for the old country and for the Empire would 
by [sic 1 the creation of a Militia Army System.' II Chamberlain was so impressed that 
he took Hutton to see Arthur Balfour, the First Lord of the Treasury and Leader of the 
Commons, and Hutton again explained his plans for British and colonial militia and 
his system of cooperative defence for the Empire. 12 Hutton wrote excitedly to Minto 
the next day describing the meetings, 'It is very evident that the Imperial Government 
are quite determined to have a consistent and properly organized military system in 
which the Colonies shall be invited to take part at the end ofthe present war.' 13 It was 
a momentous occasion for Hutton - he had succeeded in impressing his imperial 
dreams on British policymakers - and the fact of Chamberlain's failure did not 
diminish that achievement. 
9 Wilde, 'Chamberlain's Proposal of an Imperial Council in March, 1900',241. 
10 Record of interview, Hutton and Chamberlain, I March 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078, 156. 
"Record ofinlerview, Hutton and Chamberlain, 1 March 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078,157. 
12 Record of interview, Hutton and Chamberlain, I March 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078, 157-
8. 
13 Letter, Hutton to Minto, 2 March 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50080, 180. 
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This episode was an important precursor to Hutton's South African campaign, the 
subject of this chapter. His experiences in the war brought together the main threads 
of his career: mounted infantry, militia and colonial armies. They now formed a 
single idea, his 'Militia Army System' for the cooperative defence ofthe Empire, 
which he had successfully pitched to the highest levels ofthe British government. It 
was a scheme which, by the creation of a field force able to operate anywhere against 
the modern conscript armies of Europe, would secure Britain and the Empire against 
the ever more perilous threat of war. In South Africa Hutton was given the 
opportunity to test such a force, to prove its worth, and in the process to help solidify 
imperial sentiment. 
The outbreak ofthe Second South African war had fuelled the flames of Hutton's 
imperial ambitions. In Canada he had worked himself into a frenzy in his desire to go 
to the front. He was drawn not only by a soldier's desire to campaign, but, more 
importantly, he sensed that this was a moment of great importance for colonial 
defence participation and for the Empire generally. It seemed a ratification of the 
imperial agenda that he had pursued in Canada and New South Wales.14 And it 
promised to further greatly that agenda. As he wrote to Wood: 
I look upon this war, sad as it has been in losses of so many of our best Officers 
and men, unfortunate as it has proved in success to our arms, as one of the most 
valuable events in the future of the Empire. The fact of all our Colonies with 
responsible Government having identified themselves in such a practical form 
with the common interests of the old country will be more pregnant of great 
results than any event in the last half-century. Again each great Colony itself 
14 Letter, Bridge to Hutton, 1 March 1901, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50097,13. 
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will be welded together with one great sub-division of our Empire by having 
that community of interest and of sympathy which our active part in this present 
campaign must promote. IS 
He felt that the experience of having colonial troops fight alongside imperial ones 
would greatly enhance imperial unity, vowing to Wolseley that he would 'leave no 
stone unturned to make successful a step so important in the future development of 
the Empire.' 16 Hutton's success in bringing his ideas to Chamberlain and Balfour had 
encouraged him further - he had been heard at the highest level of government and he 
now intended to prove the validity of his theories. South Africa, to Hutton, was the 
ideal proving ground. 
Shortly after his arrival in South Africa Hutton was presented with an opportunity to 
fulfil his promise to Wolseley and establish the value of colonial military cooperation. 
He had arrived in Cape Town at the end of March 1900 to take command of a brigade 
of British militia at Kimberley. After just a week in that post he was transferred to 
Bloemfontein, the recently conquered capital of the Orange Free State, where he 
assumed command of a brigade of mounted infantry. Lord Roberts was planning to 
march on Pretoria, the capital of the Transvaal, and had decided to form a division of 
mounted infantry units to assist the cavalry in that march. Hutton's brigade, 
nominally a part of that division, combined a core of British mounted infantry 
regulars with an assemblage of mounted volunteers from the British and colonial 
militias. 
15 Letter, Hutton to Wood, 30 January 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50086, 213. 
16 Letter, Hutton to Wolseley, 4 September 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50085, 134. 
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Hutton was ecstatic at receiving his new command. He enthused that his brigade was 
really a division in number - having between 5 and 6000 men. l7 Most importantly, 
his vision of imperial troops fighting together side by side was fulfilled: 'It realizes 
my dream of the last 10 years. I wish that the chance had come 10 or even 5 years 
ago, but if God grants me health and strength I trust under Providence to make my 
command a success. The responsibility is very great, quite as much political and 
imperial, as it is military.'18 Hutton's brigade contained mounted troops from 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Britain - it was the ideal force for proving the 
value of his imperial ideas and the perfect vehicle for further cementing imperial 
sentiment. 
This was a post that Hutton had desired for many months. Before the outbreak of 
hostilities he had written to Wolseley from Canada suggesting he be placed in charge 
of colonial horsemen in the event ofwar. 19 Wolseley was receptive to the request and 
favoured Hutton, 'a man accustomed to Colonists, their ways and their 
susceptibilities,' as the ideal candidate for such a command.2o Lansdowne, the 
Secretary of State for War, had intimated to Hutton in March that he would get a 
command of colonial mounted troops.21 Hutton himself suspected that Chamberlain 
had had a hand in the appointrnent.22 That these three men had influenced Hutton's 
appointment (or at least that he imagined that they had) is significant because these 
three men were the very same British leaders before whom Hutton was striving to 
17 Letter No. 6, Hutton to wife, 2 April 1900, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 
1,22. 
18 Letter No.6, Hutton to wife, 2 April 1900, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 
1,23. 
19 Letter, Hutton to Wolseley, 4 September 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50085, 130. 
20 Note, Harvey to Arundle, 23 September 1899, BUL, Chamberlain Collection, JC 29/2121169 
[Wolseley note 19 September 1899]. 
21 Record of interview, Hutton and Marquis of Lansdowne, 2 March 1899, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 
50078,154. 
22 Letter, Hutton to wife, 17 April 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50091, 31. 
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establish the value of colonial and British militia mounted units operating together. In 
London, a month earlier, he had promised these three something that in South Africa 
he desperately tried to deliver. He saw himself as their agent, sending Chamberlain 
periodic reports about his command such as this message: 
The importance, which you, Sir, have attached to the association together 
in one single campaign, & to the service under similar conditions of so 
many representative corps from our various Colonies, will be more than 
proved. I feel certain that this will will [sic 1 be an element of vital 
importance in moulding colonial military opinion to accept before long a 
consolidated military system for the whole empire. The Colonial Corps 
out here are not merely soldiers, they are citizens of every social, and 
political grade - many of them men of great influence and importance in 
the communities from which they come.23 
This sense of an imperial mission shaped Hutton's command in South Africa. 
It was a mission made more urgent by Hutton's sense that British racial prestige was 
at stake in South Africa. His use of racial language during the war became ever more 
agitated and frustrated, almost desperate. Initially, the British were quite lenient in 
their treatment of surrendered Boers - amnesty was offered to any who would 
surrender their arms.24 For a time Hutton favoured the policy, and he wrote 
ingratiatingly to Chamberlain praising Roberts's generosity.25 As the war dragged on, 
however, he increasingly viewed that policy with scorn, wanting to force an early end 
to the conflict after long and frustrating marches: 'As it is French & I make wide & 
powerful strategical marches & turn the enemy from one position after another, but 
23 Letter, Hutton to Chamberlain, 2 June 1900, BUL, Chamberlain Collection, JC 29/4/8/24. 
24 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, 74. 
25 Letter, Hutton to Chamberlain, 2 June 1900, BUL, Chamberlain Collection, JC 29/4/8/24. 
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we have only the annoyance of seeing our mobile foe retiring in front of us - bag & 
baggage. ,26 Enemies laid down their arms, taking the oath of neutrality, only to rise 
in the rear and attack British convoys and isolated posts. Hutton became exasperated 
with Roberts, describing him to his wife as a 'Military Gladstone', and longed for a 
'younger and a stronger, harder Com. in Chief. One who will do and dare, and who 
will exercise the rod of the Conqueror over the conquered in such a manner as to 
cause the ignorant Boers to know and feel that their cause is a lost one, and that 
success is hopeless.' The British, he continued, 'must kill and destroy, if we are soon 
to really settle the question the supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon Race over the 
Dutch. ,27 Hutton became ever harder in his stance, bemoaning the legal constraints 
that Roberts imposed on him.28 When British policy became tougher - in August 
Roberts proclaimed that the British would no longer provide for the hungry wives and 
children of Boer fighters - Hutton wholeheartedly approved, believing it would do 
much to bring the war to a quick end.29 
Hutton was eager for a quick end to the war. He feared a protracted war might 
undermine British prestige: 
Shameful I call it! What will military critics say. Here we have some 30 000 
men with quite 5 000 Mounted Men held up by some 4 or 5000 wretched 
farmers - Dutchmen - for whom in old days we had so profound a contempt. 
We at last drive off our enemy, but never succeed in taking a gun or in seriously 
harassing his retreat. .. It is too shameful! Please God this war may soon end, as 
26 Letter, Hutton to wife, 30 July 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50091, 212. 
27 Letter, Hutton to wife, 30 July 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50091, 212. 
28 Letter No. 33, Hutton to wife, 28 July 1900, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 
3,38. 
29 Letter, Hutton to wife, 14 August 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50091, 241. 
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there is nothing but discredit to be gained to us in a military point of view, and 
little credit indeed in the political outlook.3D 
Hutton repeatedly referred to the necessity of harshly punishing the Boers in order to 
bolster British prestige: 'Our enemy must be made to feel the effect of fire and sword 
- we must kill and slay if our superiority as a race is to be established over that of the 
Dutch in South Africa.,31 
This conception of the Boers was radically different to the opinion he had formed 
during the first South African war, twenty years earlier, when he had admired the 
Boers, likening them to 'the best class of yeoman farmers at home.' 32 He now viewed 
them with almost no sympathy at all, likening them to 'savages and uncivilized 
races. ,33 Harsh tactics were a necessary recourse because, to Hutton, a 'moral effect' 
was the only means of making an impression on such an enemy. The Boers, he 
decided, were' as stubborn as they are ignorant and fanatical. They are moreover 
intensely proud,' he added, 'and having posed as patriots are ready to make any 
sacrifices for their opinions. ,34 The Boers had become, for Hutton, an alien race - to 
whom it was unnecessary to extend any sympathy, pity or mercy. 
This dramatic shift in Hutton's racial view ofthe Boers owed something to the 
fiustration of a drawn out war against an enemy using guerrilla tactics. More 
important, though, was his fear that any loss of prestige would affect British power. 
This is witnessed in the fact that at the start of his South African tour, before he had 
30 Letter, Hutton to wife, 31 August 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50091, 258. 
3I Letter No. 33, Hutton to wife, 28 July 1900, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 
3,38. 
32 Letter, Hutton to father, 19 May 1881, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50090. 
33 Leiter, Hulton to wife, 2 August 1900, BL, Hulton Papers, ADD 50091, 218. 
34 Leiter, Hulton to wife, 18 August 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50091, 252. 
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encountered even a single Boer, he was already impressed with the need to crush any 
resistance. He put this opinion to Chamberlain, 'we soldiers do not for one moment 
believe that the spirit of the Boers is broken, and it is generally recognised that to 
terminate hostilities before the moral and physical supremacy of the British race is 
asserted would be merely to perpetuate the recent and the present general feeling of 
unrest which permeates the whole community of South Africa - white and black.,35 
Victory was vital to ensure the predominance of the British race. This was primarily 
to bolster the Empire against its extemal enemies, but it was also of importance in 
quelling internal dissent: after serving in South Africa he wrote to Parkin in Canada 
suggesting that the British would prevail over the Boers and that the French 
Canadians should 'read a lesson ... [that] British institutions, British justice & the 
Anglo-Saxon tongue are to be the ruling principles of all portions of the British 
Empire.,36 Hutton suggested to Parkin that the war had been mainly fought to 
consolidate such ideas and principles.37 The Boers, then, hardly existed at all in 
Hutton's world view: they were only of importance in that they were an obstacle to 
British progress and a blemish on British prestige. 
Hutton's brigade was assigned to John French's Cavalry Division for the march from 
Bloemfontein to Pretoria. French had been one of the few British commanders to 
avoid disgrace during the early months of the war and his string of victories -
Elandslaagte, Colesburg, Klip Drift - had made him a hero at home.38 Presciently, 
Hutton had written to French in January expressing the 'wish that I were with you at 
the head of 5000 Mounted Infantry, the dream of my last 20 years, and never, I fear to 
3S Letter, Hullon to Chamberlain, 25 April 1900, BL, Hullon Papers, ADD 50078, 219. 
M Letter, Hullon to Parkin, 24 October 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50083, 219. 
37 Letter, Hullon to Parkin, 24 October \900, BL, Hullon Papers, ADD 50083, 219. 
38 R. Holmes, The Little Field Marshal: A Life a/Sir John French, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 
2004,67 & 80. 
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be realized.'39 It was the fulfilment of his life's ambition and he was glad to be 
accompanying an old friend, and newly minted hero, who respected the qualities of 
his mounted infantry and was familiar with their strategy and tactics.4o He saw fate's 
hand at work in the fact that he and French now had, 'a golden opportunity before us 
of putting into practice before a worthy foe those very principles of tactics for which 
we had both contended twelve years ago at Aldershot in the teeth of bitter 
.. ,41 
opposItIOn. 
The march commenced at the beginning of May. Hutton's task was to gallop around 
and behind Boer commandos to prevent their escape and so pin them against 
Roberts's main force of infantry. A number of skirmishes were fought, but the Boers 
largely eluded the invading force, preferring to harass the British than to stand and 
fight.42 Hutton's brigade met its first significant resistance crossing the Vet river at 
Coetzee's Drift on 5 May. For Hutton, the victory confirmed the qualities of colonial 
troops and justified the existence of mounted infantry, writing that, 'In fact it was a 
typical Mounted Infantry Fight. ,43 During the battle Hutton ordered the New South 
Wales Mounted Rifles to charge the Boers. He described the scene in a letter to his 
wife: 
[I] told them the situation, reminded them that we (they and I) were 
comrades and then pointed out to them that they must take the Drift and 
make good the Northern Bank ofthe River. They did not want a second 
word, I can tell you. The glint of battle was in their eyes - we 
39 Letter, Hutton to French, 20 January 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50086, 316. 
40 Letter, Hutton to wife, I3 May 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50091, 66. 
41 LetterNo. 17, Hutton to wife, I3 May 1900, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 
1,74. 
42 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, 80. 
43 Letter No. 15, Hutton to wife, 6 May 1900, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 
1,60. 
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understood one another, they and I, and I never had a doubt but that what 
brave men could do, they would do ... Eager and detennined the New 
South Wales men, Queenslanders and New Zealanders, vied with one 
another in their efforts if possible to reach and close with their foe. 44 
As early as his first battle, therefore, Hutton was already convinced of the success of 
his mounted infantry and imperial projects. 
Hutton believed that the success of his force would prove the value of his first major 
contribution to British military refonn: the mounted infantry. He confided to Minto 
that, 'if God wills it, our fine force of 11,000 Mounted Infantry should be able to 
make such an impression on the campaign as to establish the value of Mounted 
Troops, armed and equipped as are ours, above all cavil or argument. ,45 A mere 
month's campaigning under his belt and he was already convinced of his success in 
that aim, suggesting to Minto that the advance from Bloemfontein had revealed the 
power of mounted troops and that, 'in fact the whole campaign is corroborative of the 
facts which Your Excellency and I have been preaching for the last 20 years. ,46 The 
great expanse of the South African veldt hampered the effectiveness of infantry and 
highlighted the value of mobile troops. Hutton thought that in such an environment 
'men on foot are perfectly helpless' and fit only for stationary duties.47 He also 
believed that shortcomings in the British cavalry system had been exposed and that 
consequently, 'the absolute necessity of a Mounted Infantry has been established.48 
Badsey disputes this, arguing that the British cavalry only perfonned badly because 
44 Letter No. IS, Hutton to wife, 6 May 1900, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 
1,58-9 [Hutton'S emphasis). 
"Letter, Hutton to Minto, 14 April 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50080, 204. 
46 Letter, Hutton to Minto, 14 May 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50080, 222. 
47 Letter, Hutton to wife, 22 June 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50091,148. 
48 Letter, Hutton to Minto, 23 September 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50080, 262. 
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they had to compete for forage and remounts with masses of improvised horsemen, 
insufficiently trained for such work.49 Nevertheless, Hutton concluded, with French's 
concurrence, that at least six new regiments of mounted rifles should be raised as a 
part of the British cavalry. 50 These regiments would cooperate with the cavalry in 
much the same way Hutton had cooperated with French - acting as a support, a pivot, 
and a reserve.51 They imagined that British Yeomanry and colonial mounted forces 
would copy the training and equipment of that force, and be trained and staffed by 
officers from those regiments. 52 
It was not feasible to expect the British exchequer to pay for six new regiments and 
Hutton believed that the only way to get that number of mounted infantry would be to 
train parts of the British militia in that role. It is not surprising, then, that another 
conclusion Hutton drew from the Second South African war was the effectiveness of 
militia. In an interview with Chamberlain in December 1900 he suggested that South 
Africa had proved the success of his reorganisation of the militias of Canada and New 
South Wales and he advocated the introduction of the same system in Britain.53 He 
believed that an Empire-wide defence system based on the Militia Act was the logical 
conclusion to be drawn from the Second South African war. 54 
For Hutton, the essence of his brigade was its imperial nature. When he marched he 
told his troops that their actions would determine not only the honour and credit 
49 S. Badsey, 'Fire and Sword: The British Anny and the Anne Blanche Controversy 1871-1921', 
DPhil Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1981, 140 & 141. 
50 Letter, Hutton to Minto, 23 September 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50080, 262. 
51 Letter No. 17, Hutton to wife, 13 May 1900, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 
1,76. 
52 Letter, Hutton to Minto, 23 September 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50080, 262. 
53 Record of interview, Hutton and Chamberlain, 6 December 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078, 
227 [memorandum of interview held 5 December 1900]. 
54 Letter, Hutton to Minto, 14 April 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50080, 203. 
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accorded them as individuals, but also that accorded to the colonies they represented, 
and 'that the future of the Empire in a large measure was at stake. ,55 He imagined 
that this was reciprocated. For example, he noted that when he congratulated a 
mortally wounded Canadian soldier on his gallantry, the dying man pluckily replied, 
'I came here to confirm the principle of the Unity of the Empire, and I have laid down 
my life in a Great Cause.'56 Hutton hoped to use the brigade to strengthen imperial 
sentiment and therefore strongly felt the importance of his command. Convinced of 
its imperial significance, he assured Chamberlain that, 'I feel very heavily the 
responsibility entailed, as if successful this happy association of selected 
representatives from the self-governing Colonies of Canada and Australia will 
exercise no small effect upon the future military consolidation of the defences of 
England. ,57 He promised to leave 'no stone un-turned in order to take advantage of 
the opportunity thus afforded.'58 
One way that Hutton sought to take advantage of this opportunity was in the 
structuring of his brigade. This organisation reflected his dream of Greater Britain. 
In New South Wales and Canada - in his speeches, in his federal defence plans, and 
in his idea of a 'national militia army' - Hutton had attempted to strengthen Canadian 
and Australian local identity, as individual members of a larger nation, Greater 
Britain, whose strength would enhance that greater nation. Organising his brigade, he 
took a similar approach, highlighting both local and imperial identity, and ultimately 
seeking to fuse them together. Visually, Hutton achieved this in the insignia he had 
his troops wear. Months earlier, in Canada, he had designed the badge worn by 
"Letter No. 19, Hutton to wife, 27 May 1900, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 
2,27. 
56 Letter, Hutton to Parkin, 24 October 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50083, 218. 
57 Letter, Hutton to Chamberlain, 25 April 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078, 219. 
58 Letter, Hutton to Chamberlain, 25 April 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078, 219. 
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Canadians in South Africa: an imperial crown on a maple leaf with the word 'Canada' 
beneath. 59 Two years later, when serving as General Officer Commanding in 
Australia, Hutton would design a very similar emblem for the First Commonwealth 
Contingent to South Africa, the Rising Sun Badge.6O Again, this fused an imperial 
crown with a local symbol- the rising sun, a contemporary symbol used to represent 
the new Commonwealth - and the word' Australia. ,61 During the war, Hutton 
improvised and he had the Australians in his brigade wear an 'A' on their helmets.62 
Hutton similarly arranged his unit in ways intended to highlight and strengthen its 
Greater Britishness. He assembled a staff of officers representative of the different 
colonies.63 Four members of that staff were Australians.64 Hutton was unique among 
British commanders in his willingness to use colonials in these roles.65 In each corps 
he joined the colonial troops to a battalion of picked mounted infantry men from the 
regular British infantry so that, 'each corps, and consequently the Brigade, becomes 
Imperial, and not merely Colonial in character. ,66 He felt that this excited a healthy 
competition and in his despatches to the War Office he portrays this: 'Nothing could 
exceed the excellent behaviour of the troops generally: Canadians, New South 
Welshmen, Queenslanders and New Zealanders vied with one another, and with the 
two veteran battalions ofImperial Mounted Infantry, in their efforts to be the first to 
"c. Miller, Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War. 1899-1902, Canadian War 
Museurn and McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 1993,54. 
6Q R Grebert, The Australian Anny Slouch Hat and Rising Sun Badge, The New South Wales Military 
Historical Society, Sydney, 2002, 97-99. 
61 C. Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes: Citizen Soldiering in Australia, 1854-1945, Allen and Unwin, 
St Leonards, 1998, 51. 
62 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, 78. 
63 Letter No. 8, Hutton to wife, 8 April 1900, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 
1,32 
64 L. Field, The Forgot/en War: Australian Involvement in the South African Conflict of 1899-1902, 
Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1979, 111. 
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close with the enemy. ,67 At the same time, he hoped that, ifhis Brigade met with 
success, the commingling might help eradicate 'the old jealousies between regular 
British troops and colonial levies. ,68 
This mixture of soldiers from a variety of colonies and from the regular British army 
threatened friction, jealousies, and discord and Hutton imagined he would need a 
'delicacy in handling' and infinite tact. 69 At the end of his campaign Hutton was 
pleased to have witnessed little of this in his brigade, something quite remarkable 
given the disparities in pay between these troops, and he hoped that such unity would, 
'now permeate into every comer of our Empire and find a sympathetic echo in every 
backwood homestead of Canada and of the North West, in every station & farm of 
Australia and in every portion of New Zealand, where the chances & vicissitudes of 
this abnormally difficult campaign are discussed.' 70 
As a result of these imperial intentions Hutton really felt the importance of military 
success for his brigade. He suggested to Minto that, 'Upon the success which it 
achieves will to a very great extent depend the feeling ofthe Australian and Canadian 
Troops and through them the Colonies whom they represent towards a Military Co-
operative System of Defence for the Empire.'71 On another occasion, he remarked 
that, 'I am so glad that our Canadians have behaved so well - the loss is sad - but the 
good which it will do in cementing the Empire is the great compensation.' 72 It is 
67 Despatch, Hutton to Roberts, 'Report on operations 1st Mounted Infantry from 115 to 9/5',9 July 
1900, TNA, PRO, WO 105/9. 
68 Letter, Hutton to Parkin, 24 October 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50083, 214. 
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therefore not surprising that Hutton expressed delight in the fighting qualities of the 
Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian soldiers within his command. He boasted to 
Chamberlain of the' fine material' of these men who 'fairly revel in fighting' and 
suggested there was 'positively nothing of which these troops are not capable. ,73 His 
letters horne to his wife are full of praise for these troopS.74 Summing up the work of 
his brigade he assured Chamberlain, 'It is impossible to speak in too high terms of the 
manner in which the troops representing the various Colonies of Canada, New South 
Wales, Victoria, Queensland, New Zealand, South Australia, Western Australia and 
Tasmania have behaved. The Colonial Troops have shown an eagerness to close with 
the Boers, a steady gallantry under heavy artillery fire, and a silent ever cheerful 
endurance of hardship and cold, which has won the highest admiration of all the 
regular Troops with whom they have been associated. ,75 
Hutton was not the only British general to sing the praises of the colonial troops. 
Wilcox argues that it became a common perception that colonial horsemen were the 
troops best suited to conditions in South Africa.76 Their hardiness and skill in the 
saddle were highly regarded, as was their independence of mind and spirit. Lord 
Roberts wished that British regulars shared this same quality.77 Hutton also valued 
this independence - he brought his men into his confidence on campaign, sometimes 
risking the secrecy of the operations, in order that he had the 'intelligent cooperation 
of everyone,' he was convinced that in modern war 'the days of automata are gone.' 78 
13 Letter, Hutton to Chamberlain, 25 April 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078, 219. 
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The colonial officers within Hutton's command, however, did not perform as wel1 as 
he had hoped. He found them deficient in professional attainments and education and 
unable to fil1 positions of high or independent command.79 The Canadian officers 
proved even worse than those from Australia. 8o Hutton confided to his wife that his 
staff of picked colonial officers had been a failure - an opinion echoed by one of his 
corps commanders who felt that Hutton's incompetent staff had hampered the 
functioning of his brigade. 81 This deficiency of colonial leadership impressed on 
Hutton the importance of British command and organisation of these forces. He 
concluded that the Canadians proved the most effective colonial troops in South 
Africa despite being man for man inferior soldiers because they were 'so wel1 
organized and administered.' 82 Of course it was Hutton himself who had been 
responsible for that organisation. 
This high estimation of colonial troops and correspondingly low estimation of their 
officers reflects Hutton's professional prejudices. His attempts to assert that 
perspective in the colonies - especial1y in the retirements of officers such as Spalding, 
Airey and Domvil1e - had been the source of much of the conflict in those commands. 
It generated tension in South Africa as wel1; Miller reports that Hutton was 'intensely 
disliked' by the members of the Canadian Mounted Rifles.83 'Banjo' Paterson, in 
South Africa as a war correspondent, described resentment of Hutton's fondness for 
79 Letter, Hutton to Minto, 27 March 1901, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50081, 21. 
80 Letter, Hutton to Minto, 18 August 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50080, 255. 
81 Letter, Hutton to wife, 17 August 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50091,245; De Lisle, 'Memoirs of 
the Great Boer War', KCL, GB99 De Lisle Item 2, Vol. I, f. 49. 
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'drill and pipeclay.'84 Harry Chauvel, one of Hutton's Australian officers (and 
afterwards one of his finnest supporters), was similarly repelled by Hutton's 
officiousness, 'we absolutely hate him already and we don't care how soon it's 
over.'85 
Hutton did not measure the success of his brigade merely in the quality of his 
mounted and colonial troops. He measured it also in providence, in the divine favour 
with which he imagined God held his personal, and his country's, mission. Hutton's 
letters home during the war were full of references to God. He prayed for 'the 
discrimination and insight' to know how best to use his marvellous force. 86 Hutton 
courted divine favour through prayer and by organising church services for his men 
on the march. He likened his men to Cromwell's Roundheads - attending services 
mounted and ready to ride off - 'We shall be the better for marching on our way to 
the final phase of the Campaign with God's blessing on our heads, and with prayer to 
God still on our lips. ,87 According to his own testimony, however, it was not a prayer 
left on their lips as they rode to battle, but the national anthem, 'God Save the Queen', 
for this was how he ended his services.88 This says something about the nature of his 
religious belief at this stage. He was devoutly religious; but his Christian faith 
supported his faith in the British nation. For example, on the very same page that he 
urged the necessity to 'kill and slay' the Boers he warmly approved of a Chaplain 
84 A. Paterson, Press Despatch, 18 April 1900, A. Paterson, From the Front: Being the Observations of 
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reminding the troops 'that we represented the cause of Christianity, ofliberty and of 
justice. ,89 To his mind there was no contradiction. 
God did seem to watch out for Hutton's brigade - they enjoyed an almost 
miraculously low rate of casualties. In a series of sharp encounters Hutton's men 
survived heavy enemy fire with little ill effect. Wilcox describes the brigade's first 
action - the crossing at Coetzee's Drift - and the men's mystification at prevailing 
with very light injury.9O In another episode, Hutton avoided a potentially ruinous 
engagement with a far larger Boer force when a chance messenger brought word not 
to march - the official notification arriving too late to have prevented disaster. Hutton 
mused after the incident, 'how much depends upon chance or upon Providence in 
war.,91 In over 30 actions Hutton's brigade lost only four officers and seventeen men 
killed and Hutton attributed this to 'a kind Providence.,92 He came to believe that 
God was watching over him and his troops in South Africa, enabling him to be of 
service to Great Britain, and facilitating the success of his work.93 He wrote in June 
of the minimal casualties in his brigade: 'This has been an extraordinary result for so 
much valuable & important work, and I can only account for it by the fact that 
Providence has especially blessed the tactical dispositions made and enabled me to 
carry out the orders given me in such a satisfactory manner as I have minimized the 
loss to my Troops. The fire of the enemy has been frequently very heavy and well 
directed, and I never save the men when there is a definite object to be gained. ,94 
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Hutton conceived of this apparent mercy as more than a reward for his brigade's 
benedictions. He saw it as divine favour for the British cause in South Africa and for 
his own efforts at more closely binding the Empire. '1 fully believe that God is with 
us,' he wrote to his wife, continuing, 'Our cause is a sacred one and 1 dare to feel 
assured of victory.' 95 He connected his miraculously low rate of casualties to divine 
approval of his imperial mission in a letter to Parkin: 
You will understand therefore with what a profound feeling of gratitude 
toward God 1 am leaving South Africa. I feel that ifas a very humble 
instrument of an All-Wise Providence I have been enabled to act the 
very difficult part allotted to me with some measure of success it has 
been that the same Providence has decreed that the destiny of the World 
shall be controlled ere long by the Unity and solidarity of our Empire in 
spite of the many opposing influences at work. 
1 can believe in nothing else, and nor indeed would you, had you been a 
spectator with me of the heavy fire to which my Troops have been 
continually exposed, the risks run with impunity, and dangers 
successfully mastered. [This] has over again been a matter of the utmost 
astonishment to my Staff & myself1 There has been a very general 
comment among our Troops that some especial Providence seemed to be 
always present to save us from serious loss, and to bring us unvarying 
success.96 
These notions about God and divine approval demonstrate three things. They show 
how far Hutton had travelled from his stepfather's evangelical faith - how whole-
95 Letter, Hutton to wife,S July 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50091,178. 
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heartedly he had adopted the broad church position - and how finnly he was 
embraced within the grip of nationalism. They also show how strongly he was 
attached to his plans for the Empire. 
Hutton really felt the imperial significance of his command. He imagined that what he 
was doing, that the success which his brigade attained, would strengthen the Empire 
and might save the British nation. He was therefore indignant at any obstacles placed 
in his path. A letter of his to Parkin illustrates this: 
No British Commander now living has had the privileges which have fallen to 
my lot of commanding every variety of our Colonial Troops, and I 
unhesitatingly aver that there are in the Empire no stronger arms and no nobler, 
braver hearts than are to be found among the Canadians, the Australians and the 
New Zealanders. Is it to be wondered at therefore that I feel deeply moved at 
the indignity of such men being made the sport of parti-political wire-pullers 
and intriguers.97 
In his commands in Canada and New South Wales, Hutton's imperial aspirations 
clashed with the exigencies of colonial politics and the intractable problem of control. 
In South Africa the 'intriguers' came from a new quarter. 
Generally speaking, the colonies were happy for Hutton to have command of their 
troops. Hutton felt very much at home in his brigade, remarking at how pleased the 
Australians were to see him - many of whom he took to be old friends. 98 He 
described shaking hands with a Canadian sergeant and feeling compelled to shake a 
second time, 'with such a look of sympathy between us as only we soldiers 
97 Letter, Hutton to Parkin, 19 July 1900, NAC, George Parkin fonds, MG 30 D 44, Volume 14,4269. 
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understand, and which we shall probably both remember to our dying day.' 99 He felt 
he shared an intimate connection with these men, many of whom he had led before. 
Despite the examples given earlier of resentment at Hutton's leadership style, many 
did remember him and were happy to serve under him again. lOo He received 
congratulatory cables from Australian and New Zealand premiers. Lewis, the 
Tasmanian premier, had been in Sydney at the time and remarked on the general 
delight there at Hutton's having been selected for the command. 101 Seddon wrote 
from New Zealand on a couple of occasions to express how glad he was that the 
Australian and Canadian troops were led by an officer familiar with their peculiarities 
(particularly their resistance to strict discipline) and who had imperial service 
experience.102 Seddon shared Hutton's hope in the imperial benefits flowing from his 
command: 'Their rubbing shoulders together will result in taking off corners, and is 
bound to bring about a lasting good-fellowship. This will help to improve the 
Imperialistic feeling and bind the Empire together in an indissoluble whole. ' 103 
By the beginning of June the capitals of the two Boer republics were under British 
control but several Boer commandos and their leaders remained at large. On 16 July 
Botha launched an attack, hoping to break through to Pretoria. Johannesberg was to 
have risen at the same time. 104 The Boers attacked along the length of British front 
held by Hutton at Wittport, trying to dislodge him and clear the path to Pretoria. 
Hutton weathered the assault, victorious but suffering 58 casualties - including the 
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death of Frederick Borden's son (who had joined the second Canadian contingent).105 
Hutton buried the younger Borden by torchlight in a little cemetery he established 
near his head quarters. He telegraphed his sympathy to Dr Borden and then wrote to 
Parkin of 'the irony of fate that while the father should be indicting me behind my 
back in Canada, the son should be fighting to victory at my side here in South 
Africa!' 106 
Laurier's government in Canada was indeed Hutton's one colonial opponent. Laurier 
and his ministers were furious at Hutton's appointment in cornmand of Canadian 
troops, considering it a slap-in-the-face, and they contemplated sending a formal 
complaint to the British government. 107 This opposition hardly affected Hutton, 
though. He believed he had the support of the Canadian troops themselves and, as his 
response to the younger Borden's death shows, that was what mattered to him. 
It was a delightful situation for Hutton - he had the benefit ofJeading colonial troops 
without having to contend with any colonial politicians. He expressed a great relief at 
this to Minto: 
Thank God we have no party politics here, that fatal Upas Tree, which withers 
up all discipline, comradeship, and military efficiency, is at any rate not 
indigenous to the military soil here, but its dark shade is well known to exist at 
Ottawa, and in a less degree in some of the other Colonial Capitals.108 
In his early letters home to his wife Hutton seems buoyed by the freedom of 
campaigning: 'Darling one! I feel as happy as I ever did in my life - the fresh brisk 
10' Miller suggests that had Hutton deployed more of his reserves many of those casualties would have 
been saved. Miller, Painting the Map Red, 248. 
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air, all my troops & officers about me whom I like, the responsibility & the interest of 
the Campaign.' 109 However, the tone of his letters changed as Hutton realised that he 
had a new set of obstacles to contend with in South Africa. There was a new gang of 
'intriguers.' His imperial ambitions - heightened by colonial participation in the war 
- were frustrated by the political infighting of the British army. 
The disastrous beginning to the Second South African war shook Wolseley's ring of 
officers from their perch atop the leadership ofthe British army. Buller, Wolseley's 
protege and now rival for the position of British Commander in Chief, a long-time 
friend and patron to Hutton, was disgraced by the series of defeats that befell his army 
in the Black Week of 1899. After Black Week, Lord Frederick Roberts was sent with 
reinforcements and orders to take command in South Africa.' 10 Roberts had vied with 
Wolseley for decades over the direction of the British army and he had built up his 
own gang of officers loyal to him. He had famously attacked the Cardwell reforms, 
and by implication Wolseley, at a dinner at Mansion House in February 1881, given 
in his honour after Afghanistan. This launched twenty years of hostility between the 
rival camps. Wolseley's military thinking, his emphasis on the creation of mobile 
field forces, had been shaped by the experience of fighting colonial wars in Africa; 
Roberts, on the other hand, had had his career in India, he believed in the paramount 
importance of maintaining the Northwest Frontier, and wanted a large army based in 
India.'" The contest between these two rings of officers was complicated further by 
Lieutenant-General Horatio Kitchener - a rising power in the army, not aligned to 
either group, who had built a public reputation based on his own success in North 
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Africa. Kitchener served as Roberts's chief of staff in South Africa and he wielded 
his own influence. 
Arriving in South Africa, finding the Wolseley ring in tatters, Hutton felt politically 
isolated: 'I am not too well pleased at my command [the brigade of British militia at 
Kimberley], but I am not in the Roberts gang - nor am I in the Egyptian circle of 
Kitchener's men. I must with God's help make the most of my chances as they are, 
hoping for the best.' 112 He was happy to serve with French, an independent minded 
man and a fellow admirer of Lord Wolseley, but Roberts blamed French for his 
failure to capture Boer leaders at the battle of Poplar Grove, and Hutton feared that 
their role in the advance would be minimized. I 13 
Hutton found constant irritation in Roberts and his band. He resented the fact that 
those officers, men who had opposed the mounted infantry movement, who had 
'always scoffed at our efforts to create a mobile infantry from our regular infantry 
Battalions, are the very men who are now profiting by our determination and 
foresight.,114 Roberts became very keen on mounted infantry and encouraged the 
colonies to send their contingents in that fonn. 115 Years after the war Hutton 
attributed the success of the whole war to his own mounted infantry refonns: 'It has 
been said that the successful issue of the South African War was largely due to the 
principles and practice of Mounted Infantry which had been introduced into the 
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training of the Army twelve years before.' I 16 Hutton saw the success of mounted
infantry in South Africa as a personal victory and it angered him that that success was
not rewarded: 'The creation of Mounted Infantry which has alone enabled our Troops
to succeed in this Campaign was solely and entirely mine, yet my Mtd Inf Command
has been allowed to dwindle away to some 800 men.' 117
Hutton was also critical ofthe way Roberts prosecuted the campaign, accusing him of
'a want of energy and directness ofplan which is very conspicuous and differs from
Lord Wolseley.,1l8 He felt that Roberts's patronage ofhis friends, particularly
Lieutenant-General Ian Hamilton and Major-General Reginald Pole Carew, extended
to jealously denying Hutton any credit for his own successes and those ofhis brigade.
When it was mooted that a colonial detachment should travel to London for a public
parade Hutton hoped for the command but doubted that, 'the Field Marshal [Roberts]
will give me any prominence, or recognize my connection with them. To do so would
be to bring some notoriety which he is always so careful to reserve for his immediate
clique.' 119 Ofhis work with French, Hutton complained:
I feel certain that our combined work therefore will be ignored as much as is
possible. Everything is sacrificed to Ian Hamilton & Pole Carew. The
Commander in Chief seems to believe that there are no other Generals to whom
he owes anything but his old personal staff. At any rate I am quite prepared to
find that all allusion to French and his column has been reduced in the official
telegrams to the smallest dimensions, & with this silence will of course be
included all allusion to my splendid fighting brigade with its magnificent
116 E. Hutton, 'Notes upon the evolution ofMounted Infantry', 23 May 1907, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD
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representative troops from all our self governing colonies & the Imperial
interests thus entailed. 12o
The immediate source of Hutton' s irritation with the Roberts gang was Ian Hamilton.
Hutton's mounted infantry brigade was nominally part of Hamilton's mounted
infantry division. It was a large division, and Hutton was generally permitted to
operate independently, but Hamilton commandeered many of Hutton's units (he took
control of two of Hutton's four corps) and Hutton chafed constantly against his
command. He resented Hamilton, a man with little experience ofmounted infantry,
for getting a command that he felt was rightfully his. 121 Hamilton was very close to
Roberts (his former ADC and Military Secretary) and Hutton saw him as the Field
Marshal's 'left hand man' - acting for him behind the scenes. 122 He felt that
Hamilton was intriguing to keep him in the background, deliberately preventing him
from having access to either Kitchener or Roberts. 123 Hutton found his force
repeatedly plundered to strengthen Hamilton's column.!" He tried to resist Hamilton
by unsuccessfully appealing to Kitchener, asking that his brigade be given back a
mounted infantry corps, arguing that French needed his assistance and that, 'There is
again the importance of the Colonial representatives being associated together during
the present campaign which is I know one of the most valuable factors in the
organisation of the Brigade in its relation to the future defence ofthe Empire and the
Imperial policy of the British Govermnent.' The association ofcolonial military
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forces would contribute, he argued, 'more than anything else to the consolidation of
the military forces of the Empire.' 125
This was the most galling aspect of the problem for Hutton. He believed that his
attempts at fostering greater imperial defence cooperation were being obstructed by
the intrigues of a self-interested gang ofofficers. In his appointments in New South
Wales and Canada Hutton had directly appealed to the press in order to reach the
public and push his reforms. Hutton shared this strategy with many of his felIow
officers: his direct superior in South Africa, French, wrote him: 'I quite agree with
you that the only way to get real Reforms is to work the People for alI they're
worth.'!" Roberts and his gang hogged the limelight in South Africa. Hutton
repeatedly complained ofthis, writing, 'As for my Brigade and myself the very least
possible has been said as to our part in the triumphant advance.' 127 No
correspondents travelIed with Hutton's forces and he believed this the result of a
'determination of someone at Head Quarters to under-rate, and minimize alI my
work.,128 Hutton scoured the papers looking for a report of this victory at Riet Vlei,
which he thought the'greatest coup ofthis phase of the War', and discovered that, 'so
far as the Public is concerned, my part in the Campaign is kept studiously in the
background.t'j" In Hutton's scheme, Roberts pandered to the popularity of the
colonial regiments without understanding their true importance, 'Ofcourse the little
man made some pretty remarks to the Canadians; meant for the Press, but kindly in
I2S Letter, Hutton to Kitchener, 31 May 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50086, 312.
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manner as he is I never feel that he has any real sympathy in me or in anything I
dO.'130 Hutton despaired that it seemed from the papers that he had done nothing.l'"
Hutton was not just interested in the publicity of imperial issues. He was also
concerned that, without public exposure, he would not gain professional advancement
and personal recognition from the campaign.Y He felt under appreciated, 'I do not
seem to possess the knack of getting rewards & recognition for all that I have done for
the Army, for Australia, for Canada & for the Empire. I have made so many
sacrifices, have taken distinct lines so frequently, & have carried great & useful
measures so often - yet others are preferred to me. So it is here!' 133 He hoped to be
promoted to major-general at the end of the campaign and also longed for a
K.C.M.G., in recognition ofhis work in New South Wales; and he asked his wife to
wield her social influence to that end: 'Between ourselves I shd rather have a
K.C.M.G. than anything else after this campaign as it would be some small
recognition of the part I played in Australia in bringing on Federation, & be some
compensation for the treatment I received in Canada for compelling a reluctant
French-Canadian Govt to send Troops to South Africa.' 134 Hutton suspected that the
'jealousy ofme by the Roberts set' would prevent any official recognition ofhis
services, '& only a very scanty appreciation shown for the splendid troops which I
have had under me.' 135 In the end he was proved right - missing out on the major-
general's list and being passed over by many of his contemporaries.l" French, on the
other hand, thanks to the publicity surrounding his early successes, returned to
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London a hero, receiving two knighthoods in as many years and honorary doctorates
from Oxford and Cambridge. 137
Hutton, discouraged by these intrigues and set backs, looked to escape to an
appointment as commandant of the post-federation Australian army: 'I want to be quit
of it all, and would gladly go to Australia if asked, and shake the S.A. dust and
discredit off.' 138 He believed he was very popular in Australia and would be
welcomed as commander of the new federal army. 139 In July he dined with Major Lee
and the officers ofthe NSW Lancers who pressed him to return to Australia.14o In the
same month he received a missive from Colonel Waddell in Sydney encouraging him
in such a hope. Waddell wrote that all in New South Wales longed for his return to an
Australian command: 'With Federation and a good man at the head the Australian
Army can be made something ofa credit to the Empire, and we all hope that it will
fall to your lot to command it.,141 Hutton imagined that Australia would be the next
step in furthering his cooperative scheme for the defence of the Empire.
The last conventional campaign of the Second South African war was fought in
August and September around Middelburg - against Boer forces led by Louis Botha.
Hutton's last action was at Kaapsche Hoofin September. His brigade's advance
forced the Boers to abandon their position there and (according to Hutton), 'with it all
hope ofpreventing the further advance ofour Troops, and the collapse of the
137 Holmes, The Little Field Marshal, 118.
138 Letter, Hutton to wife, 31 August 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50091, 255.
139 Letter, Hutton to wife, I July 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50091, 171.
140 Letter No. 33, Hutton to wife, 28 July 1900, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215,
Vol. 3, 38.
14' Letter, Waddell to Hutton, 5 July 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50096, 255.
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Transvaal Republic.' 142 After the campaign there were no armies left to fight in South
Africa - the war became one of occupation and counter-insurgency. Hutton's force
was broken up in October and he was allowed to return home. Hutton was relieved,
'Everyone is very complimentary, & I verily believe that French and I are about the
only two Generals, who have not come in for hostile criticism - based upon some
shortcomings or pseudo disasters!' 143
Despite the personal professional frustrations of South Africa Hutton believed that he
had achieved something for the Empire by his South African service. He had led the
brigade of his dreams - a mounted force representing 'the vast range ofthe world
wide British Empire' - on a successful campaign, 'consistent with the just aspirations
ofour self governing colonies,' to ensure that:
Among al1 these [military setbacks] will always remain the feeling that,
whatever the ebb and flow of war, this at least is certain viz that where
the Union Jack flies, and British hearts beat there Britons mean to stand
- shoulder to shoulder - back to back - and if necessary fight the world
at large.!"
He had come to South Africa with the imperial purpose ofproving the value ofhis
plans to reform the British and colonial militias, in order to provide a mobile field
force capable of defending the Empire against the new threats arising in Europe.
Hutton was driven by fears for British security that he conceptualised in racial terms -
he demonised the Boer and sought to re-establish British racial prestige. He felt it his
duty to prove the value ofmounted infantry, of militia, and ofthe colonial soldiery,
142 Letter No. 40, Hutton to wife, 14 September 1900, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS
1215, Vol. 3, 98.
143 Letter, Hutton to wife,S October 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50091, 286.
144 Letter, Hutton to Parkin, 24 October 1900, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50083, 214.
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and he believed it vital that his brigade be conspicuously successful. The extent of his
adherence to his imperial mission is witnessed in its association in his mind with the
will of Providence. God might have been on his side, but the hierarchy of the British
army was not and Hutton suffered for his loyalty to Wolseley. In New South Wales
and in Canada Hutton's imperial dreams had met the political reality of the colonies;
in South Africa those dreams foundered upon the political rocks of the British army.
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7. Australia's General Officer Commanding: 1902 to 1904
I was on the point of saying that I had been with the Australian troops since their
genesis, but to this I can hardly lay claim, for the foundation of the forces which
gained such fame on the fields of Gallipoli, Palestine and France was laid a very long
time ago; and in this connection I feel there is no name which deserves to be more
remembered and honoured than that of General Hutton, to whom I am sure you will
be glad to pay tribute this evening ... I know with what an unremitting attention,
energy, and great ability he applied himself to his work until he had seen the
foundation thoroughly well laid, the results of which we see in the Australian
Imperial Force. I
Lieutenant-General Birdwood, 1920
General Birdwood, commander of the ANZAC and Australian Corps in the Great
War, was perhaps overgenerous in his praise of Edward Hutton's work in establishing
an Australian army after federation. His description chimes with Hutton's own
estimation ofhis legacy but perhaps that is reason enough to doubt it. Inflated though
it may be, it nevertheless highlights the important work Hutton did do and the great
influence he wielded over many leading Australian officers, including William
Bridges and Brudenell White. It is, moreover, notable in the way it points to Hutton's
great hopes for his command in Australia. This was the end he had hoped to achieve.
En route to Australia in January 1902 Hutton confessed these aspirations to the
famous imperial propagandist, George Parkin, 'No one except Mr Chamberlain & a
few behind the scenes knows as you know the enormous responsibilities, present and
future, which are involved by the success or otherwise ofmy undertaking. To have a
distinct & determining influence in the destinies of a young & vigorous Nation, such
as the Commonwealth of Australia, is a grave and serious issue indeed!,2
The Australian command was the summit of Hutton's colonial career. Fighting in
South Africa, he had yearned for the post, longing for a blank slate upon which he
could inscribe his cooperative system for imperial defence. In attempting to apply his
I Address, W. Birdwood, 21 February 1920, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50089, 34.
2 Letter, Hutton to Parkin, 8 January 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50083, 236.
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scheme, Hutton connected and conflicted with the agendas of both the British and
Australian governments. As in his previous commands, it was largely on the issue of
control that Hutton differed from his hosts. However, this conflict took a new form in
Australia. Hutton became embroiled in a battle for control over the shaping of the
new Australian army.
On 1 March 1901 the Commonwealth Government assumed control over the
previously distinct defence forces ofthe former colonies. John Forrest, the Defence
Minister, became de-facto Commander in Chief. Defence had been an important spur
to federation but it was no priority for the new government. Forrest had actually
swapped to defence hoping that it would prove less taxing than his previous role as
postmaster-general.3 The Barton Protectionist government had a majority in the
House of Representatives but only a third or so of the Senate seats; Reid's Free Trade
party sat in opposition and the Labor party, split on the fiscal question, was vital to the
passage of Barton's bills. This political environment limited the government's
program: it avoided controversial policy and spent most of its political energies on the
passage of the White Australia legislation. The government was also hamstrung
financially: the Braddon clause returned three quarters of commonwealth tariff
revenue to the states and a prolonged drought was depressing the economy. In its
early administration of defence the government was therefore conservative. Atkinson
terms it the 'Federalist' phase of Australian defence policy: careful, unimaginative,
inexpensive and firmly based on colonial experience."
3 F. Crowley, Big John Forrest, University ofWest Australia Press, Nedlands, 2000, 303.
4 L. Atkinson, 'Australian Defence Policy: A Study ofEmpire and Nation (1897-1910)', PhD Thesis,
ANU, 1964,81.
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Forrest did set about drafting a Defence Bill for the Commonwealth but it was largely
just an amalgam of the views of the various states' General Officers Commanding.
When introducing this bill to the House on 9 July 1901 Forrest sounded embarrassed,
confessing to a lack of expertise in military matters and admitting that he had taken
the portfolio expecting it to be a sinecure. He announced his intention to keep a tight
grip on his department's spending and to favour the development of a citizen-style
defence force, believing it the most economical and publicly acceptable model, and
one proven by Australia's experience of the war in South Africa. 5 This first Defence
Bill floated about parliament for some months and was eventually allowed to lapse.
A defence task that the government did pursue with vigour was the appointment of a
commander for its forces. One of Forrest's first actions as minister was to send a
request to the British government for a suitable officer. The Australians were quite
specific in the type of man they wanted: one with experience in the Second South
African War, sympathy for civilian military forces, and a workmanlike attitude. They
disdained the frills and expense of a society general. Hopetoun, the Governor
General, had contacted Chamberlain privately with a further request: he asked that the
new general not be one 'who would go in for speech making, or have any sort of truck
with the press."
This requirement seems to have ruled Hutton out of the early running. At this stage,
Hutton's career was in trouble. He had missed out on promotion after South Africa
and Wolseley, his mentor and patron, was one ofthe war's political casualties.
Wolseley had publicly challenged Lansdowne's position as Secretary ofState for
'Speech, Forrest to House of Represeutatives, 9 July 1901, CPD, Volume 2, 2159-61.
6 Letter, Hamilton to Hutton, 13 January 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50086, 376.
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War, arguing that, as the Commander in Chief, he should not be overruled on matters
of grave importance and he had asserted his right to make his case directly to the
public in such an event. 7 Wolseley's position had resonated with Hutton who wrote
to him and claimed to have fought for the very same principles in his own conflicts
with ministers in New South Wales and Canada. Hutton congratulated Wolseley on
insisting that the military chief control training, discipline and appointments. These
matters were vital, Hutton insisted, 'to the future of the Army as a Profession, and
with them are bound up the security nay! the very existence of the British Empire."
In fact, Wolseley's disgrace demonstrates how out of step Hutton's ideas on military-
civilian relations had now become. Having witnessed the effects of this in Hutton's
tumultuous command in Canada, Chamberlain now resisted his appointment to
Australia." It seemed that Hutton's only chance of gaining the post was if all the other
contenders declined. 10
And luckily for him most did. A succession of British generals followed Major-
General Pole Carew, favoured for the post by Lord Roberts (Wolseley's replacement
as British Commander in Chief), in refusing the meagre salary on offer. An
exasperated Chamberlain confessed to Hopetoun that, '1 do not believe a good man
can be obtained for less than £3500 or £3000 at least.' II The Australians in their turn
also became frustrated: 'The War Office has treated us most [word obscured] in the
matter of the New Commandant & appears,' Alfred Deakin complained to Charles
Dilke, 'only anxious to find a well paid officer for some of their privileges instead of
7 H. Strachan, The Politics ofthe British Army, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, 104.
8 Letter, Hutton to Wolseley, 6 March 1901, BL, Hutton Papers, AD 50085.
9 Letter, Chamberlain to Hopetoun, 15 January 1902, SLNSW, Joint Copying Project, Hopetoun
Papers, TD 73/91/9.
10 Letter, Kitson to Minto, 2 December 1901, NLS, Lord Minto Papers, MS 12579,276.
II Letter, Chamberlain to Hopetoun, I August 1901, BUL, Chamberlain Papers, JC 11/28/5 and
Roberts Minute, 7 August 1901, JC 11/28/12.
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seeking to give us the most efficient man to organise our raw material.' 12 When his
name finally came up Hutton fairly jumped at the opportunity. His sense of mission
overrode qualms about the poor pay and conditions. Even when his attempts to
include a British staff officer or two, or even just his choice of an aide de camp
(which was customary), with his appointment were rebuffed and the Australian
government insisted he come alone, he assented.
These circumstances surrounding Hutton's appointment were significant. The
Australian government was restricted by its budget; however, it was not simply a case
of forced economy: parliament did not want to pay any more. They refused to pay for
the social life of a 'gold-lace soldier.' 13 The government simply wanted a capable
soldier with experience of the recent war. 14 They also insisted that an entirely local
staff should assist their commander and, most importantly, they wanted someone who
appreciated citizen soldiers.i'' Underlying these attitudes was a distrust of the War
Office and distaste for its bureaucracy. In a large measure these attitudes arose from
Australian perceptions of the South African campaign. Understanding the Australian
response to the Second South African War goes a long way in explaining their
relationship with Hutton during his tenure as General Officer Commanding.
The Australian response to the British crisis in South Africa in 1899 had been one of
overwhelming support. This continued through the campaign and was surer than
support even in Britain itself. Hutton remarked to the Duke of Connaught in April
12 Letter, Deakin to Dilke, 16 October 1901, BL, Dilke Papers, MSS 43877, 166.
13 'A Risky Experiment', The Sunrise, 7 December 1901, NLA, Hullon Letters and Press Cuttings, MS
1215, Vol. 1900-4,32.
14Daily Telegraph, 11 September 1901, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 1900-
4.
" Daily Telegraph 10 September 1901, NLA, Hutton Lellers and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 1900-
4.
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1902 that: 'The Military Enthusiasm and patriotic feeling throughout Australia is
positively refreshing after reading the pro-Boer speeches in the English papers and the
traitorous effervescence of the Irish M.P. in the House of Commons.' 16 This near
unqualified endorsement of the British position did not, however, mean an uncritical
attitude to the actual conduct of the British campaign. British defeats at the hands of
Boer commandos tarnished Australian perceptions of the War Office, which to them
became a sort ofbungling, over-bureaucratised joke.17 The British officer was seen
as all frills, good on the parade ground but a liability in actual war.
Juxtaposed against the failures of the British professional system were the perceived
successes ofthe Boer guerrillas, and the Australian, New Zealander and Canadian
amateur citizen soldiers.l" Australia developed a belief in the native fighting quality
of its men that was very similar to the Canadian militia myth voiced by Sam Hughes.
They concluded that in any future war Australia could usefully contribute a low cost,
volunteer, amateur contingent, paid for from Imperial coffers, and that this would be
more than sufficient to fulfil her imperial obligations. This engendered a belief that
excessive spending on an Australian military was wasteful and showy. It removed
much ofthe urgency from the early defence debates.l" It created tension between
Australia's professional and civilian officers. And it led to calls for a more
democratic army, with a contracted staff and headquarters, and a smaller officer
corps.
16 Letter, Hutton to Duke ofConnaught, 29 April 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078, 63.
17 Letter, Clarke to Hutton 5 August 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50082, 293.
IS R. Norris, The Emergent Commonwealth; Australian Federation: Expectations and Fulfilment 1889-
1910, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1975, 123.
19N. Meaney, A History ofAustralian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901-23, v. 1: The Search for
Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1976,40.
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This citizen army model was particularly popular with the Labor party who, according
to Sydenham Clarke (now Governor ofVictoria), favoured, 'rifle clubs as the
Australian military ideal, & they regard the elements of discipline with abhorrence. ,20
Democratic defensive ideals were well suited to this party and they took the 'lessons'
of the South African campaign further than most. The first federal Labor caucus
added a commitment to a citizen army to its platform." Tennyson (Australia's second
Governor General) feared that the 'the Labour party, who are the real dictators of
policy to this Government, view with no favour any permanent force whatever.'22
Labor's powerful position in the parliament caused these prejudices to limit the kind
ofdefence policy Barton's government could hope to achieve.P
The British authorities, for their part, drew quite different conclusions from the
Second South African War.
An idea held by the British in common with the Australians was a respect for the
Australian soldier, particularly in a mounted role. This respect was coloured by views
on race. The white citizens of the Empire were deemed intellectually and morally
suited to the conditions modern warfare. Lord Brassey, for example, suggested to the
Colonial Defence Committee that Australians were better equipped than the Indian
army for 'irregular warfare, where all would depend on individual energy, resources,
and courage. ,24 British fears about an impending war on the continent made these
20 Letter, Clarke to Chirol, 27 August 1903, BL, Clarke papers, ADD 50831, 170-80.
21 R. McMullin, So Monstrous a Travesty: Chris Watson and the world's first national labour
§overnment, Scribe, Melbourne, 2004, 60.
2 Private Despatch, Tennyson to Chamberlain, 25 February 1903, NLA, Tennyson Papers, MS 479,
Series 3, 41.
23 Letter, Barton to Tennyson, 26 May 1903, NLA, Tennyson Papers, MS 479/5/97.
24 Letter, Brassey to Colonial Defence Conunittee, 8 August 1898, TNA, PRO, CAB 11/121, Colonial
Troops for Imperial Service in War 1898-1900.
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racially-based assessments ofAustralian soldiery all the more important because of a
widespread belief that only white troops could successfully face the professional
armies of Europe. This was made clear in a number of Colonial Defence Committee
memoranda, for example:
For such purposes, troops despatched by the self-governing Colonies would be
of special value: no European Power other than Great Britain is in a position to
draw on large communities of white subjects outside Europe for military
assistance, and the action of expeditionary forces based on Australasian and
Canadian ports might be ofgreat importance during the early stages ofa war.2S
The British assessment of the value of Australian troops was qualified, however, by
the beliefthat training, equipment and leadership were all still essential to their
military success. Colonial irregulars had been sufficient to fight Boers, but the well-
trained armies of Europe were quite a different foe. By 1902, many in Britain had
come to regret the attitudes that their enthusiastic praise of the colonial contingents
had helped to foster. Clarke's remark was typical: 'By the by, the silly despatches of
the early days from S.Africa which gave us to understand that only the Colonial
Imperial Volunteers and such like did anything played its mischiefhere. The
Australians, many ofthem, believe that they were the only real soldiers, and the belief
is not good for them. They are quite unfit, in training, & discipline to meet good
regular troops. ,26 Hutton was warned before he came to Australia that this praise of
the inherent soldierly qualities of the Australian troops had generated a belief that all
that was necessary for an Australian defence policy was a body ofriflemen and that
2S Confidential Memorandwn, 'Colonial Troops for Imperial Service in War', 13 June 1902, No. 293
M, TNA, PRO, CAB 8/3.
26 Letter, Clarke to Bridge, 8 August 1903, NMM, Bridge Papers, BRI/I8.
230
the rifle clubs could furnish a sufficient force?? Convincing the Australians to
seriously undertake the equipment and organisation of their forces threatened to be a
difficult task.
Nevertheless, the ready response of the colonies to British calls for help had been
heartening. It encouraged the home authorities to believe that such help would always
be forthcoming:
The present war in South Africa has demonstrated the fact that the
defence of the British Empire in the future is not a question to be left
wholly to the people ofthe British Isles, but that the English-
speaking people throughout the Empire are willing to take their share
in its defence, and provide the men, and possibly the money,
therefore.f
Wolseley put it to Hutton in 1902 that, 'We cannot do too much to foster a love for
England in every part of our Empire, as long as we, like a bundle of sticks, keep
together, we can afford to laugh at all combinations of nations that may be made with
hostile intentions towards this country.'29
Believing that colonial help would be ready to hand, several British officers and
politicians drew up schemes to coordinate that assistance. The War Office received a
range of different schemes relating to Australia, from, among others, Lord Brassey
(then Governor of Victoria), Colonel Gordon (the South Australian Commandant),
Colonel Mackey (of the NSW Lancers), and Major-General French (Hutton's
27 Letter, Downes to Hutton, 21 December 1901, B1." Hutton Papers, ADD 50097, 105.
28 Letter, Brassey to Colonial Defence Committee, 8 August 1898, TNA, PRO, CAB 11/121, Colonial
Troops for Imperial Service in War 1898·1900.
29 Letter, Wolseley to Hutton, 9 January 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50085,184.
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successor to the New South Wales commandj.i'' Many overtures were made to
Hutton - after he arrived in Australia - highlighting the importance of solid
commitments. General Nicholson, Head of the Intelligence Branch of the War Office,
for example, remarked on the fact that the Australian Government still left the
decision to send troops to the moment of crisis and noted:
Our view here is that it is desirable that that authority should be able to rely for
certainty on Colonial contingents ofdefinite strength being available for
defensive or offensive operations in any part of the world as soon as the Navy
has acquired such command of the sea as will permit of the transmarine
movement of troops.' I
Lord Roberts wrote to Hutton the following year regretting the fact that Britain lacked
formal guarantees of Australian assistance and must therefore leave her out of its
general contingency planning.Y And the British government's Royal Commission
into the Second South African War, impressed by the colonial contingents, sought
information from Hutton as to the likely support Britain would receive in the future.r'
It complained that more formal arrangements for colonial military contributions were
not forthcoming." British authorities therefore desired formal commitments oftroops
that they could include in their war plans and figure into defence spending. In trying
to formalise colonial assistance, however, these plans went against one of the main
conclusions the Australians had drawn from South Africa, that assistance for imperial
defence should be voluntary and tendered at the time ofactual need.
30 Confidential Memorandum, 'Australia: Defence Forces and Defences', 30 March 1901, No. 254 M,
TNA, PRO, CAB 8/3.
31 Letter, Nicholson to Hutton, 10 June 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50086.
32 Letter, Roberts to Hutton, 12 December 1903, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50085.
33 Despatch, Onslow to Termyson, 16 January 1903, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50082, 55; and Letter,
Darley to Hutton, 4 December 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50082, 222.
34 Letter, Brodrick to Hutton, 12 November 1903, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50085, 46.
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Hutton was aware of these contrasting approaches to the recent war. Like the
Australians, he was enthused by the success of colonial mounted units in South Africa
and, like the War Office and the home authorities, he felt that such units must be
properly trained, equipped and organised to be of use in a continental war. He
suggested this in strong terms to his minister, Forrest: 'The utter fallacy of the
argument as regards land militia has been proved over & over again in history, &
recently in South Africa the value of Militia Troops, when led by trained &
experienced officers, has been proved beyond all cavil. ,35 In his first Australian
annual report Hutton declared:
The strong leavening ofofficers and men who have served well and with
distinction in the campaign in South Africa affords a valuable element towards
insuring success in a national emergency. It would be wrong, however, to
suppose that a few individuals, however excellent, can in themselves make an
efficient military organization, or form a substitute for a sound system of
military training and instruction."
On the other hand, Hutton had come to believe, unlike many in the British
administration, that a formal assurance of Australian assistance was not necessary.
He had faced this problem in New South Wales and in Canada and he realised that
such a cession of control ran against the constitutional grain:
I am absolutely convinced that given a National Emergency involving a menace
to the unity and solidarity of the Empire that Australia would be found
determined at all hazards to take a foremost part, and that any Government
which advocated any other policy would not last a week... It is however idle to
35 Letter, Hutton to Forrest, II April 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50084 [Hutton's emphasis).
36 'Annual Report upon the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia: January 1902 to 30
April 1903', Printed by order of the Goverrunent ofAustralia, I May 1903,30.
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imagine that any self-governing Colonies whether it be Canada or whether it be
Australia will for a moment admit the right of the Imperial Government to bind
them to defined military assistance without representation in the Imperial
Councils which may make such assistance necessary. In other words the
Military assistance to be rendered in time ofNational Emergency by either
Canada or Australia must be purely one of sentiment and self-interest so long as
the existing condition of non-representation continues.I'
Hutton's solution was to circumvent the problem. He envisaged an Australian army
organised along such lines that, although it was not committed in advance, should war
break out it would be ready to immediately come to the assistance of the Empire. As
in New South Wales and Canada, he planned an Australian field force capable of
overseas service. In a letter to Brodrick he summarised his intentions:
Military instinct and sentiment is at its height and there is no question now as in
1893-96 of endeavouring to create interest in defence matters. There is however
a generally accepted idea that the Australian Military Forces should be utilized
only for the defence ofAustralia and that in the event of assistance being
required in any National Emergency outside Australia that volunteer forces
should be raised to meet the occasion. This was done as you know in the later
phases of the war with the result that the Australian Troops necessarily partook
more or less of Irregulars. Under such conditions military assistance given from
Australia in any War involving a Campaign against European or similarly
trained and organised troops would be of comparatively small value.
37 Letter, Hutton to Darley, 20 January 1903, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50082 [Hutton's emphasis).
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I need hardly say that you may rely on me to do my utmost to induce the
Commonwealth Government and public opinion generally to take a broad view
of military defence and that I will leave no stone untumed to compass that end.
I will further do my best to develop the mounted troops in Australia and to have
the forces trained and available here for such services as the Australian
Government may allot, and organised on such a system that the whole or part
may be available for rendering valuable assistance to the Empire in the hour of
need. 38
In taking this approach Hutton did not believe he was entirely hoodwinking his
govemment. His proposed army was perfectly suited to participating in imperial
defence but it also had a legitimate local defensive function. Balancing promises to
officers and politicians back home to furnish a sizeable Australian field force (such
as: 'I can promise you 10000 Australians who shall, please God, in 18 months be
available to do good service... What did you think of the German cavalry? I should
like to have a tum at them with one good Cavalry Brigade and 10,000 Colonials, but
led by Imperial Officers! ,39) was a genuine belief that an Australian field force would
also be a worthwhile local asset. Hutton was both an ambitious officer, seeking to
impress his masters and to build a field force to fight the armies of Europe; and he
was a believer in Greater Britain, and in the development ofAustralia as a portion of
that greater imperial nation. Hutton spoke frequently of the rising threat posed by
Japan and the likelihood of future conflict in the Pacific: 'I look upon Australia,' he
wrote, 'if strong in a military sense as she should be, as the necessary counterpoise to
38 Letter, Hutton to Brodrick, 30 July 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50085.
39 Letter, Hutton to French, 25 September 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50086, 346.
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Japan in the course of the next Century. ,40 In 1902 he confided to Minto privately his
concerns about 'the East': that the Japanese ascension, the opening up of China, and
the new Panama Canal combined 'to make this particular epoch a very critical &
fateful period. The power & influence of Australia must necessarily be in direct ratio
to its military power as well as its commercial influence.'41 Hutton's proposed field
force was not simply a Trojan horse designed to unwittingly send Australian soldiers
off to a continental war. It also had the local purpose, related to Hutton's vision of
Greater Britain, of enabling Australia to defend her comer of the Empire.42
Australia, Britain and Hutton, therefore, took contrasting views on the form that
colonial military assistance to the Empire should take. These views were informed by
differing perspectives on the success of the colonial forces in South Africa. The
Australians believed that in a campaign of British blunders their volunteer forces had
been singularly successful and were not willing, ahead of time, to allow the British
government, or the War Office, a free hand in disposing oftheir military resources.
They took the success of their militiamen and bushmen as justification for an
economical approach to the construction of their new army, based on a citizen army
model. Britain was grateful for colonial assistance, hoped it might be forthcoming
again, and sought to build on that success by formalising the arrangement. They
believed that, to be effective, colonial forces must be properly trained and disciplined.
Hutton also hoped to establish a professional militia army. However, he was willing
to accept that colonial assistance could be tendered voluntarily, at the time of need.
Once again he endeavoured to implement his cooperative scheme ofdefence. These
were different approaches, not to the question of whether Australia would come to the
40 Letter, Hutton to Minto, 27 March 1901, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50081, 29.
41 Letter, Hutton to Minto, 10 January 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50081, 75.
42 Letter, Hutton to Parkin, 8 January 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50083, 237.
236
Empire's aid, but how it would do so. These three different answers would exercise a
profound influence on Hutton's Australian command.
Hutton arrived in Melbourne on 29 January 1902 and for the first few months of his
command he enjoyed remarkably clear sailing. A fortnight before his arrival,
Chamberlain had requested additional Australian contingents for South Africa and the
Barton government had responded with two Commonwealth contingents, and was
shortly to announce a third. Imperial sentiment was high and Hutton enjoyed a warm
reception from the public, the troops and his government.Y Hutton was particularly
pleased with the Australian press. Already friendly with Sydney newsmen, he now
became connected, through Sydenham Clarke, to David Syme, the influential
Melbourne press baron. 'I have a difficult job enough,' he confided to Buller, 'but
have one great advantage over Canada in that public life is clear and honourable here,
and that there exists an excellent and honest press. ,44 Hutton was delighted by his
initial contact with Barton and Forrest who, he claimed to Minto, assured him they
would give him ample control and would act on his recommendations.Y Clarke
summed up the optimistic mood on Hutton's arrival, 'Australia is displaying a very
fine spirit just now & I think the time is most propitious for laying the foundations of
a great organization for Australian defence. ,46
Hutton had two staunch allies assisting him in his work in Australia. Sydenham
Clarke, Governor of Victoria, was one of Britain' s most influential writers on imperial
defence. He had been important in the development of Hutton's own thinking on the
43 Letter, Hutton to Ommaney, 3 February 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078, 259.
44 Letter, Hutton to Buller, 2 October 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50086 .
., Letter, Hutton to Minto, 8 March 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50081.
46 Letter, Clarke to Hutton, 17 January 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50082.
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subject. His presence in Australia during the first two years of Hutton's command
was a great moral and intellectual support. Hutton visited Clarke most Sundays at
Shelbrooke to discuss his defence reorganisation and Australian politics. Australia's
second Governor General, Tennyson, was Hutton's other main ally. Tennyson filled a
role similar to Minto's in Canada, advising Hutton ofthe government's mood and
occasionally mediating between Hutton and his ministers. In his memoir Hutton
recalled that, 'my constant intercourse with the Governor General gave me an insight
into the attitude and ideas of the Cabinet Ministers which proved of the greatest
assistance' and 'it was largely due to him that lowed the measure of success which I
had achieved in face of almost insuperable difficulties. ,47 Tennyson was particularly
active in encouraging Forrest to adopt Hutton's suggestions for the 1903 Defence
Bil1.48
Everything therefore augured well for Hutton's command and he became hopeful of
success. Most significantly, the Barton government initially seemed prepared to go
along with Hutton's program. After his first official meetings he wrote to the
Colonial Office assuring them that 'the Government here are prepared to approach the
Defence System of Australia upon a broad basis. ,49 And he had some grounds for this
claim. The government decided to postpone its Defence Bill to allow Hutton to
redraft it and to remove clauses restricting the use of Australian forces to home
waters. 50 Edmund Barton borrowed Hutton's writings on imperial defence and used
them extensively in a speech to welcome Hutton at a banquet on 15 February 1902.
Barton ensured that the press received the speech and he informed Hutton privately
47 E. Hutton, 'Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hutton', BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50113,
Period VIII, 10 & 18.
48 Letter, Tennyson to Forrest, I July 1903, NLA, Forrest papers, MFM G660.
49 Letter, Hutton to Ommaney, 24 February 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078.
50 Letter, Hutton to Brodrick, 24 February 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50085.
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that he intended that it announce the policy ofhis government. 51 In that speech
Barton declared his determination to make Australia, 'the headquarters of the Empire
in these southern seas'; he echoed Hutton's insistence on a properly trained militia,
'we could not make a nation of soldiers by rifle shooting alone'; and, referring to
South Africa, he claimed that Australia, though it would not enter every small war,
must be ready to send troops to defend the Empire again. 52 Hutton wrote to Brodrick,
the Secretary of State for Defence, sending press extracts of the speech and indicated
that the government had already acquiesced to his proposal for a force of 20,000
mounted men 'equipped and organised for service wherever Australian interests are
threatencd.Y' At the beginning of March, Hutton enthused, 'The change in public
opinion here in Australia, which this War has brought about, is truly remarkable. It
will moreover develop still more.'54
For the next few months it appeared as though it just might. Hutton was very lucky to
have as his minister one of the staunchest imperialists in the government. In 1902,
John Forrest was developing his minute on Naval Defence. This led to the
restructuring of Australia's naval agreement with Britain. Forrest sought out the
advice of Sydenham Clarke on the question.55 He also approached Hutton and in
April Hutton assisted with the drafting of the minute. Hutton was impressed with it
and likened it to his own views on defence: '[it] is based upon a System of Co-
operation.t " Forrest's naval minute was very imperial and in its sentiments it nicely
matched the military changes Hutton hoped to make:
51 Letter, Hutton to Ommaney, 24 February 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078.
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In regard to Defence we must altogether get rid of the idea that we have
different interests to those of the rest of the Empire, and we must look at the
matter from a broad common standpoint. If the British nation is at war, so are
we; if it gains victories or suffers disasters, so do we, and therefore it is of the
same vital interest to us as to the rest of the Empire that our supremacy on the
ocean shall be maintained... That this is the sentiment deep-rooted in the hearts
of the Australian people, has, I am proud to say, been shown during the South
African war, which we have made our own, proving unmistakably to the world
that our interests in war as well as in peace, are indissolubly bound up with the
Country from which our fathers came, and to which we are all proud to
belong"
On 7 April 1902 Hutton delivered his own statement ofpolicy to the government, his
Minute upon the Defence ofAustralia. This minute drew from his earlier Canadian
and New South Wales policies. He warned that defence could only ever be assured
by a capacity to take the offence and argued that:
The defence of Australia cannot, moreover, be considered apart from the
defence ofAustralian interests. Australia depends for its commercial success
and its future development firstly upon its seaborne trade; and secondly upon the
existence, maintenance, and extension of fixed and certain markets for its
produce outside Australian waters.
It is hardly consistent with the present development ofAustralia as a young and
vigorous nation to neglect her responsibility for defence outside Australian
57 Letter, Forrest to Hutton, 10 April 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50084.
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waters, and in the robust period ofher youth thus to rely upon the strong arm of
the Mother Country.
It may be assumed, therefore, that Australia will determine not only to defend
her own soil, but to take steps also to defend those vast interests beyond her
shores upon maintenance of which her present existence and her future
prosperity must so largely depend. 58
Hutton proposed that a large portion of the Australian army be mounted. He
suggested that this accorded with the natural aptitudes ofAustralians and moreover it,
'provides exactly that description of fighting man which has proved so valuable in
South Africa, and which, without doubt, would constitute a most powerful, ifnot
controlling, factor in any campaign in which Australian troops might be engaged.' 59
Hutton did not baldly state that this force would be available for imperial service but
the subtext ofhis minute was clear. He explained the line he was trying to follow to
the British Secretary of State for War: 'I have been careful to avoid any direct
reference to assistance to the Empire in time ofwar except inferentially. There is a
certain section in Australia who are little Englanders & who would restrict the use of
Australian troops to Australian soil. My minute was written to prove the utter fallacy
of such principles but I have preferred to allow this inference to be drawn rather than
to actually state it. ,60
Hutton's April minute received a positive response from his government and Barton
and Forrest both congratulated him on it.61 For Hutton, the publication ofhis April
58 E. Hulton, 'Minute upon the Defence of Australia', 7 April 1902, TNA, PRO, CAB 11/24 1902-
1913.
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60 Letter, Hutton to Brodrick, 7 April 1902, BL, Hulton Papers, ADD 50085.
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minute was a milestone. He had now introduced his cooperative system ofmilitary
defence into the two key self-governing colonies. He wrote at the time of this
achievement in Biblical terms, 'The idea therefore of a Co-operative System of
Military Defence has been officially presented to both the Canadian and Australian
Governments! The good seed has taken into good ground in the Australian
Government, & if the Canadian soil in 1899 proved to be barren & stony until forced
along by the demonstration ofpublic opinion... the representatives ofboth
Governments will have had the principles of Co-operation plainly before them. ,62
Barton and Forrest were both preparing to leave for the colonial conference and
Hutton believed that with these minutes on naval and military defence they were well
equipped to discuss Imperial cooperation.f
Unfortunately for Hutton, events in London would threaten these early hopes. The
British Secretary of State for War, St John Brodrick, had decided, on the basis of the
Second South African War, that arrangements for colonial military assistance ought to
be formalised. For the last few years he had been considering the problems of
imperial defence and had actually approached Hutton in early 1901 for advice on the
question." Hutton had suggested the calling of a colonial conference to discuss a
general scheme for the defence of the Empire.i" Brodrick evidently decided that the
June 1902 colonial conference, held in conjunction with the Royal coronation, would
be a suitable forum. At that conference, he asked the assembled leaders of the
colonies for a formal contribution to imperial defence. He based his proposal on a
paper by Lieutenant-Colonel Altham, a British intelligence officer, which put the case
62 Letter, Hutton to Ommaney, 8 April 1902, BL, Hulton Papers, ADD 50078.
63 Leiter, Hutton to Ommaney, 8 April 1902, BL, Hulton Papers, ADD 50078.
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for definite colonial peacetime military commitments. Altham had discovered in
Hutton's proposed Australian field force the ideal unit for such a purpose and had
suggested renaming it the 'Imperial Australian Force' and making it available for
defensive or offensive operations in any part ofthe world. 66 Brodrick encouraged
Barton and Forrest to establish this 'Imperial Australian Force', consisting of 9,000
men ready to be handed over to War Office control in emergency.V
Barton was embarrassed by this direct request. He wrote privately and apologetically
to Chamberlain requesting a private conversation before the conference to explain,
'the reasons why we hold certain views,' and he continued, 'We should all understand
the limitations which may at the present moment hold back the completion of some
things we all want to see achieved. ,68 Believing that he could never get the Australian
parliament to acquiesce to the cession, during peacetime, of control over forces for
which it was paying, Barton ultimately rejected Brodrick's proposal. Brodrick was
bitterly disappointed and complained to Chamberlain that, 'from a military point of
view it is the wreckage ofthe scheme which would have saved us heavy
expenditure. ,69
Hutton was also disappointed by the conference but for different reasons. He was
angry that Brodrick pushed for a guarantee of Australian defence assistance. As he
confided to a fellow general, 'I fondly hoped that I had persuaded Mr Brodrick of the
absurd supposition that our Colonies would accept any definite military contribution
66 Lt-Col A1tham, 'The Organization ofColonial Troops for Imperial Service', appendix to
Memorandom No 293M, 13 June 1902, TNA, PRO, CAB 8/3.
67 Meaney, A History ofAustralian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901-23, 62.
68 Letter, Barton to Chamberlain, 9 June 1902, BUL, Chamberlain Collection, JC 17/2/4.
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to the Military strength of the Empire without due representation.' 70 He realised that
Australian public opinion would never stomach such a scheme and that there were
constitutional issues at stake, 'The cost of the system which I propose to create would
naturally fallon the Commonwealth Government, and it would equally rest with that
Government to employ their troops how or where they might decide.,71 This was why
Hutton insisted that, although he was preparing colonial troops for imperial service,
the eventual offer of such service must be voluntary. Barton mirrored Hutton's
position when rejecting Brodrick's proposal at the conference: 'Our people are like
their countrymen here, they will do much in time of warlike emergency which in time
of peace they would decline to bind themselves beforehand to accomplish.' 72
Hutton was fairly certain that, without a prior formal commitment, Australian support
could still be relied upon in emergency:
Co-operation in the Defence of the Empire under the circumstances that exist
would be solely a matter of sentiment, and in the present condition ofpublic
feeling it would be unwise to press anything more. The strongest possible
feeling of sympathy with, and determination to be considered a part of the
Empire exists in every part of Australia. This feeling has been intensified a
hundred fold by the recent Campaign and nothing has struck me so much since
my return to Australia as the extraordinary development of public feeling in this
respect."
Unfortunately for Hutton, Brodrick's overt attempts at securing colonial military
assistance impacted on his own schemes in Australia. He admitted as much to
70 Letter, Hutton to Kelly Kenny, 4 August 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50097, 163.
71 Letter, Hutton to Nicholson, 23 July 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50086.
72 Speech, Barton at Colonial Conference, 30 June 1902, BUL, Chamherlain Papers, JC 17/1/1.
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Brodrick himself, 'It is not too much to say that a serious apprehension that the
Imperial Government means to force Australia into some defined form of defensive
action in case of the Empire being threatened has been raised. This will I fear be
followed by outspoken criticism of even the indirect efforts which I have been making
to induce the Australian Parliament and public opinion to accept the fact that the
defence of Australian interests cannot be compassed by the defence ofAustralian
soil.'74 He put it in even plainer terms to his old friend, Minto, describing the
'immense harm' the proposal had had on his attempts at introducing, 'a sound military
and political system ofdefence in Australia. ,75
Brodrick's failed proposal at the colonial conference was not the only British attempt
at securing definite commitments from Australia. The British authorities continued to
press for formal defence commitments from the Australian government. For Hutton,
the most egregious of these requests arrived in early 1903. In February, Tennyson
received, for the advice of the Australian government, the remarks that the Colonial
Defence Committee had made on Hutton's April 1902 minute. All Hutton's efforts at
subtlety - at keeping imperial intentions as subtext - were quashed by the Colonial
Defence Committee's blunt remarks. They challenged Hutton's assertions ofpossible
threats to Australian security (rejecting the possibility of invasion on the grounds of
the preponderant power of the British navy) and thereby undermined the local
defensive purpose of the Australian field force. The Colonial Defence Committee
nevertheless agreed that Hutton's field force was valuable: not for Australia's own
defence, but as an addition to imperial power. Like Brodrick, the Committee drew
from the conclusions of Altham's paper when they suggested:
74 Letter, Hutton to Brodrick, 30 July 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50085.
7S Letter, Hutton to Minto, 24 August 1902, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50081.
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If it were the settled policy ofthe Commonwealth to maintain the effective
nucleus ofa force (say two mounted brigades and one infantry brigade
according to the organization discussed above) ready to be directed in the event
ofwar to any point which the Commonwealth Government might decide, this
force would form a real accession to the military strength of the Empire. In such
a case it would be possible for the Imperial authorities to assign to this
Australian Contingent a definite role in those initial strategic dispositions on
which success in war so largely depends. 76
On receiving this cable Hutton, and his vice regal friend Tennyson, were alarmed.
Just three months earlier, Hutton had submitted a scheme of reorganisation based on
his April minute. In it he had had provided for the establishment of a garrison force, a
field army (containing the mounted troops of the six states amalgamated into eighteen
Light Horse regiments), and a permanent cadre of instructors, experts and
administrators.I' Publication ofthe cable's contents threatened to disrupt those plans.
Hutton and Tennyson tried in vain to have the correspondence suppressed, fearful of
its effect on the Australian government. Tennyson cabled immediately deprecating
'most strongly' the distribution of the minute to the government, fearing 'harm to
Imperial interests.'78 Tennyson wrote to Chamberlain and described the difficulties
Hutton was already having with a parliament heavily influenced by the Labor party.
He urged that 'no impediment ought to be thrown in the way ofGeneral Hutton, who
informs me that he has received a general authority from the Minister of Defence for
76 Remark No 30 I, •Australia: Minute upon Defence by General Officer Commanding the Military
Forces', TNA, PRO, CAB 5/1 R 22/10/02.
77 'Annual Report upon the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia: January 1902 to 30
April 1903', Printed by order of the Government of Australia, I May 1903, 17.
78 Despatch, Tennyson to Colonial Office, 16 February 1903, TNA, PRO, CO 418/26.
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his plan of reconstruction of the Military Forces.' 79 Tennyson feared that 'unreliable'
members of Barton's cabinet, such as Lyne, would leak the cable to the Press and use
the opportunity to push for 'further & excessive retrenchments' in defence.8o The
Colonial Office insisted that Tennyson pass the minute on, believing that Australian
ministers should have unfettered access to the opinions of its experts." Tennsyon
then resolved, on his own authority, to present the cable only to the two most
imperial-minded members of cabinet, Barton and Forrest. He and Hutton then both
prevailed on those two to keep the matter quiet. Tennyson did this despite being
reprimanded by the Colonial Office for getting involved.82 Hutton warned Forrest
that, 'Without intending to do so the C.D.C. provide a weapon for argument on the
part of those who would abolish out Military Forces altogether, which might be used
in a manner that would most seriously embarrass you & those members of the Cabinet
who realise the necessity of Military Defence.'83 As a sweetener, a pleading Hutton
even suggested to Forrest that he might be able to lower his defence estimates for the
following year by £20,000.84 On April 1 1903 Hutton wrote with relief to the
Colonial office to say that thanks to Tennyson's influence Barton and Forrest would
keep the Colonial Defence Committee memorandum confidential.f
This relief proved premature. The remarks of the Colonial Defence Committee did
eventually get out. Forrest himselfused the remarks to force economies from Hutton
79 Private Despatch, Tennyson to Chamberlain, 25 February 1903, NLA, Tennyson Papers, MS 479,
Series 3, 41.
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when, in June, he questioned the size of Hutton's proposed field force.86 Hutton
became convinced that the embodiment of Althams proposal in the Colonial Defence
Committee memorandum hampered all his subsequent efforts at implementing his
own scheme. He wrote despairingly to the Colonial Office four months later, 'I have
done all that was possible under the circumstances to induce the Government and to
persuade the public to [adopt] a broader policy, both officially and unofficially - both
publicly and privately. Whatever hopes I may have had were, however, shattered by
Lieut. Col. Altham's proposals of 25th November 1901 which were published in full
in the Australian Press.'87
The British attempts to secure a formal military contribution from Australia therefore
affected Hutton's plans; however, suspicions about the expeditionary motives
underlying Hutton's schemes were not the only impediment to Australian acceptance
ofhis reform proposals. Finance and Australia's own response to the Second South
African War proved just as important. The Australian government was constrained in
the funds it could spend, budgets were very tight, and retrenchment was the order of
the day. In addition, the type of army that the Australians hoped to build with those
limited funds conflicted with Hutton's professional agenda.
Even during Hutton's 'honeymoon' period the government's purse strings were being
progressively drawn tighter. Less than a fortnight after Hutton triumphantly
submitted his April 1902 Minute upon the Defence ofAustralia, he sent another
minute to his minister, concerning the government's intention to cut the salaries ofhis
headquarters staff. Hutton argued that staffpositions were the summit ofmilitary
86 Atkinson, 'Australian Defence Policy', 168.
87 Letter, Hutton to Ommaney, 19 August 1903, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078.
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ambition and must be rewarded accordingly, so as to attract educated and worthy
young gentlemen. 'It is incumbent on Officers of the Head Quarters Staff,' he
insisted, 'to maintain the dignity of their high positions and responsibility which
involves considerable outlay of money on uniforms and on their personal style of
living.,88 Hutton was attempting to apply his idea of a professional officer corps in
Australia.
Huntington describes military professionalism as the middle ground between
aristocratic and democratic ideals: noble birth was no longer necessary to be an
officer but one still had to be 'respectable. ,89 Australian politicians, representatives of
one of the most advanced democracies of its day, were suspicious of Hutton's
professional model. It was imperative that they contain costs; but, in doing so, they
deliberately directed their economies at Hutton's headquarters staff and at the
permanent forces. These cuts reflected the Australian impression, borne of lessons
they drew from the Second South African War, that officers represented frills and that
staff meant red tape. Permanent forces, such as the Royal Australian Artillery, were
unnecessary when Australia's citizen soldier could provide the defence.
This perspective pervaded the 1902 estimates debates. When Forrest left for the
colonial conference in 1902 he was aware ofparliament's mood and he left
instructions to cut £130,000 from the defence estimates. Sydenham Clarke, furious at
this parsimony, frothed that the government was, 'humbly subservient to the Labour
88 Minute, Hutton to Forrest, 18 April 1902, included with Letter, Hutton to Hopetoun, SLNSW (JCP),
Hopetoun papers, m 73/91111.
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Tail.,90 The Acting Minister, William Lyne, exceeded Forrest's target when he
submitted estimates with a reduction of £175,000 to parliament. Mr Page's statement
is indicative of the debate that followed, 'We do not want a staffof curled darlings to
perform society functions, but men who will act as practical instructors to the military
forces. ,91 Members cited the experience of South Africa to demonstrate that only a
very short period was needed to 'lick men into shape [to take to the field)'; opposed
money spent on the permanent force while the citizen soldiers suffered cuts; deplored
the British army's 'smartness for the sake ofbeing smart'; and accused Hutton's staff
of creating mounds ofuseless paper work." As a result of the debate Lyne agreed to
a further reduction of £35,000 and promised to direct it mainly at the administrative
staff.93
Hutton, angry at these heavy cuts, stonewalled Lyne until Forrest's return. In late
1902, when Forrest arrived back in Australia, he and Hutton at once came into
conflict over the estimates. Forrest was now left with just £520,000 to fund his
department for the remainder of the financial year." He insisted that Hutton reduce
his staff and retire some ofhis clerks." Hutton, for his part, claimed that there was
'no possibility' that he could further reduce his staff, or clerks, and continue to fulfil
his functions as GOC. He threatened retirement (referring to the government's
difficulty in appointing a GOC in 190I), 'If the Government think that a lower tender
than my present one is possible and advisable I will gladly meet their views and make
90 Letter, Clarke to Chirol, 15 June 1902, BL, Clarke papers, ADD 50831, If. 107-12.
91 Speech, Page to House ofRepresentatives, 2 October 1902, CPD, Volume 12, 16394.
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room for another Contractor.'96 Forrest, however, stood firm and Hutton was
eventually forced to relent. Forrest explained his reasons to Hutton thus:
It is not a personal matter at all but I know what the country wants & it is
I. Permanent Garrison support to maintain in good order the forts & armaments
&c.
2. A sufficient staffof well-qualified officers & men for instructional purposes
in the various branches.
3. All the rest citizen forces.' 97
In his reply Hutton, while reluctantly conceding, revealed his own priorities:
I fully recognise the value ofCitizen Forces such as Militia and Volunteer[s] but
the defence system of Australia can never be satisfactory or effective without a
nucleus ofpermanent troops which shall include the specialists, the instructional
Corps, and the basis for your Field Force if ever it is required to engage in active
service. Experience of the recent war, and history generally if correctly read,
proves conclusively and without a shadow of doubt that a Militia or Volunteer
System such as we have here in Australia could not for one moment hold its
own in the Field as Military body against any Force which was organised,
trained and disciplined upon the lines common to all European and
Europeanized Armies. 98
Hutton resisted Australian attempts at economy in order to ensure that his field force
would be properly trained and equipped, in line with his professional ideals, and
therefore capable of assisting Britain in a European war.
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The budgetary belt was drawn even tighter around Hutton in 1903. In May he was
again ordered to reduce his headquarters staff. Once again Hutton threatened to
resign." When his Deputy Quarter Master General retired in June Hutton was not
permitted to appoint a replacement. 100 In his annual report of that year Hutton voiced
his complaints about reductions in his staff, their meagre salaries, and general
government parsimony. He declared, 'the plan adopted of reducing the Staff and
Permanent Forces, and at the same time retaining the numbers of and expenditure
upon the Citizen Forces, cannot but be viewed with the gravest apprehension.' 101
Embarrassed, Forrest refused to publish the report, and urged Hutton to alter it. This
provoked renewed disputes over money and Hutton accused the civil staffofhis
department, particularly Captain Collins, the Secretary, ofneedless penny-pinching. 102
Hutton clashed with his minister in 1903 over appointments, too. At the Victorian
Easter Camp in March, Hutton promoted a permanent officer from New South Wales,
Colonel Lee, over the head of a more senior civilian, Lieutenant-Colonel Braithwaite.
Hutton did this without consulting his government, Braithwaite complained, and on
26 March the matter came before cabinet. Once again there were rumours that Hutton
would retire. 103 The different attitudes held by Hutton and the Australians, as to the
worth of citizen soldiers, were responsible for this dispute. Hutton valued the
Australian militiaman, but only when led by a well-trained officer. For the
Australians, the worth of British professional officers had been clearly demonstrated-
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and negatively - in South Africa. Forrest made this quite clear in a letter to Hutton.
He explained that, though cabinet would probably feel bound to stand by its general,
such a decision would be 'against the grain & if it comes to a decision tomorrow it
will perhaps not be in favour of appointing Col Lee...The difficulty is 'the citizen
soldier' being overlooked or passed over.' 104
A further point of contention between Hutton and his government in 1903 was the
new Defence Bill. Hutton lobbied vigorously for a provision allowing the sending of
the field force overseas. He defended this position on the grounds of local security-
pointing to the rise of Japan and Russia, and the presence ofcontinental powers in
New Guinea and the New Hebrides - and argued that Australia must be prepared to
operate offensively in its region. lOS Hutton's main concern, however, was to enable
the field force to participate more readily in his cooperative scheme for Imperial
Defence. 'It can, moreover,' Hutton argued in his annual report, 'hardly be supposed
that Australians desire to repudiate their responsibilities as a partner of the British
Empire in regard to co-operation for defence.' 106
Forrest disagreed. He decided that only the permanent forces should be liable to
compulsory overseas service.l'" This position was not anti-imperialist. Forrest was
simply determined to retain Australian control of its forces and to preserve the
voluntary character of the Australian militia. When he launched the bill in
parliament, he did so with a hearty, imperial-minded speech: 'I am proud to say I am
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Imperialistic, in the sense that I believe in binding Australia as closely as possible to
the mother country;' but in the same breath, 'I am not prepared, however, to do
anything that would in the slightest degree limit our freedom, or interfere with our
Constitutional rights, nor would 1give up anything to which we are fairly entitled.' 108
Forrest envisaged Australian assistance in the defence of the Empire when he
described the objects of its army, but on Australia's terms, with a citizen army and
with freedom of action:
In my opinion, they are to train our citizens in the use of arms, so as to enable us
to protect and defend Australia from invasion or from hostile attack; and
secondly, that we may be able, in case ofneed, ofour own free will to assist in
maintaining the integrity and the power of our Empire. It is our Empire and not
the Empire of other people, and we are under an obligation to assist in
maintaining it, not in the interests ofothers, but in our own interests, which 1
hold, are identical with the interests of the British race. 109
The Defence Bill was amended even further during its readings to prevent any
Australian forces whatsoever being compelled to serve overseas. McCay voiced the
mood of the House when he declared than any compulsion would be a departure from
the 'public sentiment of Australia' and that, when they were needed, Australia would
have no shortage of volunteers.l" Again, this was consistent with the Australian
understanding ofthe lessons of the Second South African War. They believed that
the volunteer contingents they had raised had proved as successful as any other and
that compulsion was unnecessary. 'The Minister', declared another member of the
House, 'has before him undisputed evidence, from our experiences of the South
lOS Speech, Forrest to House ofRepresentatives, 16 July 1903, CPD, Volume 7, 2265.
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African War, as to the desire of the men to volunteer, and I do not think it is necessary
to provide a compulsory clause [for the permanents] of this description.' 1I 1
Despite all of the problems Hutton had faced he did still achieve substantial reforms
in his first two years in Australia. He organised central and district staffheadquarters,
formed the Royal Australian Artillery Regiment, introduced a general system of
military instruction, and in December 1902 his Peace and War establishments had
been approved. InJuly 1903 his scheme for the reorganisation of the State troops
according to the principles ofhis April 1902 minute was finally accepted by the
Barton government. Hutton had amalgamated the state rifle clubs into a single
national organization, had published a Military Forces list for the Commonwealth
with a gradation of officers, and in March 1904 the Defence Bill was passed with
amendments.
Hutton's final year in Australia, 1904, was far less satisfactory. The problems he
encountered in that year were essentially the same as those he had faced in his first
two but they took a more extreme form. It was a particularly unstable year in
Australian politics. After a federal election and subsequent by-elections there was an
almost equal split in the house between the Protectionists, Labor and the Free Traders.
Three different governments were formed over the course of the year and Hutton had
to deal with a variety ofdifferent ministers, some hostile. Furthermore, his two great
aids and confidants - Clarke and Tennyson - had returned home to England.
Meanwhile, the financial restrictions on him had grown even worse: by mid-1904
III Speech, Crouch to House of Representatives, 23 July 1903, CPD, Volume 7, 2549.
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Hutton faced losing two more members from his already heavily depleted
Headquarters Staff and more than a third ofhis permanent artillery. I 12
In February 1904 Hutton was humiliated when large numbers of the Hobart militia
absented themselves from their annual inspection. The new minister (Chapman), the
Admiral, and all their wives were present. Word ofthe mass insubordination reached
London and the King himselfwas concerned; he pressed Arnold-Forster, the new
Secretary of State for Defence, to recall Hutton and find him a post at home. I 13 The
Tasmanians were aggrieved that their government had insisted they be retained on
levels of pay lower than that received by the rest of the Commonwealth army. I 14
Hutton was furious. He declared that no matter how poorly they had been treated by
the Commonwealth, as soldiers it was their duty to attend and he announced that all
those absent without excuse would be dismissed. This mass abstention highlighted
the great drawback of a voluntary force. Hutton attempted to surmount this by
appealing to a shared British nationality and the common traditions ofthe British
army: 'We are all alike British troops,' he declared, 'serving one King and one
country... The principle upon which the great traditions of the British Army are based
is that military service is voluntary, and that the soldier's pay has always been a
matter ofrelative insignificance to the discharge of his duty, and to the sacrifice (if
need be) ofhis life.'115
The coming of the Labor party to office in mid-l 904 marked the nadir of Hutton's
Australian command. Labor took the 'lessons' of South Africa further than any other
112 'Military Forces of the Commonwealth ofAnstralia, Second Annnal Report', Published for
Govenunent ofCommonwealth of Australia, 5 July 1904, 5 & 9.
113 Diary, Arnold-Forster, 27 February 1904, BL, Arnold-Forster papers, ADD 50336, f. 183.
114 Letter, Hutton to Roberts, 14 February 1904, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50085.
lIS Mercury, 8 February 1904, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 1900-4.
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party. They strictly adhered to the idea ofa citizen army and stoutly opposed
Hutton's professional pretensions. Hutton fought incessantly with his Labor minister,
Senator Dawson. They knocked heads over all manner of things, including payment
for the trial of a new type ofrevolver, the civil administration of the department, and
over a ciphered message Hutton had billed to the department. I16 Hutton particularly
deplored the Labor government's reinstatement of Major Lenehan to Australia's
permanent force. Dawson did this by a special executive order when Hutton refused
to give his agreement.I'" Lenehan, the former leader of the Bushveldt Carbineers, had
been found guilty of culpable neglect for failing to report the murders for which
Morant and Handcock were executed. When Lenehan returned to Australia, Hutton
had insisted he retire. The conduct of Lenehan's unit had confirmed Hutton in his
belief that colonial units must be trained, disciplined, and properly led. Hutton
thought the episode had brought, 'contempt upon the name ofAustralia, and
Australian soldiers.'!'! In an article he later wrote for the imperial anthology, The
Empire and the Century, Hutton was careful to distinguish the irregular colonial units
(such as the Bushveldt Carbineers) from what he believed to be the true
representatives of the colonies in South Africa: the official contingents composed
largely ofmilitia. I 19 The Labor party, on the other hand, saw this as another example
of shabby War Office treatment of the Australian volunteer soldier. Once again,
Hutton's professional ideas clashed with the Australian idea of a citizen army.
lI6 Minute, 'A Minute of l S" August 1904 by Senator Dawson', NAA, A5954 llS5/21.
117 McMullin, So Monstrous a Travesty, lOS.
lI8 Letter, Hutton to McCay, 23 September 1904, included with Despatch, Governor General to
Colonial Office, 12 October 1904, TNA, PRO, CO 41S/31.
lI9 E. Hutton, 'The Bond ofMilitary Unity' in The Empire and the Century, John Murray, London,
1905,242.
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Hutton's term of office expired a few months later. He proved to be Australia's only
General Officer Commanding. Reid's Free Trade government (Labor lost office in
August 1904) replaced the position with an army board, defence council and an
inspecting officer. In doing so, they followed the advice of a committee headed by
Senator Dawson that had examined the problems of control that resulted from having
a General Officer Commanding who was at once responsible for the efficiency of the
force and who, as the sole responsible adviser to the minister, was also responsible for
reporting on the state of that force. 120 This problem - the anomalous position ofthe
General Officer Commanding - had been a source oftension in each of Hutton's
colonial commands. In abolishing the position, the Australians mirrored the
restructuring of the British army's administration that followed from the Esher
Committee's report. Dr Borden, Hutton's minister in Canada, introduced similar
reforms there.
For all the disappointments of Hutton's command - battles with his governments over
expenditure, staff cuts, the limitation of military service to Australian waters - he did
also have his share of success. Hutton succeeded in establishing, on paper at least, his
field force and, even though the government could not send it overseas, it was his finn
(and probably not unjustified) belief that it would volunteer itselffor such service. In
fact, he endeavoured to make such a sentiment the, 'guiding principle of at least all
the Troops comprising the Field Force.' 121 As he told the West Australian shortly
before leaving the country, 'he was absolutely certain that in the future, when she was
120 Memorandum, 'Command and Administration of the Military and Naval Forces of the
Commonwealth', with Letter, Dawson to Hutton, 16 August 1904, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD50084,
371.
121 Letter, Hutton to Ommanney, 19 August 1903, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078, 304.
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called upon to take her share of the Imperial burdens of defence, Australia would be
found in the proud position of excellence which was her due.' 122
Later events would prove that Hutton had succeeded in that ambition. Senior
Australian army officers, such as William Bridges, Harry Chauvel, and Brudenell
White, remained faithful to their old leader. 123 White wrote to Hutton shortly before
the outbreak ofthe First World War: 'You are never forgotten by the Australian
soldier. The mention of your name always arouses enthusiasm,' he assured Hutton,
who was to him, 'the founder of the military spirit of Australia & its patron saint.
Some day you must give me the material that you have & let me write your life so that
the young soldier in Aust may have a high ideal.' 124 On campaign, in 1916, he wrote:
'The achievements of the Australian troops is your achievement for their military
organization & military spirit were founded by you.' 125 John Antill wrote at about the
same time describing the Light Horse memories of Hutton, 'they [Light Horse] look
upon you, especially we older hands, as the 'father' ofour arms. To you it must be
particularly gratifying to see the fruits of your great foresight and labours - would that
you had been able to come out and lead us.' 126 Bridges tried to have Hutton
appointed in his place as commander of the Australian Imperial Force. 127
On the basis of these achievements, therefore, Birdwood's praise of Hutton's role in
Australia was not entirely misplaced. Hutton understood, like nearly no other British
122 West Australian, 9 August 1904, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 1900-4.
123 C. Coulthard-Clark, A Heritage ofSpirit: A biography ofMajor-General Sir William Throsby
Bridges, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1979,45: G. Verney, 'General Sir Brudenell White:
The StaffOfficer as Commander' in The Commanders: Australian Military Leadership in the
Twentieth Century, ed. D. Homer, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1984,32.
124 Letter, White to Hutton, 4 March 1913, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50089.
125 Letter, White to Hutton, 30 January 1916, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50089.
126 Letter, Antill to Hutton, 2 October 1916, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50089.
127 Address, W. Birdwood, 21 February 1920, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50089, 34.
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figure, the strength of Australian imperial sentiment balanced against its reluctance to
be formally bound to imperial defence. Aware of these limitations, Hutton developed
a model for colonial defence that took account of local concerns for their autonomy
but nevertheless prepared their forces for voluntary service in defence of the Empire.
In attempting to implement this model Hutton met with opposition motivated, not by a
local nationalism, but by a determination to retain control over the shape of the new
Australian army. Hutton's governments, strictly limited in what they could hope to
achieve because oflimited funds, sought to apply what they believed to be the lessons
of the recent campaign in South Africa. They attempted to apply a citizen model to
their new army, a model that conflicted with Hutton's professional ideas.
In his years in Australia Hutton nevertheless managed to implement the basic
elements ofhis system. He summarised his own achievement thus:
My reward was, and always will be, in the happy retrospect of great and lasting
work for Australia and for the Empire. I leave to History and to future
generations the real estimate of the work done, and of the result achieved. I am
at least satisfied that the military system, and the military spirit of the Australian
Army created during 1893-96, and more recently in 1902-04 will continue, and
will year by year develop, proving to the world that a Race of British birth and
origin has sprung into existence at the Antipodes which shall carry to fruition
the great principles for which the British Empire stands with the same consistent
courage and unwavering determination which have animated their fore-bears. 128
128 Hutton, 'Memoirs', Period VIII, 23.
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With some prescience he suggested to the King's secretary at the end of his Australian
tenure that 'The Light Horse Regiments are a splendid success and some day will play
a prominent part in the Defence of the Empire.' 129 Ten years later they did.
•29 Letter, Hutton to Bigge, 5 October 1904, BL, Hutton Papers, ADD 50078.
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8. Conclusion
The last two decades of Lieutenant-General Edward Hutton's (1848-1923) life were
spent, but for a short stint of service in World War One, in quiet retirement on his
estate in West Sussex.' Even in these declining years his thoughts stretched to the
furthest reaches ofthe Empire. Chairing a West Sussex branch meeting of the
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children he compared the problems
ofparenting with those ofmanaging imperial relations:
Certainly, his experience in dealing with Anglo-Saxons overseas was that if you
tried to drive them, the Australian or Canadian would set his back up against the
wall and call you names. If, on the contrary, you endeavoured to meet his ideas
and idiosyncrasies in a broad, general way and allow yourself to lead rather than
to coerce or drive, you would go to greater lengths in carrying forward any work
for the public betterment.2
On his return from his post as commandant of the first federal Australian army,
Hutton's career had collapsed. He had struggled to find a new command and a
dispute with his old friend and comrade from South Africa, John French, following a
training exercise at Aldershot, effectively put an end to his career.' In 1907 he was
retired, with the new rank of lieutenant-general, and was reduced to expending his
expertise on informal gatherings like the one above. This, despite the fact that his
extensive service in the colonies in the last decade of the Victorian era had given him
an unparalleled experience of colonial political and military matters. 'Few British
I In 1915 Hutton conunanded the 21" Division and supervised their training in England. Heart trouble
forced his resignation from this final conunand.
2 West Sussex Gazette, 14 February 1907, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol.
1904-1907,196.
3 Report, Adjutant General to Secretary of State for War, TNA, PRO, WO 138/31 7/2107.
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officers have had greater opportunities than Sir Edward Hutton of estimating the value
of the fighting material of our colonies,' opined one journal.4
It is from those colonies that Hutton's career derives its significance. He had been
driven to them by his own peculiar sense ofmission. It was a mission born in the
British army, in his relationships with Warre and Wolseley, it was given a direction
by Seeley; but, ultimately, it was his own mission. At times it intersected with British
policy, and sometimes with colonial; often it conflicted with colonial policies and
annoyed his British superiors. Though distinct, it nevertheless reflected trends in
imperial thought: Hutton's ideas struck chords with Wolseley and with Chamberlain,
with Reid, Barton, and Forrest, even with Borden in Canada. In his carrying of that
mission to the colonies, in their responses, and in his adjustments, manoeuvres and
political ploys Hutton's colonial career illuminates the relationships between Britain,
the self-governing colonies, and the idea of Greater Britain.
Greater Britain was not a fixed star from whose orbit the British self-governing
colonies slowly, but inexorably, made their escape. Greater Britain, like most forms
ofWestem nationalism, was an idea that flowered in the late nineteenth century and
would slowly wither in the twentieth. Hutton's early life illustrates this: he was not
born the imperialist that he became; he was certainly schooled in militarism,
manliness and professionalism at Eton, a schooling that continued through his early
career in the army, and these ideas influenced his developing imperialism; but he was
initially beholden to a different vision of the Empire, the just and Christian Empire of
his stepfather. Over the course ofhis early career this changed as he became ever
4 'Australian Soldier: Sir Ed. Hutton thinks him a Model for Britain', Daily Chronicle, 14 February
1905, NLA, Hutton Letters and Press Cuttings, MS 1215, Vol. 1904-1907,87.
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more attuned to the threats facing British power and as his religious views drifted
from his stepfather's doctrinal faith.
It was only in the decade before Hutton's first colonial command that his idea of the
Empire was fixed in its final form. In a series oflectures Hutton consolidated his
thinking on the Empire, incorporating all of those ideas from his early life. With the
setting up ofa mounted infantry school at Aldershot Hutton found a practical outlet
for his professionalism. The system Hutton developed fitted into Wolseley's broader
program of working around chronic under-funding to attempt to scrape together a
field army that might be able to do battle with the new continental armies. Hutton's
work organising the mounted infantry was essential training for his later efforts at
organising colonial field forces for overseas service. In this period Hutton also
became acquainted with the work of Seeley whose vision ofGreater Britain, it might
be argued, Hutton had been working towards throughout his life; a vision that he
surely served for the remainder ofhis career.
New South Wales afforded Hutton his first opportunity ofputting that vision into
action.
He brought with him both Wolseley's determination to form a field army to fight in
Europe and Seeley's vision of Greater Britain: the idea that the self-governing
colonies and Great Britain already formed a single imperial nation, that schemes and
plans were unnecessary, and that civic education could more tightly knit the Empire
together. In Hutton's military reforms, in his plans for Australian federal defence, and
in his imperial rhetoric both of those influences were at work. Hutton endeavoured to
secure colonial defence assistance but he also valued the sentiment that bound the
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Empire together. Just as Hutton's agenda had more than one dimension, so too had
the colonial response, which was more complex than many historians allow: there was
resistance to aspects ofHutton's plans, but it was a resistance based on a
determination to retain local and parliamentary control over their defences forces -
not on a colonial nationalism.
Hutton summarised those first colonial experiences in his 'Co-operative System for
the Defence of the Empire', a remarkable scheme that married Wolseley's expediency
to Seeley's more sentimental and consensual approach to the self-governing Empire.
Hutton brought this scheme to Canada where he implemented professional reforms,
promoted a national army, and discussed the imperial connection. He went further in
suggesting a Canadian contribution to imperial defence than he had dared in Australia
and was surprised at the result. The tolerance of the Canadian government did not
last. With the outbreak of the Second South African War, the imperial connection
became a source of tension between the French and English speaking populations and
the militia became one of the most important departments. At the same time, Hutton
became even more vociferous in boosting the Empire and in his resistance to political
interference. The interests of the Canadian government now clashed with Hutton's
agenda and he was eventually forced to resign his command.
Hutton bounced back from his embarrassing exit from Canada to lead a mixed brigade
ofmounted troops from Britain, Canada, the Australian colonies and New Zealand on
campaign in South Africa. This was his dream command. He now had the
opportunity to establish the value of mounted infantry, a unit he had helped design,
and to prove the worth of his cooperative plans for imperial defence. This agenda
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coloured his approach to the war: his structuring of his brigade, his view ofthe
fighting quality of the colonial troops, and his sense ofa providential mission all
reflect that central ambition. In New South Wales and in Canada his imperial
ambitions had conflicted with colonial interests - in South Africa he met opposition
from a new quarter, from Lord Roberts and his gang ofofficers, and yet again his
aims were stymied.
Australia was the last colonial command that Hutton coveted. He was very happy-
and very lucky - to receive that appointment. In his April 1902 Minute upon the
Defence ofAustralia, Hutton announced a policy very similar to the one he had
pursued in New South Wales and Canada. The continuing war in South Africa, now
one of counter-insurgency and concentration camps, formed the backdrop to this
command. The Australians, proud at the praise garnered by their militia and bushmen
contingents, believed that the war had revealed their native fighting quality and
proved the sufficiency of an ad hoc response to imperial crisis. The British, on the
other hand, hoped to harness the success of those contingents by formalising colonial
commitments to imperial defence. These two positions created havoc for Hutton's
plans: he contended both with British schemes and Australian economies, ideas ofa
citizen army, and refusals to commit Australian soldiers to service overseas. These
factors limited Hutton's success in Australia and they point to the main source of
resistance he had met in all his colonial commands: the Australians, like the
Canadians, and the New South Welsh before them, shared Hutton's general imperial
sentiments. They differed only in their vision ofhow the Empire should function:
they resisted British efforts at control, at formalising the Empire, at demanding fixed
quantities of troops, because they valued their autonomy; they resisted Hutton's
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efforts at control, at determining the shape of their forces, at establishing an
independent sphere ofmilitary command, because they viewed these as their own
parliamentary prerogatives.
Seeley's Greater Britain consisted of three communities: one of interest, one of race,
and one ofreligion. Lieutenant-General Edward Hutton's colonial career
demonstrates that those communities were not always aligned with each other.
Hutton took Seeley's vision to the colonies, but he also brought with him Wolseley's
style of command and desire to build a British force capable ofmeeting mass
European armies in the field. He found that, though Australians and Canadians were
receptive to the idea ofGreater Britain, they were not ready to cede control of their
forces to the Empire or to their General Officer Commanding.
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Appendix - Borden's business and the later Canadian contingents
Frederick Borden ended his career a wealthy man, having been involved in a range of
enterprises.' At the time ofthe Second South African war, however, his businesses
were doing very badly and he used his ministerial influence to direct contracts for the
Canadian contingents to prop them up. This occurred at the same time his
relationship with Hutton collapsed.
In 1899 Borden had lumber, farming, property, mining, newspaper distribution, and
shipping interests all centred in Canning, Nova Scotia. As a minister he was not
supposed to be active in business and so he had turned over control of his company to
an associate, Kinsman, and by letters patent the F.W. Borden Co Ltd became the R.W.
Kinsman Co Ltd. Yet he remained intimately involved in the company, the assets and
liabilities were his, and Kinsman was essentially his manager. Kinsman did a terrible
job. By the middle of 1899 the company was faltering, debts were accruing and
Borden sent in an accountant. Borden wrote to Kinsman with irritation:
I am anxious to go on, and in fact can hardly afford to tum back, but things
cannot go on as they have been going for the last year. You must manage in
some way to get some money out of the business. It is no use to buy goods
simply for the purpose of scattering them among the impecunious. We have
been running a benevolent institution about long enough."
Go on they did, and they went from bad to worse. By the end ofthe year Borden was
in overdraft to the Temperance and General Life Company, indebted to the Halifax
Banking Company, and owed heavily on a mortgage for lands purchased from a firm
I C. Miller, 'Sir Frederick William Borden and Military Reform, 1896-1911', Canadian Historical
Review, 50,1969,270.
2 Letter, Borden to Kinsman, 19 June 1899, PANS, Borden Collection, MG2 64 Borden PLB 2, 970.
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ofNova Scotian lawyers, Wickwire and Cogswell. In November 1899 Borden began
planning for a sale ofbonds in his company. Two directors of the Temperance and
General Life Company, one a Liberal Senator, and the other, a Liberal M.P.P, assisted
him. The company had exhausted its credit and these bonds would be vital in paying
off debts. By the end of year Borden was being threatened with legal action from his
various creditors. Despite his influence with the board, the Temperance and General
Life Company demanded payment within thirty days. The Managing Director wrote
Borden on 30 December:
I got word from you that you would decline the draft and most assuredly had it
not been for the influence of Senator Cox and our President, the Hon. G. W.
Ross, 1should have placed the matter in the hands of our Solicitors at once.
With their assurance that I need have no fears of a 30 days' draft being met, I
issued such a draft today and had it placed to our credit in the bank. 3
Kinsman had cabled two days before mentioning that he had been forced to sell their
schooner, the Harold Borden, and ominously warning, 'Having hard time to get
through this month."
Given the parlous state ofhis finances it is not surprising that Borden grasped at the
illicit opportunity suggested by his lawyer (and creditor) on 27 December 1899.
Wickwire telegrammed Borden that day with the question, 'Cannot you arrange
supplies forage beef and vegetables for competition to limited number of firms here
say C.L. Dodge and R.W. Kinsman reply immediately." This wasn't patronage so
much as graft. In fact, by giving the beef contract to himself, Borden short-changed
the local Liberal patronage network and upset the Local Liberal MP in charge oflocal
3 Letter, Sutherland to Borden, 30 December 1899, PANS, Borden Collection, MG2/153 68371F3.
4 Cable, Kinsman to Borden, 28 December 1899, PANS, Borden Collection, MG2/153 67381F3.
'Cable, Wickwire to Borden, 27 December 1899, PANS, Borden Collection, MG2/153 67721F2.
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tenders. Technically it was the shipping companies, rather than the militia
department, who were responsible for feeding the troops until their arrival in South
Africa. However, because Borden awarded the shipping contracts he was able to lean
on the shipping agents themselves and instruct them where to tender for supplies. He
installed Wickwire as his local representative and instructed the agents from the Allan
and Elder Dempster Lines to contact him before tendering for supplies." The second
contingent sailed from Halifax, Nova Scotia, perfectly placed for Borden to finagle
the contingent's meat contract on behalfof the R.W. Kinsman Co Ltd. In early
January Borden cabled Kinsman instructing him to make a cash offer of£1300 for a
large quantity of cattle about to go to auction.' On that initial investment he hoped to
tum a tidy profit. Borden and Wickwire began encrypting their cables in January,
1900 (these are the only Borden cables for the period which are encrypted) and it is
impossible to follow their deals precisely. However, that they went ahead as planned
is indicated in a series ofmessages sent by Kinsman to Borden. On the 15th Kinsman
cabled, 'We will sell to Wickwire probably all the Beefhe will want for the next
Boats - which will let us up somewhat.,8 On the zo", he wrote:
We have got to pay some more or we will be sued and we have had all we can
stand ofthat for one year, I shipped nearly all the Hardwood deal we had left
over to St. John but we have not heard of its arrival in St. John that should give
us $200 in cash when it arrives. I hope you will be able to place the Bonds and
Stock at once and that Wickwire will soon be wanting the Beefso we can get
clear of some or all of these old notes and drafts. 9
And, finally, on 25 January:
6 Letter, Borden to Sinclair, 2 February 1900, PANS, Borden Collection, MG2 93 Letter Book 127, 17.
7 Cable, Borden to Kinsman, 9 January 1900, PANS, Borden Collection, MG2/154 7077/F2.
• Cable, Kinsman to Borden, 15 January 1900, PANS, Borden Collection, MG2/154 7077/F2.
9 Cable, Kinsman to Borden, 20 January 1900, PANS, Borden Collection, MG2/155 7331/F1.
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I hope I will not be compelled to make any more [drafts on Borden] for some
time but cannot tell- as when Wickwire gets the Beef we will be getting some
back. If you can arrange for the 100 Ibs per quarter we can fill his whole order
and get a very good thing out of it. Instead of7.54 as he said the other day it
will be 8.254 so he tells me now. 10
Borden's boodling is significant in understanding the end of Hutton's command in
Canada. His business troubles, shady dealings, and alcoholism formed a backdrop to
his deteriorating relationship with Hutton. The meat contracts are doubly important
because Borden was supplying not just the second contingent but also the third, the
Strathcona Horse. It was a crisis over control of this Strathcona contingent that
triggered Hutton's egress from office.
10 Cable, Kinsman to Borden, 25 January 1900, PANS, Borden Collection, MG2/155 72861F1.
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